Riverview Cmty. Grp. v. Spencer & Livingston
| Decision Date | 20 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 88575–3.,88575–3. |
| Citation | 337 P.3d 1076,181 Wash.2d 888 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | RIVERVIEW COMMUNITY GROUP, a non-profit Washington Corporation, Petitioner, v. SPENCER & LIVINGSTON, a Washington Partnership, and/or its successors-in-interest; George T. and Sheila Livingston, husband and wife, and the marital community composed thereof; Deer Meadows, Inc., a defunct Washington Corporation, and/or its successors-in-interest; Deer Meadow Development, Inc., a Washington corporation, and/or its successors-in-interest; S.O.S., LLC, a Washington Limited Liability Company, and/or its successors-in-interest; Deer Meadows Golf, Inc., an inactive Washington corporation, and/or its successors-in-interest; also all other persons or parties unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the real estate described in the complaint herein, Respondents. |
David P. Boswell, Boswell Law Firm PS, Spokane, WA, for Petitioner.
David A. Kulisch, Attorney at Law, Michael Robert Grover, Randall Danskin PS, Spokane, WA, David Scott Mann, Gendler & Mann LLP, Brendan Wesley Donckers, Breskin Johnson & Townsend, PLLC, Seattle, WA, Peter Guillum Scott, Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman, Bozeman, MT, for Respondent.
González, J. ¶ 1 We are asked whether property developers' representations about a property anchoring a development may impose an equitable servitude on that property. We find that such representations may impose a servitude if, among other things, they are made by someone with the authority to burden the property. We are also asked whether the Riverview Community Group has the authority to pursue equitable relief based on the developers' representations to its members. We find that it does. We reverse the dismissal of Riverview's lawsuit and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts
¶ 2 In the 1980s, Charles Spencer and George Livingston formed a partnership to develop and sell property in rural Lincoln County near the confluence of Lake Roosevelt and the Spokane River. Over the next 20 years, this partnership and its successors built the Deer Meadows Golf Course Complex (including a golf course, restaurant, hotel, store, and club), platted several nearby parcels of property into subdivisions (the Deer Meadows and Deer Heights subdivisions), and sold lots to private land owners for homes and vacation properties. A plat identifying the golf course was recorded, and an image of the plat was used to help advertise the development. A local newspaper quoted Spencer as saying he built the golf course complex " ‘so it would help sell the residential lots around here,’ " and the lots were advertised accordingly. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 107. Over the next 20 years, ownership of the unsold lots and the golf course changed forms and hands several times. After Spencer passed away and after most of the lots were sold, Livingston closed down the golf course complex and began the process of platting the course into new residential lots.
¶ 3 Many of those who had bought homes in the various subdivisions developed by Spencer and Livingston believed they had been promised that the golf course complex would remain a permanent fixture of their community, and they made the decision to purchase homes based in part on that promise. Some of those homeowners formed the Riverview Community Group, which filed this lawsuit seeking to bar the defendants from selling off the former golf course as individual homes, among other things. Riverview argued that the golf course complex was the heart of the community and provided necessary amenities and that its members had bought their property reasonably believing it would remain a part of their development. Riverview named as defendants the original Spencer & Livingston partnership, George and Sheila Livingston, the partnership's alleged successors, and anyone else claiming an interest in the golf course property. Riverview sought to impose an equitable servitude on the golf course property that would limit its use to a golf course or, if that was untenable, for other equitable relief. It also sought injunctive relief.
¶ 4 The Livingstons responded that Riverview's attempt to bring any claims amounted to fraud on the court. They moved for dismissal under CR 12(b)(7) for failure to join indispensable parties under CR 19. S.O.S. LLC, later joined by Livingston, moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that equitable servitudes were not available in Washington unless created in writing.
¶ 5 In 2012, the trial judge issued a memorandum decision granting the Livingstons' motion under CR 12(b)(7) for failure to join indispensable parties. The decision gave Riverview a "reasonable period of time" to join the Deer Meadows property owners. CP at 212. The following month, the trial court issued an order stating that "the legal issue of whether an equitable servitude can be created by implication is a question of first impression in the State of Washington" and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants to expedite review. Id. at 248.
¶ 6 The Court of Appeals largely reversed the trial court's legal rulings, finding that Riverview had organizational standing and the individual property owners were not essential parties, and concluding that Washington recognized equitable covenants. Riverview Cmty. Grp. v. Spencer & Livingston, 173 Wash.App. 568, 295 P.3d 258 (2013). However, it affirmed summary judgment on the grounds that it would be "irrational to require the defendants to rebuild and operate a failing business." Id. at 591, 295 P.3d 258. We granted Riverview's petition for review. Riverview Cmty. Grp. v. Spencer & Livingston, 178 Wash.2d 1009, 308 P.3d 643 (2013). We affirm most of the Court of Appeals' legal rulings but find its dismissal was based on facts not found in the record. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Analysis
¶ 7 We review summary judgment de novo, taking all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wash.2d 593, 600, 260 P.3d 857 (2011) (citing Mulcahy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 152 Wash.2d 92, 98, 95 P.3d 313 (2004) ). We review CR 12(b)(7) dismissals for failure to join an indispensable party under CR 19 for abuse of discretion "with the caveat that any legal conclusions underlying the decision are reviewed de novo." Gildon v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 158 Wash.2d 483, 493, 145 P.3d 1196 (2006) (citing Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir.2005) ). Such dismissals "should be employed sparingly when there is no other ability to obtain relief." Id. at 494, 145 P.3d 1196 (citing 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1609, at 130 (3d ed.2001) ).
¶ 8 Cases should be brought and defended by the parties whose rights and interests are at stake. See Walker v. Munro, 124 Wash.2d 402, 419, 879 P.2d 920 (1994) (citing Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash.2d 107, 138, 744 P.2d 1032, 750 P.2d 254 (1987)). This principle is reflected in the court rules and in common law limitations on who can bring suit. Id.; see also CR 17(a). S.O.S. LLC and the Livingstons argue that Riverview lacks standing to sue on behalf of its members, that it is not a real party in interest, and that the individual landowners are indispensable parties. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments. We affirm.
¶ 9 "Organizations have standing to assert the interests of their members, so long as members of the organization would otherwise have standing to sue, the purpose of the organization is germane to the issue, and neither the claim nor the relief requires the participation of individual members." Five Corners Family Farmers v. State, 173 Wash.2d 296, 304, 268 P.3d 892 (2011) (citing Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1789 v. Spokane Airports, 146 Wash.2d 207, 213–14, 45 P.3d 186, 50 P.3d 618 (2002) (Firefighters )). Riverview has satisfied this test. Several of its members have filed sworn declarations that establish the basis of a claim, satisfying the first element of the Firefighters test. The homeowners formed Riverview with the purpose of defending their interests, satisfying the second element. Finally, Riverview can pursue this claim for equitable or injunctive relief without the participation of individual members. The relief requested—the imposition of an equitable servitude on the land and/or some sort of injunctive relief—does not require the participation of the individual members.1
¶ 10 For similar reasons, we find the CR 17 and CR 19 arguments unavailing. CR 17(a) provides that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." Given that we find organizational standing, this rule has been satisfied. Nor have the respondents otherwise established that the individual property owners in the subdivisions were indispensable parties under CR 19(a), and we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court was incorrect in concluding otherwise. The Livingstons argue that the individual landowners in the developments are necessary parties because they could individually bring suit, raising the possibility of inconsistent results. Among other things, a party is indispensable when it "is needed for just adjudication." Gildon, 158 Wash.2d at 494, 145 P.3d 1196 (citing Crosby v. Spokane County, 137 Wash.2d 296, 306, 971 P.2d 32 (1999) ). "[I]f an absent party is needed but it is not possible to join the party, then the court must determine whether in ‘equity and good conscience’ the action should proceed among the parties before it or should be dismissed." Id. at 495, 145 P.3d 1196 (quoting Crosby, 137 Wash.2d at 306–07, 971 P.2d 32 ). Given that Riverview is seeking only equitable and injunctive relief, the other homeowners are not needed for a just...
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