Roach v. Transwaste, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 February 2022
• Docket Number: AC 43861
• Parties: William L. ROACH v. TRANSWASTE, INC.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

210 Conn.App. 686

270 A.3d 786

William L. ROACH

v.TRANSWASTE, INC.

AC 43861

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 18, 2021

Officially released February 15, 2022

Zachary T. Gain, with whom, on the brief, was James V. Sabatini, Newington, for the appellant-cross appellee (plaintiff).

Glenn L. Formica, New Haven, for the appellee-cross appellant (defendant).

Bright, C. J., and Suarez and Vertefeuille, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

This appeal arises from an employment retaliation action brought by the plaintiff, William L. Roach, against the defendant, Transwaste, Inc. In his two count complaint, the plaintiff alleged that his employment was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy and that this termination violated General Statutes § 31-51q.¹ After a jury trial, the court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for attorney's fees seeking an amount calculated pursuant to the lodestar method.² The court, however, awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees on a one-third contingency basis. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the court erred by failing to apply the lodestar method in calculating the amount of the award of attorney's fees. The defendant filed a cross appeal, claiming that the court erred by (1) awarding any attorney's fees to the plaintiff, (2) failing to set aside the jury's award of damages because it was not supported by sufficient evidence, (3) rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff because there was no evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the plaintiff's employment had been terminated for filing safety complaints, and (4) providing an incorrect charge to the jury. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the court with respect to the calculation of attorney's fees. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The following facts and procedural history, as set forth in the court's memorandum of decision deciding various postjudgment motions filed by the parties, are relevant to our resolution of the claims of both parties on the appeal and the cross appeal. "The plaintiff possesses a commercial driver's license and was employed as a truck driver by the defendant from 2013 through 2015. The defendant is a trucking company located in Wallingford ... that specializes in the transportation and disposal of special and hazardous waste. The owner and president of the defendant is John Barry. The plaintiff testified that he was terminated by Barry after raising safety complaints to the defendant.

"In July, 2015, the plaintiff complained of a problem with the steering link [in his tractor] while driving in Pennsylvania. Barry denied the plaintiff's request to buy a replacement and ordered the plaintiff to drive back to Wallingford. [The plaintiff testified that] [t]his was unsafe because the failed steering link, one of two, controlled the steering of one of the two front tires [of his tractor]. The next day [the plaintiff] was told not to show [up] for work .... [H]e [later] found out that his tractor had been driven, unrepaired, by another driver. The plaintiff was not paid for the day he missed. In August, 2015, while in Pennsylvania, a trailer [the plaintiff] was driving suffered a blown tire. Barry denied the plaintiff's requests to buy a replacement tire despite [his] expression of concern that it was unsafe to drive the loaded trailer without the normal two tire combination at the end of the axle. The plaintiff was nevertheless ordered to complete his trip with only one tire rather than the two tires with which he had been driving. Another incident occurred in August, 2015, in which the plaintiff complained over the course of [several] weeks of a problem with vibration in his tractor .... [The plaintiff] was told by Barry that [his tractor] had been inspected, there was nothing wrong with it and [that] he should continue to drive it. Ultimately, the plaintiff refused to drive the tractor and after continued complaints was told to take it to [a] dealer, who diagnosed [the issue] as [a] failure of the universal joint.

"On November 10, 2015, one tire of a two tire assembly on the plaintiff's tractor blew. [The plaintiff] [pleaded] with the office manager to buy a new tire ... [but was told] that Barry did not like to buy tires on the road. Ultimately, [the office manager] told the plaintiff to buy a used tire, and he did so. Finally, on November 16, 2015, the plaintiff noticed [the] check engine light [in his tractor] that appeared approximately twenty miles after he left the defendant's location in the early morning hours [at the] start [of] a trip. [The plaintiff] returned to the defendant's garage and left the tractor there with the engine running so that the mechanic would be able to diagnose the problem. The plaintiff locked the truck before he left the defendant's yard and returned home. He was fired [later] that day without being given a reason. Barry testified at trial that he terminated the plaintiff because it was unsafe to permit the engine [of his tractor] to idle for ... several hours.

"The plaintiff testified that he was out of work for about six months. [While employed by the defendant] [h]e was paid by the mile at a rate of [forty-six cents] per mile and he averaged a little [more] than 2000 miles per week. He also testified that during the two years he worked for the defendant he drove [a total of] approximately 230,000 miles. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The court denied the motion. The jury [then] returned a verdict [in favor of the plaintiff] for $24,288."

After the jury returned its verdict, the defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion for remittitur, and a motion to set aside the verdict. The court denied each of the defendant's motions. The plaintiff filed a motion for attorney's fees, seeking reasonable fees calculated pursuant to the lodestar method. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The court granted the plaintiff's motion but rejected the use of the lodestar method, and instead awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $8087.90, or one third of the award of damages in his favor. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

ITHE PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL

The plaintiff claims that, because he was a prevailing party under § 31-51q, he should have been awarded reasonable attorney's fees calculated pursuant to the lodestar method, as required by his fee agreement with his counsel. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that his fee agreement with his counsel unambiguously provided that he was entitled to recover as attorney's fees "33 1/3% of the total recovered" or attorney's fees based on the hourly time records of counsel billed at counsel's hourly rate, "whichever is the greater of the two ." (Emphasis added.) He argues that the court's failure to award attorney's fees pursuant to the fee agreement was an abuse of discretion. In response, the defendant argues that the plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees at all, and that, in the alternative, the court properly awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff in accordance with terms of the fee agreement. We agree with the plaintiff.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. "It is well established that we review the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees for abuse of discretion. ... This standard applies to the amount of fees awarded ... and also to the trial court's determination of the factual predicate justifying the award. ... Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. ... [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Noel v. Ribbits, LLC , 132 Conn. App. 531, 534–35, 35 A.3d 1078 (2011).

In the present case, in addressing the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees, the court concluded that the plaintiff's fee agreement was ambiguous because it states both that the "employment is on a contingency fee basis" and that "[t]ime shall nevertheless be kept on an hourly basis [and] in the event that a recovery is made and attorney[’s] fees are awarded by statute or a court ... then the law firm shall receive the amount as its legal fee, whichever is the greater of the two ." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In resolving this alleged ambiguity, the court, with no further explanation, opted to award the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $8087.90, or one third of the damages that he received. In resolving this claim, we conclude that the relevant facts of Noel are nearly identical to those in the present case. Accordingly, our decision in that case controls our resolution of the plaintiff's claim in the present case.

In Noel , an employment discrimination case, the plaintiffs’ fee agreements with their attorneys stated: "In the event of a successful resolution of the case, I agree that my attorneys shall be compensated at the rate of one-third of the entire settlement or judgment I receive in connection with my claims or an award of reasonable attorney ’s fees , whichever is greater ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Noel v. Ribbits, LLC , supra, 132 Conn. App. at 534, 35 A.3d 1078. After a jury trial, the court rendered judgment in part in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding one plaintiff $1600 in economic damages and the other plaintiff no damages. Id., at 533, 35 A.3d 1078. The plaintiffs then filed a motion seeking an award of reasonable attorney's fees. Id. The court denied the motion as to the plaintiff who did not recover any monetary damages and awarded the plaintiff that did receive $1600 in...