Robb v. Miller

Decision Date13 February 1953
Citation372 Pa. 505,94 A.2d 734
PartiesROBB v. MILLER.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Action against motorist who was travelling 25 to 30 miles an hour in school zone along street which was lined on both sides with parked vehicles for death of five year old school child who was crossing street in middle of block and who was in the middle of the street when the motorist saw him fifteen feet away. The Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, (Tried in C.P. No. 7) of the County of Philadelphia, as of September Term, 1950 No. 5195, L. Stauffer Oliver, P. J., entered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, No 193, January Term, 1952, Musmanno, J., held that the evidence justified the finding that defendant was driving at a speed which amounted to negligence and that the negligence was the proximate cause of the child's death.

Affirmed.

Michael A. Foley, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Charles A. Lord, Elwood S. Levy and Richter, Load & Farage, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MUSMANNO Justice.

North Lawrence Street in Philadelphia is a one-way, south-bound thoroughfare about 26 feet wide with row houses on the east side of the street, and a school building with school yard and a junk shop on the west side. Vehicles were parked on both sides of the street at the time of happening of the accident which is the subject of this lawsuit. On the afternoon of June 6, 1950, at about 2:45 o'clock, the defendant's car, while moving southwardly on this street at the rate of from 25 to 30 miles per hour, struck five year old David Robb, who was crossing in the middle of the block directly in front of his home, inflicting mortal injuries. The parents recovered a verdict in the ensuing trial. From the judgment entered on that verdict the defendant has appealed.

Section 1002 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 P.S. § 501, places a maximum speed of 15 miles per hour on all motor vehicles passing school buildings during school recess. On the day of the accident a bazaar or carnival for children was in progress in the school yard, thus reasserting the need for a reduced speed, even perhaps lower than the maximum permitted by the Motor Code. The defendant was familiar with the neighborhood and was charged with knowledge of the movement of children on this street.

This is not a ‘ darting out’ case in the usual interpretation of that term. The child emerged from between two cars but was in the middle of the street when the defendant saw him 15 feet away. If the motorist had been proceeding at the rate of speed dictated by law and circumstance, he could have stopped his car in time to avoid striking the child.

In Quattrochi v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 309 Pa. 377, 164 A. 59, 60, this Court properly observed:

" It is common knowledge that special caution is required for the protection of children who congregate in the vicinity of a schoolhouse.' Mulhern v. Phila[delphia] Homemade Bread Co., 257 Pa. 22, 24, 101 A. 74, 75. We have frequently mentioned the high degree of care imposed upon the drivers of vehicles owing to ‘ the tendency of small children to run across streets, especially at or near schools.’ * * * In Frank v. Cohen, 288 Pa. 221, 225, 135 A. 624, 625, this court said: ‘ The presence of children in large numbers in his immediate
...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT