Robb v. Crawford
Citation | 16 F.2d 339,56 App. DC 394 |
Decision Date | 06 December 1926 |
Docket Number | No. 4443.,4443. |
Parties | ROBB v. CRAWFORD et al. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
D. T. Wright and Philip Ershler, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
L. A. Widmayer, H. H. O'Bear, J. V. Morgan, H. W. Wheatley, and Edmund Campbell, all of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
Appeal from a decree in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, at the close of the evidence for the plaintiff, appellant here, dismissing a bill for specific performance of an agreement to exchange two parcels of real estate in this District. The contract was in writing, and signed by the plaintiff and the defendant Crawford. The other defendants were made parties because of a claim of interest through conveyances subsequent to the contract; the contention of plaintiff being that such conveyances were made with knowledge of the contract.
Under the terms of the contract, the deal was to be consummated within 30 days. Within that period, according to plaintiff's evidence, he sent representatives to Crawford for the purpose of tendering to him a deed, which had been executed by the plaintiff and a Mr. Buckman, who was jointly interested with plaintiff in the property. According to these witnesses, they informed Crawford that they were "ready to make settlement"; but Crawford replied that he did not intend to settle, because he would be paying Wardman a commission on property which he owned and was selling. Thereupon Crawford was assured that Robb and Buckman, and not Wardman, owned the property; but Crawford insisted that he did not intend to settle. Crawford then was asked if he would waive tender of the deed, and replied, "Yes; I waive anything." Later Crawford said he "waived everything."
Counsel for the plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove that plaintiff was authorized by Buckman to sign the contract here involved; the purpose of the offer, as stated by counsel, being to show "that Buckman is as much bound by this contract as Robb is in equity, and therefore, if it ever came to the question of enforcing it against Buckman, it could be enforced against him as much as against Robb." To this offer objection was made by defendant and sustained, "because of the fact," as stated by the court, "that the plaintiff did make a tender of a deed to the property, signed by both."
It further appeared that there was a second trust on plaintiff's property, which, under the terms of the contract, it was necessary to have released before consummation of the deal. Plaintiff testified that, at all times after the signing of the contract, he was ready, willing, and able to perform his part of it. The witness then was questioned concerning the second trust, and replied that "we they were arranging to release." On motion of the defendants, this answer, so far as it related to the arrangement, was stricken out.
At the close of plaintiff's evidence counsel for defendants moved for the dismissal of the bill, but upon what ground the record does not disclose. Thereupon the learned trial justice observed: Counsel for the plaintiff insisted that his client was ready, willing, and able to have the second trust released, and finally, after further discussion, asked for an hour "in which to produce the release referred to in this deed, the second trust notes, and all of the papers that are necessary for Mr. Robb to produce." This request was refused, and the bill dismissed.
Whether specific performance will be decreed in this class of cases is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the court. That discretion, however, is not arbitrary or capricious, but controlled by the established doctrines and settled principles of equity. Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 557, 567 (19 L. Ed. 501).
In that case, which originated in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the decree was for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, although the plaintiff, under a mistaken view of the contract, had tendered notes of the United States, instead of gold. The court found that the tender was made in good faith, and that, after it was rejected, plaintiff was prevented by the absence of the defendant from tendering the gold, which the court found was called for by the contract. On this branch of the case the court said:
The contract before us...
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