Roarks v. State
Decision Date | 23 May 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 182S3,182S3 |
Citation | 448 N.E.2d 1071 |
Parties | Raymond L. ROARKS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Kenneth R. Watson, Williamsport, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Lee Cloyd, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of Armed Robbery, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979) and of being an Habitual Offender, Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-8 (Burns Supp.1982), and sentenced to fifty (50) years imprisonment. This direct appeal presents the following issues:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to view a videotape of Defendant's pre-Miranda advisements interview with the police.
(2) Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's pre-trial request for a written transcript of the hearing upon his motion to suppress his confession to the police.
(3) Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's request for a written transcript of the aforementioned videotape.
(4) Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Defendant's confession to the police.
(5) Whether the trial court erred in refusing Defendant's tendered instruction upon the effect of circumstantial evidence.
(6) Whether the evidence was sufficient to identify Defendant as the bank robber.
(7) Whether the trial court correctly followed the procedure for habitual offender (8) Whether the trial court erred in admitting certified copies of records into evidence at the habitual offender proceeding.
determinations, Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-8(c) (Burns Supp.1982).
(9) Whether the trial court, in the habitual offender proceeding, erred in failing to instruct the jury on the meaning of the term "felony."
(10) Whether the trial court erred in its ruling upon Defendant's motion to correct errors.
(11) Whether the trial court erred in failing to weigh the evidence and to set forth its reasons for its ruling upon the motion to correct errors.
* * *
Defendant's assignments of error are premised upon the repeated assertion that the police interrogated him prior to reading Miranda advisements and obtaining a valid waiver of rights. Defendant was arrested, and his rights were read to him at that time and again when he arrived at the Warren County Jail. Subsequently, Defendant was transported to the Fountain County Jail. FBI Agent Goodwin admitted that there, prior to the giving of Miranda advisements and the obtaining of a waiver thereof by State Police Officer Kesterson, he, Goodwin, had questioned Defendant to obtain "background information." This information included a discussion of Defendant's criminal record. There were no questions posed concerning the robbery which is the subject of this case, Holt v. State, (1978) 178 Ind.App. 631, 636, 383 N.E.2d 467, 471, except perhaps by Defendant, who asked why he was in custody in the Southern District of Indiana, whereas the bank robbery had occurred in Warren County, the Northern District of Indiana.
The Fountain County Sheriff had made a videotape of the entire interview between Defendant and the police officers wherein Defendant had confessed, including that portion which had occurred before Defendant waived his rights. This tape was not offered at trial, however, the State did offer a separate audio recording of the same interview.
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that the portion of the videotape, which depicted events that had occurred before Officer Kesterson gave the Miranda advisements, would be suppressed but that the remainder, the confession, having occurred after a proper waiver of rights, would be admitted. The court also understandably noted, from defense counsel's examination of the witnesses, that the tone of the suppression motion and hearing primarily addressed the habitual offender charge. Defense counsel, although raising the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, never clarified the matter until the State offered the aforementioned audio recording at trial. At that time, defense counsel objected and finally stated his position, i.e., the waiver of rights was the fruit of interrogation that had occurred without the giving of Miranda advisements. That position seemingly changed, however, and by the end of the hearing upon the offer and objection it appeared to be a claim that the initial violation of Defendant's rights could not have been cured by the subsequent waiver. The court, having already heard a portion of the videotape sound track at the suppression hearing, then asked counsel if the videotape disclosed that the officers had discussed the bank robbery prior to Defendant's execution of the waiver of rights, Counsel responded:
"The only question, Your Honor, come at a period of time when, where there was background noise, that goes specifically to the question of asking Agent Goodwin; there was a question concerning prior bank robberies and there was something I have to use those words because the words on my recorded portion are not fully accurate--'you mean prior to this bank robbery' or 'Yes, prior to this bank robbery' and I don't have the words on my tape; I don't have them, but there was some words prior to 'this bank robbery', * * * " R. at 382.
The court then held:
With respect to Issues I, II, and III, Defendant has not shown how he was harmed by the asserted failures of the trial court. He cites nothing in the videotape which would have supported a conclusion different from the one reached. Additionally, Defendant was given an opportunity to transcribe the tape, but never did so. He does not explain, in his Brief or by reference to the record, the purpose to which he intended to put the denied written transcript of the suppression hearing or the tape.
ISSUE V
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's refusal of his tendered instruction No. 6; derived in part from Spears v. State, (1980) Ind., 401 N.E.2d 331, 334:
The trial court gave the following instruction:
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