Robb-Fulton v. Robb, Civ. A. No. MJG-93-505.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. MJG-93-505.
• Citation: Robb-Fulton v. Robb, 168 B.R. 575 (D. Me. 1993)
• Parties: Linda ROBB-FULTON, Appellant, v. David ROBB, Sr., Appellee. In re David ROBB, Sr.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

168 B.R. 575 (1993)

Linda ROBB-FULTON, Appellant, v. David ROBB, Sr., Appellee In re David ROBB, Sr.

Civ. A. No. MJG-93-505.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

July 6, 1993.

Anthony Andrew Keder, Hyattsville, MD, for appellant.

Richard M. McGill, Upper Marlboro, MD, for appellee.

GARBIS, District Judge.

The Court has before it Linda Robb-Fulton's Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland and David Robb, Sr.'s Opposition thereto. The Court finds a hearing unnecessary.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 15, 1991, David Robb, Sr. ("Appellee") filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. The petition was subsequently converted to a Chapter 7 petition. On February 13, 1992, Linda Robb-Fulton ("Appellant") filed a complaint objecting to dischargeability, alleging that Appellee's agreement to pay alimony was non-dischargeable. The matter was tried before Bankruptcy Judge Paul Mannes. By final order issued January 3, 1993, Judge Mannes ruled that the debt in question was dischargeable because the payments in question were intended as support for a non-adopted stepchild and not as alimony for Appellant.¹

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The parties were married to each other on November 10, 1974 and had no children together. Appellant, a high school graduate with two children from a prior marriage,² continued her education during the marriage and ultimately became a physician's assistant. Appellant states she was working part-time and earned approximately $10,000 per year. Appellee was a physician earning between $100,000 to $125,000 annually.

The parties separated in 1980 and signed a Separation Agreement. The parties reconciled in November of 1981, but this reconciliation did not last and the parties separated again in 1983. On August 24, 1983, the parties entered into an agreement entitled "Addendum to Separation and Property Settlement Agreement" (hereinafter "Addendum"). The parties agreed that, except as modified or amended by the second agreement, the original 1980 separation agreement would be regarded as valid and binding.

The Addendum provides, in part, that Appellee "does hereby agree to pay alimony (temporary and permanent) for support and maintenance of the Wife Appellant until such time as the Wife should die, or until the Husband Appellee dies, in accordance with the payment terms specified herein. . . . Said alimony shall be paid . . . in the amount of three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) per month." Addendum, at 6. The addendum further provides in separately captioned sections that Appellee shall "pay temporary support for David Maphis until he has completed boarding school . . . or until he discontinues said schooling" and that Appellee shall pay for the housekeeper then working for Appellant, but if the housekeeper should cease working, then the Appellee would pay to Appellant an additional $400 per month as "temporary support until such time as Dianna Maphis is in a residential situation elsewhere." Addendum, at 7. The Addendum was incorporated but not merged into the Final Judgment of Absolute Divorce.

Appellee testified at trial that he intended the $3,000 per month payments as support for Appellant's daughter and not as alimony. Appellee stated that he arrived at the $3,000 per month figure by taking the cost of placing Dianna Maphis in an institution (estimated by him at $2,500 per month) and taking into account the tax effects of the payment as income to Appellant and a deduction to Appellee. Appellant testified that she needed support at the time of the separation and was aware of the disparity in her income and the income of Appellee. She further testified that the bankruptcy hearing was the first time she learned of Appellee's alleged intent that the payments be for the support of Dianna Maphis.

Appellee made payments to Appellant for approximately three years. After experiencing financial problems, Appellee ceased making the payments and informed Appellant he could no longer afford the payments. Subsequently, Appellee filed for bankruptcy protection.

DISCUSSION

Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1993) an individual debtor may not be discharged from a debt "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that — (A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise . . .; or (B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. . . ." Thus, if the payments of $3,000 per month were in fact alimony payments the debt is not dischargeable. If the payments were for the support of Dianna Maphis, who is not a child of the debtor, even if labelled as "alimony" by the parties, the debt would be dischargeable. At issue, then,...