Riverhead Park Corp. v. Cardinale

• Decision Date: 26 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 07–CV–4133 (ADS)(ARL).,07–CV–4133 (ADS)(ARL).
• Parties: RIVERHEAD PARK CORP., Stanley Blumenstein and Laurence Oxman, Plaintiffs, v. Philip CARDINALE, individually, George Bartunek, individually, Barbara Blass, individually, Leroy E. Barnes, individually, Dawn C. Thomas, individually, Rose Sanders, individually, and the Town of Riverhead, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

881 F.Supp.2d 376

RIVERHEAD PARK CORP., Stanley Blumenstein and Laurence Oxman, Plaintiffs,

v.Philip CARDINALE, individually, George Bartunek, individually, Barbara Blass, individually, Leroy E. Barnes, individually, Dawn C. Thomas, individually, Rose Sanders, individually, and the Town of Riverhead, Defendants.

No. 07–CV–4133 (ADS)(ARL).

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

July 26, 2012.

Campanelli & Associates, P.C., by: Andrew J. Campanelli, Esq., David Antwork, Esq., of Counsel, Garden City, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Smith, Finkelstein, Lundberg, Isler & Yakaboski, LLP, by: Phil Siegel, Esq., of Counsel, Riverhead, NY, for Defendants.

Jaspan, Schlesinger & Hoffman, LLP, by: Stanley A. Camhi, Esq., Laurel R. Kretzing, Esq., Maureen T. Liccione, Esq., of Counsel, Garden City, NY, for Defendant Thomas.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

The Plaintiffs Riverhead Park Corp. (“RPC”), Stanley Blumenstein, and Laurence Oxman commenced this action against the Town of Riverhead (“Town”) and, individually, against Philip Cardinale, George Bartunek, Barbara Blass, Leroy E. Barnes, Dawn C. Thomas, and Rose Sanders (“the Defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging conspiracy and violations of the Plaintiffs' procedural due process rights, substantive due process rights, and equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Defendant Thomas now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 56, dismissing the Complaint insofar as it asserts allegations against her individually. The Plaintiffs oppose this motion. In addition, the Plaintiffs cross-move to amend the Complaint to add state law and § 1983 malicious prosecution claims and to withdraw and eliminate causes of action for equal protection and conspiracy.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Thomas' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her individually is granted, and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion to amend the Complaint is granted with respect to the withdrawal of claims and denied with respect to the addition of claims.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Initial Dispute

The Plaintiffs are the former owners of a thirteen (13) acre parcel of land (“the Parcel”) located on the south side of County Route 58, in the Town of Riverhead, Suffolk County, New York. The Defendants are the Town of Riverhead and severalof its board members and employees. Defendant Thomas is the Town Attorney.

On January 9, 2004, the Plaintiffs completed the purchase of the Parcel for the sum of $825,000. At the time of the purchase, the Parcel was located in the Town of Riverhead's Industrial A zoning use district, which prohibited retail use but permitted agricultural use. However, the Town of Riverhead had recently adopted a Comprehensive Plan which recommended that most of the town, including the Parcel, be rezoned to Business Center, which permitted retail use and prohibited agricultural use. The rezoning took effect on October 12, 2004, when the Local Law was filed with the New York Secretary of State. The parties dispute whether the Town Board was required by Town Code § 44–6(B)(5) to submit the proposed zoning change to the Farmland Preservation Committee for review prior to enacting it.

On either October 1, 2004 (according to the Defendants) or October 2, 2004 (according to the Plaintiffs), the Plaintiffs began clearing the Parcel of trees and vegetation and filling the wetlands. On October 4th, 2004, the Plaintiffs were served with a Stop Work Order (“SWO”) for the clearing of land without a permit, citing a violation of Town Code § 52–8.2 “Land Clearing Permits.” The SWO was signed by the Defendant Thomas. The Plaintiffs continued to clear and fill the land at least through October 5, 2004. On October 5 and October 7, 2004, the Plaintiffs were served with two additional Stop Work Orders, signed by the Defendant Barnes. The Plaintiffs were also issued a number of summonses by the Town.

B. The State Court Action

On October 22, 2004, the Town commenced an action, Town of Riverhead v. Riverhead Park Corp., Index No. 25539/2004 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.), before the Honorable Justice Joseph Farnetti, (“the State Action”) against the Plaintiffs in the Supreme Court of Suffolk County. Also on October 22, 2004, the Town obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) preventing the Plaintiffs from any further clearing, filling, or agricultural practices on the Parcel. The TRO remained in place until March 31, 2008, when the Town's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied by Justice Farnetti. On October 5, 2010, Justice Farnetti granted the motion by the Plaintiffs (the defendants in the state action) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the Town lacked capacity to sue without a Town Board resolution authorizing the suit, which had not occurred.

The Town moved to vacate, reargue, and renew the decision. The motion was denied by Justice Farnetti on October 13, 2011, on the ground that the Town had failed to present new or overlooked facts or law sufficient to overturn the order. In the interim period, the Plaintiff RPC filed for bankruptcy, and the Parcel was subsequently sold by the mortgagee pursuant to the bankruptcy proceedings on October 18, 2010.

C. The Present Action

On October 3, 2007, the Plaintiffs commenced the present suit, pursuing causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging conspiracy and violations of the Plaintiffs' procedural due process rights, substantive due process rights, and equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated their rights through the issuance of the SWOs and summonses; the enactment of a zoning change without prior submission to the Farmland preservation committee; the Town's allegedly selective enforcement of the Town Code against the Plaintiffs; and an alleged conspiracy to deprive the Plaintiffs of the use of their property. The Plaintiffs allege each cause of action against every Defendant. On October 10, 2011, the Defendant Thomas moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 dismissing the complaint against her individually. The Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and on November 21, 2011, the Plaintiffs cross-moved to amend the complaint to add state law and § 1983 malicious prosecution claims based on the State Action and to withdraw and eliminate the causes of action for equal protection and conspiracy. The Defendants oppose the Plaintiffs' cross-motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. As to the Plaintiffs' Cross Motion to Amend

1. Legal Standard on a Motion to Amend

As an initial matter, because they seek to add claims based on events that occurred after the filing of the complaint, the Plaintiffs' motion is more properly classified as one for leave to serve a supplemental pleading under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d) (“Rule 15(d)”). Rule 15(d) states in relevant part that “the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d). As a general matter, Rule 15(d) “reflects a liberal policy favoring a merit-based resolution of the entire controversy between the parties.” Witkowich v. Gonzales, 541 F.Supp.2d 572, 590 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223–24 (2d Cir.1994) (citations omitted).

Where, as here, the Plaintiffs seek to add related claims against the same defendants, the analysis under Rule 15(a) and Rule 15(d) is the same. See M.V.B. Collision, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 F.Supp.2d 205, 222 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (“The same standard, however, applies to both motions to amend and motions to supplement.”). A court should deny leave to amend or to serve a supplemental pleading only upon “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the [moving party], ... undue prejudice to the [nonmoving party,] ... [or] futility.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., Inc., 404 F.3d 566, 603–04 (2d Cir.2005) (applying the Foman standard to a motion to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a)); Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 66 (2d Cir.1995) (applying the Foman standard to a motion to serve a supplemental pleading pursuant to Rule 15(d)). The party opposing the motion bears the burden of establishing that an amendment would be prejudicial or futile. See Blaskiewicz v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 29 F.Supp.2d 134, 137–38 (E.D.N.Y.1998). Ultimately, it is “within the sound discretion of the court whether to grant leave to amend.” John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Amerford Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir.1994).

A proposed amendment is futile if the proposed claim could not withstand a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Lucente v. IBM Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir.2002). Under the now well-established Twombly standard, a complaint should be dismissed only if it does not contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In considering a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true the factual allegations set forth in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs' favor. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118, 110 S.Ct. 975, 979, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990); In re NYSE Specialists Secs. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir.2007). Only if this Court is satisfied that “the complaint cannot state any set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief” will it grant dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir.1993).

Here, the Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint to: (1) withdraw and eliminate causes...