RLH v. State
Decision Date | 15 November 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 79A02-0004-JV-262.,79A02-0004-JV-262. |
Parties | In the Matter of R.L.H., A Child Alleged to be Delinquent, Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, Amy E. Karozos, Deputy Public Defender, Attorneys for Appellant.
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Robin Hodapp-Gillman, Deputy Attorney General, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant-Defendant R.H. appeals the juvenile court's true findings that he was a delinquent child for committing two acts that would constitute two convictions for Criminal Mischief if committed by an adult.1 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
R.H. raises two issues on appeal which we restate as follows:
I. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's true findings; and,
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering R.H. to pay restitution in the amount of $378.50.
The facts most favorable to the juvenile court's true findings indicate that in May of 1999, two homes under construction and owned by Lux-Klinker Homes, Inc., were damaged. Both homes were located on Lionheart Lane in Lafayette, Indiana. The home located at 1523 Lionheart Lane had approximately ten holes kicked into the finished drywall. The house located at 1514 Lionheart Lane sustained a broken window and three torn screens. The total damages for the two houses equaled $378.50. Detective Bryan Cummins ("Detective Cummins") from the Tippecanoe County Sheriff's Department received information that led him to believe that two ten-year-old boys, R.H. and C.R. were involved in the incident. After further investigation, the Tippecanoe County Deputy Prosecutor filed a Probable Cause Affidavit against R.H. based on Detective Cummins's police report. The juvenile court authorized the filing of a Petition Alleging Delinquency against R.H. and said petition was filed on August 18, 1999. This original Petition Alleging Delinquency, which charged R.H. with two counts of what would be Criminal Mischief if committed by an adult, stated, in Count I, that the damage to the house located at 1514 Lionheart Lane (broken window and torn screens) occurred "[o]n or about May 13, 1999," resulting in a pecuniary loss greater that $250.00 but less than $2,500.00, and, in Count II, that the damage to the house located at 1523 (drywall) was done "[o]n or about May, 1999...." (R. 14-15.) The Petition Alleging Delinquency was later amended on November 3, 1999. In the amended petition, the only significant change was that the damages language was deleted from Count I and added to Count II.
At the fact-finding hearing, C.R. testified that he was with R.H. at the house located at 1523 Lionheart Lane, on or around May 13, 1999, and that he observed R.H. kick approximately ten holes in the house's finished drywall. C.R. further testified that he was surprised when R.H. began kicking the walls and that he tried to stop R.H., but that R.H. just ignored him. C.R. denied being present when the damage was done to the window and screens of the house located at 1514 Lionheart Lane. C.R. did testify, however, that in May of 1999, R.H. told him that he and another youth, R.D., had thrown rocks at the garage of another home under construction on Lionheart Lane and that either R.H. or R.D. had also thrown a brick through one of the windows of the house. Another youth, P.B. also testified that she had overheard R.H. talking to C.R. at the bus stop about the damages done to the houses on Lionheart.
At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found that the evidence presented against R.H. was credible and ruled that R.H. was a delinquent child for having committed two acts that would constitute Criminal Mischief if committed by an adult. Following a subsequent dispositional hearing held on February 10, 2000, R.H. was ordered to pay restitution of $378.50, representing the total amount of damages done to both houses. This appeal ensued.
Our standard of review regarding sufficiency of the evidence claims is firmly established. When the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated to be a delinquent for committing an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the State must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. IND. CODE § 31-37-14-1; see also Al-Saud v. State, 658 N.E.2d 907, 908 (Ind.1995). On appeal, this Court does not reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, but instead looks to the evidence most favorable to the conviction and to all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Toney v. State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 368 (Ind.1999). In other words, we will affirm the conviction if the evidence admitted at trial contains adequate probative value from which the jury could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 368-69. Circumstantial evidence is no different than other evidence for this purpose, and standing alone may sufficiently support a conviction. Vest v. State, 621 N.E.2d 1094, 1095 (Ind.1993). Additionally, the uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction on appeal. Toney, 715 N.E.2d at 369.
R.H. argues on appeal that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he committed two acts that would constitute Criminal Mischief if done by an adult. Specifically, R.H. claims that with regard to Count I, the State's sole proof that he caused the damage to the house located at 1514 Lionheart Lane was C.R.'s testimony that R.H. told him that either R .H. or R.D. had thrown a brick through the window. Therefore, R.H. concludes that because C.R. couldn't remember which boy was said to have thrown the rock, the State only proved that there was a possibility that R.H. was the person who broke the window and thus the State failed to meet its burden of proof. With regard to Count II, concerning the damage done to the drywall in the house located at 1523 Lionheart Lane, R.H. argues that the State's evidence conclusively showed that the damage done to the house located at 1523 Lionheart Drive was done on May 13, 1999, and that he provided evidence at the fact-finding hearing that he was not at said house with C.R. on May 13, 1999, and therefore could not have committed the charged offense.
As stated earlier, circumstantial evidence, standing alone, may sufficiently support a conviction. Vest, 621 N.E.2d at 1095. However, R.H. is correct when he argues that the evidence supporting a conviction must prove more than a mere possibility that the defendant could have committed the charged offense. See Freeman v. State, 458 N.E.2d 694 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) ( ).
The only evidence supporting the juvenile court's true finding regarding Count I is witness testimony from C.R. and P.B. When questioned about the damage done to the house located at 1514 Lionheart Lane, C.R. testified as follows:
(R. 87, 89.) Immediately following this exchange, on cross-examination, defense counsel questioned C.R. as follows:
(R. 89.) P.B. also testified regarding the damage done to the homes on Lionheart Lane. P.B. testified as follows:
(R. 93-96.) We agree with R.H. that this evidence, standing alone, simply is not enough to support a reasonable inference that R .H. committed the offense alleged in Count I beyond a reasonable doubt. While this circumstantial evidence certainly shows that R.H. had visited the location in question during the relevant time period and further throws a degree of suspicion upon R.H., we must emphasize that a judgment based on suspicion and opportunity alone may not support a conviction.
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