Roach v. Port Authority of Allegheny County

Citation550 A.2d 1346,380 Pa.Super. 28
PartiesJosephine J. ROACH and Thomas Roach, her husband, Appellants, v. PORT AUTHORITY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY and State Farm Insurance Companies.
Decision Date29 November 1988
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania

John M. Silvestri, Pittsburgh, for appellants.

Frank M. Gianola, Pittsburgh, for appellees.

Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MELINSON, JJ.

MELINSON, Judge:

This is an appeal from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County granting, without Leave to Appellant to Amend, the Appellee's (State Farm Insurance Companies') preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer.

Appellants, Josephine J. Roach and Thomas Roach, her husband, filed a two-count Complaint which named the Port Authority of Allegheny County (hereinafter "PAT") and State Farm Insurance Companies (hereinafter "State Farm") as Defendants.

To determine whether a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer was properly granted, this Court must accept as true all properly pleaded material facts, and reasonable inferences therefrom, set forth by the opposing party. Stein v. Richardson, 302 Pa.Super. 124, 448 A.2d 558 (1982); Sun Oil Co. Of Pennsylvania v. Bellone, 292 Pa.Super. 341, 437 A.2d 415 (1981), citing Trost v. Clover, 234 Pa.Super. 255, 338 A.2d 630 (1975). We must confine our analysis to the complaint and decide whether there have been pleaded sufficient facts to permit recovery if said facts are ultimately proven. Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital Association, Inc., 340 Pa.Super. 253, 489 A.2d 1364 (1985).

In addition, leave to amend a complaint lies within the discretion of the trial court unless the amended pleading has been filed within ten days of the filing of the preliminary objections. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c), 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Division 85 of Amalgamated Transit Union v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 71 Pa.Cmwlth. 600, 455 A.2d 1265 (1983). Also, the right to amend the pleadings should not be withheld where some reasonable possibility exists that the amendment can be accomplished successfully. Post v. Mendel, 510 Pa. 213, 507 A.2d 351 (1986); Otto v. American Mutual Insurance Co., 482 Pa. 202, 205, 393 A.2d 450, 451 (1978); Division 85 of Amalgamated Transit Union, 455 A.2d at 1267. However, "the decision to grant or deny leave to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion." Feingold v. Hill, 360 Pa.Super. 539, 550, 521 A.2d 33, 39 (1987), citing Junk v. East End Fire Department, 262 Pa.Super. 473, 490, 396 A.2d 1269, 1277 (1978). Leave to amend will be withheld where the initial pleadings reveal that the prima facie elements of the claim cannot be established and that the complaint's defects are so substantial that amendment is not likely to cure them. Feingold, 360 Pa.Super. at 550, 521 A.2d at 39, citing Spain v. Vicente, 315 Pa.Super. 135, 142-43, 461 A.2d 833, 837 (1983).

The pleadings reveal the following facts: On March 18, 1987, Josephine Roach (hereinafter "Mrs. Roach"), was a passenger on a bus owned and operated by PAT. While she was riding on the bus, Mrs. Roach was injured as a result of a fight which took place between two other PAT bus passengers. The Roaches alleged in the first count that PAT was negligent in allowing the two people who were fighting to enter the bus, and in not preventing the fight which caused Mrs. Roach's injuries. In this appeal, we are not asked to determine the rights of the Roaches against PAT with respect to the liability of PAT for their alleged negligence; therefore, we shall not address this issue.

In the second count, the Roaches alleged that State Farm was unreasonable in denying an insurance claim for reimbursement of medical bills incurred by the Roaches due to the injuries sustained by Mrs. Roach. Mrs. Roach was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by State Farm. As a result of her injuries, Mrs. Roach filed a claim with State Farm under her policy. State Farm denied her claim contending that the injuries sustained by her did not arise out of "the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" as is required for payment of first party benefits under both the insurance policy1 issued to Mr. Roach and the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.2

After denial of Mrs. Roach's claim, the Roaches filed suit in the court below naming both PAT and State Farm as defendants. Subsequently, State Farm filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and misjoinder of a cause of action. State Farm admitted all the properly pleaded facts in filing its preliminary objection. However, State Farm denied that the injuries sustained by Mrs. Roach were a result of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. Further, State Farm contends that it rightfully denied Mrs. Roach's claim; therefore, the Roaches failed to state a cause of action against State Farm upon which relief may be granted.

The learned trial judge, the Honorable Bernard L. McGinley, granted State Farm's preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer without leave to Mrs. Roach to amend. It is from that Order that Appellants filed this timely appeal.

This case presents us with the issue of whether a public transportation passenger who is injured as the result of a fight between two other passengers, sustained injuries arising out of the maintenance and use of a motor vehicle. This court recently examined the definition of "maintenance and use of a motor vehicle," as used in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, in the case of Alvarino v. Allstate Insurance Company, 370 Pa.Super. 563, 537 A.2d 18 (1988). There, the court held that injuries caused as a result of a dog's biting a passenger in a van did not arise from the use of the van and, therefore, did not have to be within the coverage of the motor vehicle policy covering the van pursuant to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. The court further stated that "the mere fact that a motor vehicle is the place where injuries are sustained is insufficient to establish a causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the injuries so as to require payment of first party benefits." Alvarino, 537 A.2d at 21. In the instant case, Roach was injured as a result of a fight between two other bus passengers. The bus was merely the place in which the injuries occurred; therefore, the trial court properly sustained State Farm's preliminary objection.

In order to interpret a statute of this Commonwealth we must observe the rules set forth in Chapter 19 of Title 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann.3 and construe the words of the statute according to their plain meaning, Commonwealth v. Sojourner, 513 Pa. 36, 518 A.2d 1145 (1986); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 446 A.2d 583 (1982). Furthermore, the object of all interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent. 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1921. When the words are not explicit such intent may be determined by considering, among other matters, "the former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects." Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. tit. 1, § 1921(c)(5).

The General Assembly of this Commonwealth enacted the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law on February 12, 1984, repealing the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act4 (hereinafter "No-Fault Act"). Under the No-Fault Act, the victim of an injury-producing accident which occurred in this Commonwealth was entitled to receive basic loss benefits.5 "It is clear that the No-Fault Act was never intended to be a general liability insurance which would cover all injuries, no matter how remotely connected with the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle, but [was] intended to cover most motor vehicle accidents." Glad v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 336 Pa.Super. 196, 200, 485 A.2d 499, 501 (1984), quoting Camacho v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 314 Pa.Super. 21, at 23, 460 A.2d 353, at 354 (1983).

The No-Fault Act defined a "victim" as "an individual who suffers injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle ..." Under the Act "maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" meant "maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle, including, incident to its maintenance or use as a vehicle, occupying, entering into, or alighting from it." Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. tit. 40, § 1009.103. Repealed. 1984, Feb. 12, P.L. 26, No. 11, Section 8(a), effective Oct. 1, 1984. See also, Schweitzer v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., 306 Pa.Super. 300, 452 A.2d 735 (1982).

Furthermore, we have consistently distinguished between those injuries that the legislature intended to be compensated exclusively by No-Fault, and those that were to be left to other remedies, by requiring a causal connection between the injury and the "maintenance and use of a motor vehicle." Cerrato v. Holy Redeemer Hospital, 342 Pa.Super. 551, 555, 493 A.2d 728, 730 (1985); Crawford v. Allstate Insurance Co., 305 Pa.Super. 167, 451 A.2d 474 (1982); compare, Glad, 336 Pa.Super. 196, 485 A.2d 499 (1984) (intentional act which has no connection with a motor vehicle accident other than that the injured party was operating a motor vehicle prior to his death held insufficient) with Spisak v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance 329 Pa.Super. 483, 478 A.2d 891 (1984) (motorist in parked car who died of carbon monoxide poisoning allowed to recover under No-Fault).

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Eisenhuth, 305 Pa.Super. 571, 451 A.2d 1024 (1982), this court held that No-Fault Insurance did not cover a passenger of a vehicle who was shot by a police officer in pursuit of that vehicle. There the court reasoned that "the cause of [the] injuries was a gunshot, not his being a passenger in [the] automobile." Id. 305 Pa.Super. at 574, 451 A.2d at 1025. This is quite similar...

To continue reading

Request your trial
28 cases
  • Home State Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 6 Julio 1998
    ...connection between injuries sustained from molestation of students by school bus driver and bus itself); Roach v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 380 Pa.Super. 28, 550 A.2d 1346 (1988) (passenger injured in fight between two other passengers on bus denied coverage under Pennsylvania Motor V......
  • Lebanon Coach Co. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 10 Abril 1996
    ...to establish the causal connection between her injury and the use of her insured vehicle. See also Roach v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 380 Pa.Super. 28, 550 A.2d 1346 (1988) (no causal connection between injury and use of vehicle where bus passenger was injured as result of fight b......
  • Eberhardinger v. City of York
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • 17 Septiembre 2018
    ...from her automobile insurance carrier because her injuries were not caused by the use of a vehicle. Roach v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 380 Pa.Super. 28, 550 A.2d 1346, 1348, 1350 (1988). Most pertinent to the instant case, a passenger who was accidentally shot by a police officer firing......
  • Petrosky v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • 30 Octubre 2015
    ...483, 478 A.2d 891, 893 (1984) ). "Causation...requires more than ‘mere happenstance.’ " Id. (quoting Roach v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty. , 380 Pa.Super. 28, 550 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1988) (rejecting claim that bus passenger injured in fight between two other passengers arose out of use of mo......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT