Roa v. City of Bethlehem, Civ. A. No. 89-5013.

• Decision Date: 19 December 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 89-5013.
• Parties: Jose F. ROA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BETHLEHEM, PENNSYLVANIA; County of Northampton, Pennsylvania; Passaic County New Jersey Sheriff's Department; and Various Unknown Officers and Employees of the Bethlehem Pennsylvania Police Department; Northampton County, Pennsylvania Prison; and City of Paterson, New Jersey, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

782 F. Supp. 1008

Jose F. ROA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BETHLEHEM, PENNSYLVANIA; County of Northampton, Pennsylvania; Passaic County New Jersey Sheriff's Department; and Various Unknown Officers and Employees of the Bethlehem Pennsylvania Police Department; Northampton County, Pennsylvania Prison; and City of Paterson, New Jersey, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 89-5013.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

December 19, 1991.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edward D. Reibman, Michele A. Varricchio, Allentown, Pa., for Jose F. Roa.

Jay E. Mintzer, Edelstein, Mintzer, Diamond & Sarowitz, Philadelphia, Pa., Francis M. Chmielewski, Law Offices of Christopher H. Wright, Bala Cynwyd, Pa., for City of Bethlehem, Morris Pagni and Arthur Gerlach.

M. Kelly Tillery, Leonard Tillery & Davison, Philadelphia, Pa., for County of Northampton, Pa.

Mark P. Albright, Reading, Pa., for Passaic County, New Jersey Sheriff's Dept. and Adam Heil.

Clayton H. Thomas, Jr., Clayton H. Thomas, Jr. & Assoc., Philadelphia, Pa., for City of Paterson, N.J.

MEMORANDUM

TROUTMAN, Senior District Judge.

The instant action, previously before the Court in connection with a motion for summary judgment by the Bethlehem defendants, returns for decisions on similar motions by the remaining defendants.

As described in our earlier Memorandum, Roa v. City of Bethlehem, et al., No. 89-5013 Slip op., 1991 WL 52798 (E.D.Pa. March 28, 1991), plaintiff was arrested by a Bethlehem police officer, former defendant Arthur Gerlach, when information received from the Paterson, New Jersey, police department indicated that there was an active warrant for the arrest of Jose Roa, whose last known address was the same as plaintiff's former New Jersey address.

Ultimately, it was determined that the Jose Roa arrested and detained by the Bethlehem police was not the same person sought in New Jersey. Prior thereto, however, plaintiff was arraigned before a Bethlehem district justice, committed to Northampton County Prison, and sent to Passaic County/Paterson, New Jersey, after he waived extradition before a Northampton County Court of Common Pleas judge. Finally, when he was to appear in the New Jersey court, plaintiff's claim that he was the wrong man was investigated at the direction of New Jersey court officials. The investigation disclosed that plaintiff was not the fugitive Jose Roa sought as the perpetrator of a Paterson robbery, and he was immediately released.

Plaintiff claims that his arrest and detention for thirty-four days by the various defendant entities constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights and seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We previously determined that the actions of the Bethlehem defendants, who relied upon information initially transmitted by the Paterson police that there was an active warrant for the arrest of Jose Roa formerly residing at 45 E. Market St., Paterson, did not violate plaintiff's Constitutional rights. We now consider the involvement of each of the remaining defendants in this unfortunate incident.

Passaic County, New Jersey, Sheriff's Department, Adam Heil

Plaintiff concedes, after consideration of information revealed in discovery, that the Passaic County Sheriff's Department and its employee, Adam Heil, did nothing to contribute to his imprisonment. Consequently, plaintiff does not oppose the motion for summary judgment of these defendants, and judgment will be entered in their favor. (See, Plaintiff's Consolidated Response to Motions for Summary Judgment, Doc. # 71, at 36).

County of Northampton, Morris Pagni

The individual defendant, Pagni, is an administrative assistant at Northampton County prison. After plaintiff's commitment to that institution to await extradition to New Jersey, Pagni became aware of plaintiff's claim that he was wrongfully detained, interviewed him in his office and may have taken some additional action to determine the accuracy of plaintiff's claim. (See, Exh. E to Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants, County of Northampton and Morris Pagni, Doc. # 66). It is clear, however, that nothing Pagni did resulted in establishing that plaintiff's claim of innocence was accurate. It appears that Pagni eventually recommended that plaintiff waive extradition in order to return to New Jersey to prove that his arrest and detention were mistaken.

Plaintiff argues that Pagni's failure to take more decisive action to aid the plaintiff, including his failure to obtain and compare identifying information relating to the plaintiff and the Jose Roa actually sought in New Jersey, and to otherwise investigate more thoroughly the plaintiff's allegations resulted in a violation of plaintiff's Constitutional rights.

Plaintiff's claims against Pagni and Northampton County appear to be based primarily upon Pagni's advice that plaintiff waive an extradition hearing which would have forced the New Jersey authorities to prove that plaintiff was actually the man for whom a warrant had been issued by the New Jersey courts. Plaintiff also contends that Pagni's failure to thoroughly investigate plaintiff's claim of innocence in light of testimony that he sometimes undertakes more thorough investigations of such claims reflects the lack of a consistent policy for dealing with inmates' claims of mistaken identity. Plaintiff argues that Pagni's cursory review of the plaintiff's claim of mistaken imprisonment and his advice to waive extradition and return to New Jersey demonstrated deliberate indifference to plaintiff's due process rights in that he was induced to forego the right to a hearing in the belief that Pagni was attempting to help him.

The record, however, belies plaintiff's contentions. In the first instance, plaintiff received the same advice, i.e., to waive an extradition hearing in order to confront his accusers in New Jersey, via his mother, who had contacted an attorney on plaintiff's behalf. (Exh. D to Doc. # 66 at 56). Second, plaintiff consulted with a public defender prior to signing a waiver of extradition form in the presence of Judge Kimberly McFadden of the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas. The public defender stated that he consulted with the plaintiff to be certain that plaintiff understood the effect of an agreement to waive extradition, as well as the likely period of time involved if an extradition hearing had been requested, during which plaintiff would have remained imprisoned. (Affidavit of Bruce Briody, Exh. A to Reply of Defendants County of Northampton and Morris Pagni to Plaintiff's Opposition to Summary Judgment, Doc. # 72). Finally, plaintiff's statement at the waiver of extradition proceeding demonstrates that his decision to waive extradition reflects his belief that it was the most expedient way to prove that his detention was erroneous. (Id., Exh. C). This belief could have arisen from the advice of two lawyers, as well as from Pagni's advice. Indeed, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Pagni's advice was particularly persuasive or convinced plaintiff to waive extradition when his inclination was to seek a hearing. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that the advice was not in plaintiff's best interest, no matter what its origin.

Consequently, although the Court may be troubled by the apparent willingness of a non-lawyer county employee to dispense legal advice, we cannot conclude, on this record, that such advice affected plaintiff's due process rights, much less resulted in a deprivation of such rights.

Although plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the prison, rather than a convicted prisoner, and, thus, not covered by the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, it appears that an analysis recently employed in that context is equally applicable to the plaintiff's alleged due process violation in this case. In Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1110 (3d Cir.1989), the court outlined the criteria necessary to impose § 1983 liability on prison officials where an inmate is wrongfully incarcerated:

To establish § 1983 liability in this context, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and, thus of the risk that unwarranted detention was being, or would be inflicted. Second, the plaintiff must show that the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under circumstances indicating that his or her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between the official's response to the problem and the infliction of the unjustified detention.

In this case, it appears that Pagni had knowledge of the plaintiff's claim that he was being unjustifiably detained. Because plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, however, the prison official's scope of responsibility for the imprisonment was considerably narrower than for a convict retained after he had served his sentence, as in Sample. Even if Pagni had positive proof that the plaintiff's claim was accurate, he had no authority to release him from custody. At most, he could have contacted court officials to alert them to the error.

In addition, plaintiff's situation was complicated by the fact that he was being detained pursuant to a New Jersey warrant. Thus, Pagni had even less access to information tending to exonerate the plaintiff than he might have if plaintiff had been arrested for a crime within Northampton County. Moreover, it is only in hindsight that it is clear that plaintiff was a victim of mistaken identity. The record indicates that at the time plaintiff was in Northampton County prison, he knew only that he was innocent of any crime in New Jersey. Even he was unaware that another man bearing the same name was the person for whom the warrant had actually been issued. Thus, we cannot conclude that under the circumstances as they appeared at the time, Pagni was deliberately...