Roach v. Union Pac. R.R.
| Decision Date | 05 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–13–2015.,1–13–2015. |
| Citation | 19 N.E.3d 61 |
| Parties | Priscilla ROACH, Special Administrator of the Estate of Clarence Roach, Deceased, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Taft Stettinius & Hollister (J. Timothy Eaton and Jonathan B. Amarilio, of counsel), and Union Pacific Railroad Company (Thomas Andreoli and Elizabeth A. Graham, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellant.
Law Offices of Tracy A. Robb (Tracy A. Robb, of counsel), Curcio Law Offices (Joseph R. Curcio, of counsel), and Gorey Law Group (John R. Gorey, of counsel), all of Chicago, for appellee.
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 This suit was brought by plaintiff Priscilla Roach, the wife of decedent Clarence Roach, as the special administrator of his estate, against his former employer, defendant Union Pacific Railroad. The suit alleges that Clarence's death was the result of injuries that he sustained while working at a Union Pacific rail yard, and it brings survival and wrongful death claims.
¶ 2 On February 7, 2013, a jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, awarding her a total of $1,589,000 in damages. Defendant filed a posttrial motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for an order reducing the jury's award of $180,000 for lost earnings to $63,561.67. Plaintiff also filed a posttrial motion for costs. On March 23, 2013, the trial court denied defendant's motion and granted plaintiff's motion in part, awarding her $2,906.01 in costs which defendant does not challenge on appeal.
¶ 3 On this appeal, defendant states in its brief:
¶ 4 On appeal, defendant claims: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by barring defendant from asking plaintiff about the fact that she and her husband lived in separate residences; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the family physician to offer an opinion about the decedent's cause of death; and (3) that the trial court erred by not remitting a portion of the jury's award for “lost earnings” because the award exceeded the amount stipulated to by the parties as the earnings that the decedent lost between his accident and his return to work.
¶ 6 The following facts are not in dispute on this appeal.
¶ 7 The decedent, Clarence Roach, was a Union Pacific carman who worked at Union Pacific's California Avenue Coach Yard, located on the west side of Chicago, Illinois, earning approximately $60,000 per year. The California Avenue Coach Yard serves as an area for Union Pacific to inspect, repair and maintain commuter railcars. On February 1, 2008, while working at the California Avenue Coach Yard, the decedent was struck by a train performing a “shoving” movement, which involves switching rail cars onto certain commuter trains based on their maintenance schedules. As a result, the decedent sustained several injuries, including a degloving
injury to his right leg. He was treated by several physicians, including Dr. John Sullivan, a trauma surgeon; Dr. Simon Lee, an orthopedic surgeon; Dr. John Polley, a plastic surgeon; and Dr. Manzoor Shah, an internist and the decedent's family physician, whose opinion was the subject of a motion in limine at issue on this appeal. A little over a year later, on March 9, 2009, the decedent returned to work.
¶ 8 On May 16, 2008, after the accident but before returning to work, the decedent filed a single-count complaint against Union Pacific alleging a negligence claim for damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (2006)
). In March 2010, while this case was still pending, the decedent suffered a stroke and subsequently died on May 15, 2010, at the age of 57. After his death, plaintiff amended the complaint to allege that her husband's death was the result of the 2008 accident and to assert survival and wrongful death claims.
¶ 9 Prior to trial, the parties brought two motions in limine which are at issue on this appeal. First, plaintiff moved to bar questions concerning the fact that plaintiff and the decedent lived in separate residences. Although Union Pacific acknowledged that plaintiff and the decedent had frequent contact after the accident, it opposed the motion on the ground that this fact was relevant to the basis of plaintiff's knowledge about the decedent's pain, suffering and loss of function. The trial court granted the motion, stating in a written order that defendant was barred from making “any reference to the marital status and living arrangements of the Plaintiff and decedent.” In addition, defendant moved to bar the testimony of family physician, Dr. Shah, particularly regarding the decedent's cause of death, which was denied.
¶ 10 Since neither the nature of the decedent's underlying injuries nor the amount of damages, except for the stipulation of lost earnings, is at issue on this appeal, we only summarize the evidence at trial. At trial, plaintiff testified regarding the decedent's pain and suffering and called a number of occurrence and medical witnesses, including Dr. Shah, whose evidence deposition was read into the record; Dr. Sullivan, the decedent's trauma surgeon; Dr. Simon Lee, the decedent's orthopedic surgeon; and Dr. Polley, the decedent's plastic surgeon, whose video deposition was played to the jury.
¶ 11 Defendant Union Pacific also called several witnesses, including Dr. Joseph Hartman, a board-certified internist and cardiologist who was retained as an expert witness and who opined that the decedent's workplace accident in 2008 was unrelated to his death in 2010.
¶ 12 In addition, the parties entered the following stipulation:
¶ 13 On February 7, 2013, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and completed the following jury verdict form as follows:
¶ 14 As already stated, defendant's posttrial motion for a new trial and, in the alternative, for remittitur was denied, and plaintiff's posttrial motion for costs was granted in part, resulting in an award for costs of $2,906.01 which is not at issue on this appeal. After the trial court's ruling on the posttrial motions on May 23, 2013, defendant filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 2013, and this appeal followed.
¶ 16 On appeal, defendant claims: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by barring defendant from asking plaintiff about the fact that she and her husband lived in separate residences; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the family physician to offer an opinion about the decedent's cause of death; and (3) that the trial court erred by not remitting a portion of the jury's award for “lost earnings” because the award exceeded the amount stipulated to by the parties as the earnings that the decedent lost between the accident and his return to work. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 18 Defendant claims that the trial court's order barring it from asking about plaintiff's and the decedent's separate residences “essentially” barred it from cross-examining plaintiff about her knowledge of the decedent's pain and suffering.
¶ 19 As both parties acknowledge, our standard of review on this issue is highly deferential to the trial court. Questions concerning the admission of evidence at trial are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse the trial court absent an abuse of that discretion. Matthews v. Avalon Petroleum Co., 375 Ill.App.3d 1, 9, 313 Ill.Dec. 132, 871 N.E.2d 859 (2007)
(citing Brax v. Kennedy, 363 Ill.App.3d 343, 355, 298 Ill.Dec. 994, 841 N.E.2d 137 (2005) ). This same deferential standard also applies to a trial court's decision on a motion in limine.
Maggi v. RAS Development, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 091955, ¶ 61, 350 Ill.Dec. 939, 949 N.E.2d 731.
¶ 20 An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would adopt the trial court's view. People v. Cerda, 2014 IL App (1st) 120484, ¶ 183, 379 Ill.Dec. 775, 7 N.E.3d 201
; Matthews, 375 Ill.App.3d at 9, 313 Ill.Dec. 132, 871 N.E.2d 859 (citing Brax, 363 Ill.App.3d at 355, 298 Ill.Dec. 994, 841 N.E.2d 137 ). In determining whether there has been an abuse of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Doe v. Parrillo
...or unreasonable or a decision no reasonable person would make. Roach v. Union Pacific R.R. , 2014 IL App (1st) 132015, ¶ 20, 385 Ill.Dec. 503, 19 N.E.3d 61. ¶ 40 Section 2-1007 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that the court has the discretion to grant additional time for "the doing of......
-
Russo v. Corey Steel Co.
...jury, courts employ ‘a totality of the circumstances’ approach." Roach v. Union Pacific R.R. , 2014 IL App (1st) 132015, ¶ 55, 385 Ill.Dec. 503, 19 N.E.3d 61. ¶ 32 In this case, during argument on the posttrial motion, the posttrial judge evinced concern consistent with the first Purtill fo......
-
Ittersagen v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp.
...qualifications are reviewed as a matter of law de novo (see Roach v. Union Pacific R.R. , 2014 IL App (1st) 132015, ¶ 51, 385 Ill.Dec. 503, 19 N.E.3d 61 ; McWilliams v. Dettore , 387 Ill. App. 3d 833, 844, 327 Ill.Dec. 290, 901 N.E.2d 1023 (2009) ), it has also been said that a trial court'......
-
Allen v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr.
...App (1st) 190778, ¶ 70, 448 Ill.Dec. 189, 175 N.E.3d 1099 (citing Roach v. Union [Pacific] R.R. , 2014 IL App (1st) 132015, ¶ 51, 385 Ill.Dec. 503, 19 N.E.3d 61 and McWilliams [v. Dettore ], 387 Ill. App. 3d [833,] 844[, 327 Ill.Dec. 290, 901 N.E.2d 1023, 1031 (2009)] )."However, that quota......
-
50-State Survey of State Court Decisions Supporting Expert-Related Judicial Gatekeeping
...for consideration by the jury, courts employ ‘a totality of the circumstances’ approach”) (quoting Roach v. Union Pacific. Railroad, 19 N.E.3d 61, 71 (Ill. App. 2014)); Poliszczuk v. Winkler, 899 N.E.2d 1115, 1134 (Ill. App. 2008) (“the trial court closely examines proposed opinion testimon......