Riverside Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America

• Decision Date: 04 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 18293.,18293.
• Citation: 410 F.2d 267
• Parties: RIVERSIDE COAL COMPANY, Inc., a Kentucky Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

410 F.2d 267 (1969)

RIVERSIDE COAL COMPANY, Inc., a Kentucky Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18293.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

April 4, 1969.

Willard P. Owens, Washington, D. C., for appellant, Edward L. Carey, Willard P. Owens, Washington, D. C., Albert W. Spenard, Madisonville, Ky., on brief.

Frank C. Ingraham, Nashville, Tenn., for appellee.

Before WEICK, Chief Judge, O'SULLIVAN and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.

WEICK, Chief Judge.

In the District Court the plaintiffs, James Jessup, an individual doing business as Jessup Coal Company (Jessup), and Riverside Coal Company, Inc. (Riverside), sued United Mine Workers of America (UMW) for damages to their respective businesses resulting from the alleged violation by UMW of § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947¹, and the common law of Kentucky.

The case was tried to the court without a jury. The District Judge, in an opinion appearing on eighteen pages of the printed record, found violations by UMW of both § 303 and the common law of Kentucky, and that Riverside was damaged as a proximate result thereof in the amount of $20,000, for which amount he entered judgment against UMW. He found no damage for which Jessup was entitled to recover and dismissed the complaint as to him. Only UMW has appealed. We affirm.

The first question presented by UMW is whether the action was barred by the Kentucky statute of limitations, K.R.S. 413.140, which provided that an action for conspiracy shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued.

Conspiracy is not an element of the claim for violation of § 303 which involved a secondary boycott, the purpose of which was to force Riverside to recognize or bargain with UMW. K.R.S. 413.140 would therefore not apply to an action brought under § 303.

While the complaint by an amendment alleged that the acts of UMW also constituted an unlawful conspiracy, it is clear that plaintiffs' cause of action under the common law of Kentucky was for wrongful interference with plaintiffs' business. This is a tort which has long been recognized by the courts of Kentucky. United Construction Workers v. New Burnside Veneer Co., 274 S.W. 2d 787 (Ky.1955).

Although violations of both § 303 and the common law of Kentucky are alleged, these were not separate causes of action but were merely different grounds to support plaintiffs' single cause of action for wrongful interference with its business. United Mine Workers v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1959).

The District Judge was correct in applying Kentucky law and in holding that the one-year conspiracy statute of limitations was inapplicable.

UMW next contends that § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act² applies in determining its responsibility for the acts of its agents and members. It argues that plaintiff did not establish by clear proof that UMW or the officers and field representatives of District 23 of UMW actually participated in or authorized or ratified the unlawful acts of individual officers, members or agents, and that UMW had no knowledge thereof.

Section 6 was repealed in part by the Labor Management Relations Act —

"* * * which expressly provides that for the purposes of that statute, including § 303, the responsibility of a union for the acts of its members and officers is to be measured by reference to the ordinary doctrines of agency, rather than the more stringent standards of § 6." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1144, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

Section 6 therefore applies only to the claim for violation of the common law of Kentucky and not to the § 303 violation where the ordinary doctrines of agency control. In Gibbs, the District Court had found no violation of § 303, but retained pendent jurisdiction and tried the case under the common law of Tennessee. It was therefore necessary in Gibbs to determine the liability of UMW under the strict provisions of § 6.

In the present case, however, the District Court found that "there is clear and substantial proof to establish agency so as to hold the union responsible for the wrongful acts of these officers, both on the claim asserted under Section 303 and the state claim" based on the common law of Kentucky. In our opinion, these findings were supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the standards set forth in § 6 and has stated:

"We are of the opinion that the requirement of `authorization\' restricts the responsibility or liability in labor disputes of employer or employee associations, organizations or their members for unlawful acts of the officers or members of those associations or organizations, although such officers or members are acting within the scope of their general authority as such officers or members, to those associations, organizations or their officers or members who actually participate in the unlawful acts, except upon clear proof that the particular act charged, or acts generally of that type and quality, had been expressly authorized, or necessarily followed from a granted authority, by the association or non-participating member sought to be charged or was subsequently ratified by such association, organization or member after actual knowledge of its occurrence." United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 406-407, 67 S.Ct. 775, 781, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947).

The Court continued by way of amplification:

"There is no implication in what we have said that an association or organization in circumstances covered by § 6 must give explicit authority to its officers or agents to violate in a labor controversy the Sherman Act or any other law or to give antecedent approval to any act that its officers may do. Certainly an association or organization cannot escape responsibility by standing orders disavowing authority on the part of its officers to make any agreements in violation of the Sherman Act and disclaiming union responsibility for such agreements. * * * The grant of authority to an officer of a union to negotiate agreements with employers regarding hours, wages, and working conditions may well be sufficient to make the union liable. An illustrative but nonrestrictive example might be where there was knowing participation by the union in the operation of an illegal agreement after its execution. And the custom or traditional practice of a particular union can also be a source of actual authorization of an officer to act for and bind the union." Id. at 409-410, 67 S.Ct. at 783.

The District Court found that the issues of the case arose out of three labor disputes between Jessup, Riverside and UMW. The first two disputes involved Jessup and UMW. The third dispute involved Riverside and UMW. Jessup was the principal shareholder of Riverside and his family owned the residue of its issued shares. The primary cause of the labor disputes, as found by the Court, did not arise out of the traditional struggle between a union and a non-union mine operation.

Jessup was a small mine operator. He had signed a contract with UMW when he was engaged in business as an individual, even though he stated that he could not afford to make the Welfare and Retirement Fund payments of forty cents per ton. He paid only about twenty-five per cent of the payments due and misrepresented the tonnage produced. After incorporation of Riverside, Jessup refused to sign the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 as amended, not because he was opposed to having a union shop, but because of the economic fact that he could not operate at a profit under the agreement. He did, however, check off the union dues of his employees who belonged to the union.

The District Court found that during the time material to this action, Arthur Chaney, a district representative of District 23 of UMW, was charged, together with other representatives of UMW, with the duty of persuading coal operators to sign the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 as amended. UMW concedes that these men were its agents. It questions only their authority to commit the unlawful acts shown.

The District Court also found that on October 7, 1957, Chaney was going to help Jessup's truck drivers to "* * * fight it out * * *. We make our own rules and go by them."

The District Court continued:

"On October 8, 1957, he threatened `* * * if the men didn\'t come out of the pit, they was going up there and beat them up and throw them out.\' Then on October 16, 1957, he threatened the truck drivers that if they did not cease hauling coal their trucks would be overturned. On the same date he went to the mine and threatened the plaintiff\'s employees. On June 13, 1958, he and some pickets went to the pit and threatened the employees `If they didn\'t get out, he was going to throw every damn one of them out. * * *\' On the same date, he told plaintiff that he was going to put him out of business saying `We are going to do away with every damn one of you little dog holes. * * * They ain\'t sic nothing but a headache. We want you out of business and get out of our way.\' * * On the occasion that Jessup appeared to run him down, Chaney and another representative of the Union angrily told the officer in charge of the state troopers that if he didn\'t do something about it `* * * they would take the law into their own hands.\' On May 16, 1959, he threatened the pit employees, saying `we\'ll get you * * * if we don\'t get you down here, we\'ll get you on the way home. You\'ll never eat supper at home tonight.\'"

This recounting of the evidence clearly indicates that UMW's agents were actually involved in the threats of violence which took place. The issue, therefore, joined is whether UMW can be held responsible for the acts of its agents charged generally with extending the "National Agreement."

In Gibbs, the Supreme Court was faced with a...