Roane Cnty. v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp.
| Decision Date | 27 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No.: 3:19-cv-206-TAV-HBG,: 3:19-cv-206-TAV-HBG |
| Parties | ROANE COUNTY, TENNESSEE, THE CITY OF KINGSTON, TENNESSEE, and THE CITY OF HARRIMAN, TENNESSEE, Plaintiffs, v. JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC., and THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
This civil case is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Briefing Schedule Deadlines with Respect to Pending Motions to Dismiss [Doc. 73]. Plaintiffs move pursuant to Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a forty-five-day extension (to May 1, 2020) of the deadline to respond to defendants' motions to dismiss and an extension of defendants' deadline to reply to their response (to May 28, 2020). Rule 6(b) provides that the Court may grant plaintiffs' request for such extensions "for good cause." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Plaintiffs offer two reasons for their request. First, they claim that defendant's motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for summary judgment by the addition of matters outside the pleadings; thus, they argue, good cause exists to extend the deadline so that plaintiffs may take discovery before responding. Second, plaintiffs state that the COVID-19 pandemic has affected counsel's schedule and obligations and constitutes good cause for the requested extension.
Defendants do not object to the requested forty-five-day extension and agree that the COVID-19 pandemic provides good cause for the extension [Docs. 74, 76]. In light of this agreement, and for good cause shown with respect to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on counsel's schedule and obligations, the Court will GRANT in part plaintiffs' motion [Doc. 73] to the extent that the deadline for plaintiffs to respond to defendants' motions to dismiss is extended to May 1, 2020, and defendants' replies are due May 28, 2020.
Defendants do, however, oppose plaintiffs' effort to seek discovery during the agreed-upon forty-five-day extension, arguing that discovery is not necessary to respond to a motion to dismiss. Thus, remaining before the Court is the issue of whether plaintiffs may pursue discovery during the forty-five-day extension. Because the matters submitted by defendants do not require that the Court convert their Rule 12 motions to Rule 56 motions, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are not entitled to the requested discovery at this stage. Thus, plaintiffs' request for discovery to respond to defendants' motions is DENIED.
Plaintiffs appear to argue that an extension to pursue discovery is warranted pursuant to Rule 56(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc. 73 p. 2-3; Doc. 73-1], which provides: "If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may . . . allowtime to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). But, Rule 56 governs motions for summary judgment, and the instant request is for an extension to respond to motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b). Thus, plaintiffs' request for discovery is predicated on their argument that defendants have, pursuant to Rule 12(d), converted their intended Rule 12 motions into motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 by supplying matters outside the pleadings.
Rule 12(d) provides that "[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The Sixth Circuit has taken a "liberal view" of matters falling within the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(d), Armengau v. Cline, 7 F. App'x 336, 334 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court may consider "the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein." Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001)). Additionally, the Court may consider "matters of which a court may take judicial notice, and letter decisions of governmental agencies." Armengau, 7 F. App'x at 334 (citing Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999)). Further, extrinsic materials that "'fill in the contours and details' of a complaint," too, may be considered without converting the motion to one for summaryjudgment. Id. (quoting Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Here, defendants have submitted numerous documents along with their motions to dismiss [Docs. 63-1 through -5; Docs. 67-1 through -17]. The Court will discuss defendant TVA's attachments before turning to defendant Jacobs'.
Defendant TVA's attachment of documents to its motion to dismiss does not convert the motion to one for summary judgment. Defendant TVA submitted (1) copies of the proposed amended complaint in this case [Doc. 59-1] that are "redlined" to show how it compares to other complaints [Docs. 63-1 (comparing it to the class action complaint in Delozier v. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-451), 63-2 (comparing it to plaintiffs' previous proposed amended complaint, Doc. 32-1)] and (2) excerpts [Docs. 63-3, 63-5], as well as a complete copy [Doc. 63-4], of the "Kingston Fly Ash Recovery Project Non-Time-Critical Removal Action Embayment/River System Action Memorandum," a memo prepared by TVA in which the EPA approved one of three proposed actions to address potential ecological risks associated with ash deposits in certain areas.
First, the copies of the proposed amended complaint that have been redlined [Docs. 63-1, 63-2] are referenced only in connection with defendant TVA's argument that plaintiffs lack standing, which go to this Court's jurisdiction and are therefore made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) [Doc. 63 p. 7-11]. Thus, Rule 12(d), which applies only to Rule12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions, is not implicated with respect to the redlined complaints. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
However, Rule 12(d) is implicated with respect to the "Kingston Fly Ash Recovery Project Non-Time-Critical Removal Action Embayment/River System Action Memorandum" [Docs. 63-3, 63-4, 63-5]. Defendant TVA's motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) argues, in part, that all of plaintiffs' claims (except for their temporary public nuisance claim) should be dismissed because they are time-barred [Doc. 63 p. 14-18]. Defendant TVA attaches the Memo [Doc. 63-4] and the excerpts [Docs. 63-3, -5] in support of this argument. Specifically, defendant TVA argues that plaintiffs knew or should have known of the potential harms posed by coal ash constituents—and thus their complained-of injuries—at least as early as August 2012, when, as evidenced by documents in the Memo [Doc. 63-5], plaintiff Roane County's Environmental Review Board was "actively participating in the CERCLA public comment process on the [issue of potential ecological risks associated with ash deposits in certain areas]" [Doc. 63 p. 17]. Thus, because the Memo is attached in support of defendant TVA's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Rule 12(d) is implicated with respect to the Memo [Doc. 63-4] and the excerpts [Doc. 63-3, -5].
The attachment of the Memo does not, however, convert defendant TVA's motion to one for summary judgment because the existence and contents of the Memo are matters of which a court may take judicial notice. "The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whoseaccuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Civ. P. 201. The Court finds that the existence and contents of the Memo are not subject to reasonable dispute. As defendant TVA notes, the Memo "is published to TVA's government website for the Kingston Recovery Project" [Doc. 63 p. 16 n.7]. And "the Court may take judicial notice of public records and government documents available from reliable sources on the Internet." Mitchell v. Tenn. Valley Auth., No. 3:14-CV-360-TAV-HBG, 2015 WL 1962203, at *4 n.2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 30, 2015) (citing U.S. ex rel. Dingle v. BioPort Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (W.D. Mich. 2003); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No. C06-4670 SBA, 2008 WL 4183981, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008)). The Court therefore finds that the Memo does not convert defendant TVA's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion. See Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2008) ("A court may consider public records without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion." (citing Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Next, the Court need not convert defendant Jacobs' motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Defendant Jacobs has submitted various new articles, press releases, and similar sources [Docs. 67-1, -2, -8, -9, -15, -16], records of various governmental bodies [Docs. 67-3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -14], various court filings [Docs. 67-10, -11, -12, -13], and a document referred to in plaintiffs' complaint [Doc. 67-17].
Each of these documents is cited in support of defendant Jacob's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), which, like defendant TVA's 12(b)(6) motion, argues, in part, that plaintiffs' claims (except for their temporary public nuisance claim) is barred by thestatute of limitations because plaintiffs knew or should have known of their claims more than three (3) years before filing this action [Doc. 65 p. 10 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105(1))]. The attachment of these documents therefore, like those attached in support of defendant TVA's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, implicates Rule 12(d).
First, the attachment of the Site Wide Safety...
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