Rivers v. State
Decision Date | 22 October 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 49A02-0202-CR-116.,49A02-0202-CR-116. |
Citation | 777 N.E.2d 51 |
Parties | William O. RIVERS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Victoria Ursulskis, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
After a bench trial, William O. Rivers was convicted of robbery1 as a Class A felony. He now appeals, raising the following issues for review:
I. Whether he is entitled to discharge because the State failed to bring him to trial within one year as required by Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C) and failed to provide him with a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution where he was tried three years and seven months after the charges against him were brought.
II. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction.
We affirm.
On May 17, 1998, an officer with the Indianapolis Police Department found eighty-four-year-old Roberta Higginson's body in her Indianapolis home. Through the course of an investigation of her death, officers learned that Rivers may have been involved.
On May 26, 1998, Rivers gave police a statement in which he told officers that he and Rene Majors were high on drugs when Majors suggested that they go to Higginson's home to obtain some money. After the pair visited with Higginson for some time, Majors rose and approached Higginson as though she were going to embrace her. Instead, she picked up a light-colored object and began beating the elderly woman with it. Majors then directed Rivers to the area of the house where Higginson kept guns and money. When Rivers returned with a gun and money, he saw Majors beating the woman with a cane. Majors also found a gun in Higginson's home. Rivers told Majors they needed to leave, and they did. The pair sold the guns. Higginson died from her injuries.
On May 27, 1998, Rivers was charged with murder, felony murder, and robbery. He testified against Majors at her murder trial after receiving use immunity for his testimony. After multiple continuances, on December 12, 2001, he was tried at a bench trial on stipulated evidence consisting of his statement to the police and the trial exhibits from Majors' trial. The court convicted Rivers of robbery, but acquitted him on the murder and felony murder charges and sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment. He now appeals.
Rivers first contends that he should have been discharged because the State failed to bring him to trial within one year. Crim. R. 4(C) provides:
Importantly for our purposes, subsection (F) of that same rule also provides in part that "[w]hen a continuance is had on motion of the defendant, or delay in trial is caused by his act, any time limitation contained in this rule shall be extended by the amount of the resulting period of such delay caused thereby."
The State's duty to try the defendant within one year is an affirmative duty, and the defendant is under no obligation to remind the State of its duty. Marshall v. State, 759 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). Whether a particular delay in bringing a defendant to trial violates the speedy trial guarantee is determined by the specific circumstances of the case. Id. The purpose of Crim. R. 4 is to ensure early trials, not to allow defendants to manipulate the means designed for their protection and permit them to escape trials. McKay v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1182, 1190 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).
Generally, a defendant is responsible for any delay caused by his action including seeking or acquiescing in any continuance. Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind.1999); Marshall, 759 N.E.2d at 669; State v. Love, 576 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Ind.Ct.App.1991),trans. denied. Moreover, when a trial court, acting within the one-year period of the rule, schedules trial to begin beyond the one-year limit, the defendant must make a timely objection to the trial date or waive his right to a speedy trial. Vermillion, 719 N.E.2d at 1204; Marshall, 759 N.E.2d at 668.
Here, the trial court acted within the one-year period to set Rivers' trial outside the one-year period on June 28, 1999. Rivers did not object to the setting of the trial. Rivers' failure to object waived his right to a trial within the one-year period of Crim. R. 4(C) and constituted acquiescence to the later trial date.
In State v. McGuire, 754 N.E.2d 639, 642 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, the defendant asked for a continuance so that the parties could engage in plea negotiations. Because the trial court granted the continuance but did not set a date for trial, we concluded that the trial court granted the defendant an indefinite continuance. We held that "once the defendant has requested an indefinite delay he must take some affirmative action to notify the trial court that he is dissatisfied with the delay and desires to go to trial in order to recommence the running of the Crim.R. 4(C) period." Id. See also State v. Isaacs, 757 N.E.2d 166, 168 (Ind.Ct.App.2001),
trans. denied (2002) (when defendant requests indefinite continuance then becomes dissatisfied with progress of his case, he must take affirmative action to restart running of the Crim. R. 4(C) period).
Here, Rivers requested that he be tried after Majors. The trial court granted this request for a continuance, but did not schedule a trial date at that time. Therefore, we conclude that Rivers requested and received an indefinite continuance of his trial. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon him to notify the trial court when he was no longer satisfied with the delay in the proceeding and that he desired to go to trial to re-start the running of the Crim. R. 4(C) time period. Id. Subsequent to the completion of Majors' trial, Rivers first notified the trial court that he wished to proceed to trial on March 20, 2001 when he filed his motion for discharge. Even after that point, he moved for two continuances that amounted to 119 days. Assuming arguendo that the remaining time accrued against the Crim. R. 4(C) time period, Rivers was tried within 148 days of asserting his desire for a speedy trial.
A defendant may not take affirmative steps that are inconsistent with being brought to trial within one year, then complain that his or her speedy trial rights were violated. See State v. Suggs, 755 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)
. In this case, we will not discharge on speedy trial grounds a defendant who acquiesces in a trial outside the one-year period, specifically requests an indefinite continuance so that his co-defendant may be tried, then makes at least fourteen express requests for continuances, and by his actions in pursuing an interlocutory appeal delays the trial even further. A review of the record demonstrates that of the entire three and one-half year period, all but 323 days passed under an express request from Rivers or his co-defendant for a continuance. Furthermore, some of the remaining 323 days are attributable to Rivers. Under these circumstances, we hold that Rivers is not entitled to discharge under Crim. R. 4(C). See also Webb v. State, 437 N.E.2d 1330, 1333 (Ind.1982) ( ).
Rivers claims that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. In reviewing claims of speedy trial right violations, Indiana and federal courts apply the analysis established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 102 (Ind.1998),cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035, 119 S.Ct. 2393, 144 L.Ed.2d 793 (1999). The Barker analysis employs four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the defendant's assertion of his or her right, (3) the government's reason for the delay, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id.; Eguia v. State, 468 N.E.2d 559, 564-65 (Ind.Ct.App.1984).
The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Lockert v. State, 711 N.E.2d 88, 91 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Id. A post-accusation delay exceeding one year has been termed "presumptively prejudicial" to a defendant and triggers the Barker analysis. Vermillion, 719 N.E.2d at 1206 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2691 n. 1, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 528 n. 1 (1992)); Danks v. State, 733 N.E.2d 474, 481 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. See, e.g., Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 805 (Ind.1998)
( ); Lahr v. State, 615 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993) ( ).
In Eguia, 468 N.E.2d at 564-65, we ap...
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