Robb v. Crawford

Citation16 F.2d 339,56 App. DC 394
Decision Date06 December 1926
Docket NumberNo. 4443.,4443.
PartiesROBB v. CRAWFORD et al.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

D. T. Wright and Philip Ershler, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

L. A. Widmayer, H. H. O'Bear, J. V. Morgan, H. W. Wheatley, and Edmund Campbell, all of Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

ROBB, Associate Justice.

Appeal from a decree in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, at the close of the evidence for the plaintiff, appellant here, dismissing a bill for specific performance of an agreement to exchange two parcels of real estate in this District. The contract was in writing, and signed by the plaintiff and the defendant Crawford. The other defendants were made parties because of a claim of interest through conveyances subsequent to the contract; the contention of plaintiff being that such conveyances were made with knowledge of the contract.

Under the terms of the contract, the deal was to be consummated within 30 days. Within that period, according to plaintiff's evidence, he sent representatives to Crawford for the purpose of tendering to him a deed, which had been executed by the plaintiff and a Mr. Buckman, who was jointly interested with plaintiff in the property. According to these witnesses, they informed Crawford that they were "ready to make settlement"; but Crawford replied that he did not intend to settle, because he would be paying Wardman a commission on property which he owned and was selling. Thereupon Crawford was assured that Robb and Buckman, and not Wardman, owned the property; but Crawford insisted that he did not intend to settle. Crawford then was asked if he would waive tender of the deed, and replied, "Yes; I waive anything." Later Crawford said he "waived everything."

Counsel for the plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove that plaintiff was authorized by Buckman to sign the contract here involved; the purpose of the offer, as stated by counsel, being to show "that Buckman is as much bound by this contract as Robb is in equity, and therefore, if it ever came to the question of enforcing it against Buckman, it could be enforced against him as much as against Robb." To this offer objection was made by defendant and sustained, "because of the fact," as stated by the court, "that the plaintiff did make a tender of a deed to the property, signed by both."

It further appeared that there was a second trust on plaintiff's property, which, under the terms of the contract, it was necessary to have released before consummation of the deal. Plaintiff testified that, at all times after the signing of the contract, he was ready, willing, and able to perform his part of it. The witness then was questioned concerning the second trust, and replied that "we they were arranging to release." On motion of the defendants, this answer, so far as it related to the arrangement, was stricken out.

At the close of plaintiff's evidence counsel for defendants moved for the dismissal of the bill, but upon what ground the record does not disclose. Thereupon the learned trial justice observed: "There is another question, it occurs to me, in the case, too. The plaintiff offered himself as ready and willing to perform. How was it shown that he was ready and willing? And he is not ready and willing now, because he has to release of that second trust, and it is not shown that he can get it." Counsel for the plaintiff insisted that his client was ready, willing, and able to have the second trust released, and finally, after further discussion, asked for an hour "in which to produce the release referred to in this deed, the second trust notes, and all of the papers that are necessary for Mr. Robb to produce." This request was refused, and the bill dismissed.

Whether specific performance will be decreed in this class of cases is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the court. That discretion, however, is not arbitrary or capricious, but controlled by the established doctrines and settled principles of equity. "No positive rule can be laid down by which the action of the court can be determined in all cases. In general, it may be said that the specific relief will be granted when it is apparent, from a view of all the circumstances of a particular case, that it will subserve the ends of justice; and that it will be withheld when, from a like view, it appears that it will produce hardship or injustice to either of the parties. It is not sufficient, as shown by the cases cited, to call forth the equitable interposition of the court, that the legal obligation under the contract to do the specific thing desired may be perfect. It must also appear that the specific enforcement will work no hardship or injustice, for, if that result would follow, the court will leave the parties to their remedies at law, unless the granting of the specific relief can be accompanied with conditions which will obviate that result. If that result can be thus obviated, a specific performance will generally in such cases be decreed conditionally." Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 557, 567 (19 L. Ed. 501).

In that case, which originated in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the decree was for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, although the plaintiff, under a mistaken view of the contract, had tendered notes of the United States, instead of gold. The court found that the tender was made in good faith, and that, after it was rejected, plaintiff was prevented by the absence of the defendant from tendering the gold, which the court found was called for by the contract. On this branch of the case the court said: "The kind of currency which the complainant offered is only important in considering the good faith of his conduct. A party does not forfeit his rights to the interposition of a court of equity to enforce a specific performance of a contract, if he seasonably and in good faith offers to comply, and continues ready to comply, with its stipulations on his part, although he may err in estimating the extent of his obligation."

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7 cases
  • Schanerman v. Everett & Carbin, Inc.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 26, 1952
    ...ventures.' See also Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U.S. 258, 267, 24 L.Ed. 693, 696 (1878); Robb v. Crawford, 56 App.D.C. 394, 16 F.2d 339, 341 (D.C.Cir.1926). In situations comparable to that before us many courts have invoked doctrines of waiver and estoppel to preclude the de......
  • Mable L. Bufton v. Edward M. Crane Et Ux
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • October 3, 1928
    ... ... St. Rep. 721, 723; ... Townsend v. Milliken (Tex. Civ. App.), 294 ... S.W. 938; Levand v. No. Am. Realty Co., 82 ... Colo. 121, 257 P. 355; Robb v. Crawford (D ... C.), 16 F.2d 339; Bowden v. Laing, 103 ... W.Va. 733, 138 S.E. 449. The contract meets all requirements ... as to certainty ... ...
  • Rifkind v. Turner., 481.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • April 25, 1947
    ...U.S.App.D.C., 157 F.2d 211. 4See cases collected in 156 A.L.R. 602; 12 C.J.S., Brokers, § 95, p. 224, n. 49; compare Robb v. Crawford, 56 App.D.C. 394, 16 F.2d 339. 5Iselin v. United States, 271 U.S. 136, 46 S.Ct. 458, 70 L.Ed. 872; Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat 225, 17 U.S. 225, 4 L.Ed. 556;......
  • David J. Joseph Co. v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Claims Court
    • February 7, 1949
    ...defenses.' Wall Grocer Co. v. Jobbers' Overall Co., 4 Cir., 264 F. 71; McCreary v. Strongman, 3 Cir., 6 F.2d 441; Robb v. Crawford, 56 App.D.C. 394, 16 F.2d 339; Ohio & M. Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U.S. 258, 24 L.Ed. "While the contract might have been terminated for various reasons befor......
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