Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie

Decision Date31 August 1982
Docket Number13141,Nos. 13122,s. 13122
Citation650 P.2d 657,103 Idaho 515
PartiesRIVERSIDE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James W. RITCHIE and Richard Farnsworth, dba the Treehouse Family Restaurant, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

W. Marcus W. Nye, of Racine, Huntley & Olson, Pocatello, for defendants-appellants.

Lowell N. Hawkes, Pocatello, for plaintiff-respondent.

BAKES, Chief Justice.

I FACTS

The previous opinion of this Court in this matter is hereby withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor. Appellants appeal from a partial summary judgment terminating a lease between them and plaintiff respondent Riverside Development Company. We affirm.

In January, 1975, with Ritchie acting as guarantor, Farnsworth entered into a twenty year lease agreement with Riverside Development for the lease of a shopping center restaurant known as "The Tree House Family Restaurant." Therein, Farnsworth was required to pay a base monthly rent of $2,250 until June 1, 1981, when the base monthly rent was to be reduced to $1,650. Additionally, Farnsworth was to pay a percentage rent equal to 8% of all gross sales in excess of $270,000 during each lease year. Following June 1, 1981, Farnsworth was to pay a percentage rent equal to 6% of the gross sales in excess of $300,000.

According to the lease, if the tenant failed to pay any rent due within ten days after the due date, Riverside had the right to declare the lease terminated, the right to reenter and relet the premises, and the right to obtain damages for any deficiency in reletting the premises. During the first year of the lease, Farnsworth generally paid the rent in a timely fashion, but following January, 1976, rentals were not paid in a timely fashion, and on the average were late 43.5 days. Nevertheless, those late payments were accepted by Riverside. On June 5, 1976, the Teton Dam failed causing severe flood damage to the restaurant, which was closed until August 21, 1976. The base monthly rental for that period was paid by appellants, but not until October 26, 1976.

Following the receipt of the report of gross sales for 1976 (received in March, 1977), a dispute arose between the parties regarding the 1976 percentage rent due as a result of gross sales in 1976. In a notice of default sent to Farnsworth on March 21, 1977, Riverside asserted that since the restaurant had only been open for 78.9% of the year due to the Teton Dam disaster, the percentage rent of 8% was to be calculated on the basis of a reduced threshold figure of 78.9% of $270,000, or $213,041. Conversely, Farnsworth argued that the percentage rent was not subject to proration and that it was only payable if the restaurant had gross sales exceeding $270,000 for all of 1976. The March 21, 1977, notice also demanded that arrears in personal property taxes be paid. Following the default notice of March 21, 1977, a series of correspondence ensued between the parties; however, there was no resolution to the dispute. Farnsworth continued to pay the base monthly rent, albeit in a delinquent manner, until May 13, 1977, when Farnsworth ceased paying to Riverside, but opened his own trust account into which he deposited the base monthly rent of $2,250 for the month of May, 1977.

On May 20, 1977, Riverside wrote to Farnsworth offering to forego further action in the matter provided that there was payment within ten days of the May minimum rent, the first quarter percentage rent for 1977, and the 1976 personal property taxes, and that the unpaid balance of the claimed 1976 percentage rent plus interest be paid in three installments. The offer was also premised upon the condition that failure to perform the lease provisions punctually or completely would "void and nullify the herein contained terms and agreements." Also, the offer further stated that none of Riverside's claims regarding default of the lease would be surrendered unless the conditions of the offer were fully discharged. From the record, it does not appear that any response was received to the offer. On June 22, 1977, Riverside sent a notice of termination, as recognized in appellant's brief. Thereafter, Riverside brought the instant action for termination of the lease and damages on July 15, 1977. Additionally, at unspecified times Farnsworth deposited the base monthly rents for June and July into the trust account which he had established. In September, 1977, following filing of the suit, Farnsworth paid to Riverside the base monthly rent for May, June, July, August and September, which was accepted. Thereafter, during the pendency of the suit, base monthly rent was paid on a fairly regular but still delinquent basis.

In early 1978, plaintiff Riverside and defendants Ritchie and Farnsworth each filed motions for summary judgment. At the time of oral argument, they effectively stipulated that there were no genuine issues of material fact in respect to the disputed percentage rental and the termination of the lease. After considering the parties' arguments, the district court ruled that there was no 1976 percentage rental owing from Farnsworth to Riverside. The court did, however, grant Riverside termination of the lease "because of the longstanding defaults" of the defendants in regard to rent and taxes. In so holding, the district court rejected the asserted defense of waiver, stating "the receipt and retention of funds paid after notice of default and after the action was filed, under the circumstances of this case, does not constitute a waiver ...." The defendants have appealed the termination of the lease. No question is presented by either party concerning the district court's ruling on the 1976 percentage rent.

II WAIVER

The appellants first argue that the district court erred in concluding that Riverside had not waived its right to terminate the lease. The existence of waiver ordinarily is a question of fact, and if there is any substantial evidence in the record to support a waiver it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the evidence establishes such a waiver. C.I.T. Corp. v. Hess, 88 Idaho 1, 9, 395 P.2d 471, 475 (1964); Independent Gas & Oil Co. v. T. B. Smith Co., 51 Idaho 710, 724-25, 10 P.2d 317, 322 (1932). In the present case there was no jury. The district court was to be the trier of fact. Although this matter was decided on summary judgment, the parties, by their mutual motions for summary judgment on the same issues and theories, 1 and by statements made in their oral arguments on the matter, effectively stipulated that there was no genuine issue of material fact which would preclude the court from entering judgment without a trial.

This Court has held in the past that even though there are no genuine issues of material facts between the parties "[a] motion for summary judgment must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions." Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 326, 411 P.2d 768, 770 (1966). Such a rule is proper where the matter is to be tried to a jury, because even though evidentiary facts may be undisputed, those evidentiary facts may yield conflicting inferences as to what the ultimate facts of a case are. If such conflicting inferences are possible, then summary judgment would deprive the parties of the right to have the jury make the decision in the matter. Nevertheless, where the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. See Pierson v. Jones, 102 Idaho 82, 85, 625 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1981); Hollandsworth v. Cottonwood Elevator Co., 95 Idaho 468, 471, 511 P.2d 285, 288 (1973); Angleton v. Angleton, 84 Idaho 184, 198, 370 P.2d 788, 796 (1962).

We were recently faced with a somewhat similar situation in Moss v. Mid-American Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 647 P.2d 754 (1982). In that case the dispute involved the question of whether the insured had made "regular and frequent" trips within the meaning of exclusionary language in an automobile insurance policy. The matter was to be tried to the court, but both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mid-American, ruling that the terms "regular and frequent" were not ambiguous, and that Moss had made "regular and frequent" trips within the meaning of those exclusionary terms. Notwithstanding the cross motions for summary judgment, this Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the terms "regular and frequent" were unambiguous, and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the meaning of "regular and frequent" as a question of fact, and not as a question of law, as it had done.

Moss is distinguishable from the present case for the following reasons. Both cases focus on finding an ultimate question of fact. In the present case, that question is whether a waiver existed. In Moss, it was whether Moss made "regular or frequent" trips. The phrase of "regular and frequent" as used in Moss was not a creature of judicial or legislative origins, but of contract. Because the contractual standard itself was ambiguous, the elements of that standard rested upon the intent of the parties and therefore formed a question of fact and not law. See Clark v. St. Paul Property & Liability Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 756, 639 P.2d 454 (1981). The summary judgment in Moss was thus reversed, because the ultimate question of whether Moss made "regular and frequent" trips was itself not sufficiently defined to permit the question to be answered without evidence showing the meaning which the parties intended to give to the phrase "regular and frequent."

In the present case, since the elements of waiver are not dependent upon the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
143 cases
  • Pizzuto v. Yordy
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • August 14, 2019
    ...Idaho 623, 944 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1997) ; Wells v. Williamson , 118 Idaho 37, 794 P.2d 626, 629 (1990) ; Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie , 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (Idaho 1982) – applies where, as here, the nonmoving party has made clear that it does not consider the record fully develo......
  • Aberdeen-Springfield Canal v. Peiper
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • May 26, 1999
    ...the conflict between those inferences." Murphy, 131 Idaho at 790, 964 P.2d at 657 (citing Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 n. 1, 650 P.2d 657, 661 n. 1 (1982)). ANALYSIS A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting ASCC's Motion For Summary Judgment. 1. The SRBA cou......
  • Pizzuto v. Blades
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • August 14, 2019
    ..., 130 Idaho 623, 944 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1997) ; Wells v. Williamson , 118 Idaho 37, 794 P.2d 626, 629 (1990) ; Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie , 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982) – applies where, as here, the nonmoving party has made clear that it does not consider the record fully develo......
  • Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • January 9, 1991
    ...This is particularly true where, as in this case, the trier of fact was to have been a jury. See Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982); Riggs v. Colis, 107 Idaho 1028, 1030, 695 P.2d 413, 415 (Ct.App.1985). The questions of whether the contract containe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Appendix A State Landlord-tenant Law Charts
    • United States
    • Every Landlord's Legal Guide (Nolo)
    • Invalid date
    ...Three times the amount of actual damages. Yes N/A Schlegel v. Hansen, 570 P.2d 292 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1977); Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 650 P.2d 657 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1982); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 6-301 to 6-324 Illinois One month's rent for every month without utility service (partial months pr......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT