Robbins v. Foothill Nissan

• Citation: 22 Cal.App.4th 1769,28 Cal.Rptr.2d 190
• Decision Date: 04 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. B070925,B070925
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Nelson L. ROBBINS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FOOTHILL NISSAN et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 190

28 Cal.Rptr.2d 190

22 Cal.App.4th 1769

Nelson L. ROBBINS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FOOTHILL NISSAN et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B070925.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

March 4, 1994.

Certified for Partial Publication ^*

Nelson L. Robbins, Sharon E. Robbins, in pro. per., for plaintiffs and appellants.

Ann S. DuRoss, Robert D. McGillicuddy, Gregory E. Gore, Washington, DC, Jean C. Wilcox, Newport Beach, Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, Maxine J. Lebowitz, Long Beach, for defendants and respondents.

TURNER, Presiding Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, Nelson L. Robbins and Sharon E. Robbins, appeal from an order dismissing their complaint against defendants, Foothill Nissan and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), as receiver for Far Western Bank ("Far Western") and Atlantic Finance Bank ("Atlantic"), a division of Far Western, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the published portion of this opinion, we determine that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over suits which are filed prior to the appointment of the FDIC as the receiver against a banking or other savings institution which is subject to a receivership pursuant to 12 United States Code section 1821. ¹

II. BACKGROUND

Present State Court Actions and FDIC Administrative Proceedings

The original complaint was filed on March 16, 1990, and named as defendants: Foothill Nissan; Far Western; Atlantic; Rafael Santiago; and A.C. Hipp. ² Plaintiffs alleged that they were overcharged for a 1987 Nissan Sentra XE that they purchased from Foothill Nissan. The second amended complaint which is at issue in this case was filed on December 7, 1990, and asserted causes of action for conspiracy and fraud, as well as violations of the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act (Civ.Code § 2981 et seq.), the Federal Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. (18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.)

On December 14, 1990, after the second amended complaint was filed, the Superintendent of Banks for the State of California found Far Western insolvent and took possession of its assets including Atlantic. On the same date, the FDIC was appointed receiver for the bank pursuant to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"). (Pub.L. 101-73 (Aug. 9, 1989) 103 Stat. 183). FIRREA is codified in 12 United States Code section 1811, et seq.

On January 11, 1991, the FDIC notified plaintiffs that, pursuant to FIRREA, they were required to file a written proof of claim on or before April 1, 1991. On February 15, 1991, plaintiffs filed a written proof of claim. On the same date, the FDIC sent plaintiffs a notice that the proof of claim had been received. Also, the FDIC provided an additional document informing plaintiffs the proof of claim was deficient in that it lacked their signatures, was not notarized, and was not supported by documentation. The FDIC requested plaintiffs to submit the additional documents to continue the review process. When the information was not submitted, an attorney for the FDIC wrote to plaintiffs on April 24, 1991, requesting the supplemental information. The FDIC also notified plaintiffs that it would be seeking a stay of the court action pending a final determination of their claim. The letter stated that the claim would be passed upon within 180 days of its submission to the FDIC. The FDIC letter further indicated: "Until the FDIC has determined the claim, the State Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Furthermore, following the claims determination, should you be dissatisfied with the FDIC's decision, your only recourse will be to seek a de novo review in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, or to seek an administrative review through the FDIC's claim review process." Plaintiffs did not submit any additional information and the FDIC did not process the claim within the 180-day period nor did it request a stay of the present action.

On April 17, 1992, the FDIC moved to dismiss the action on the ground the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the federal judiciary was vested with exclusive jurisdiction and plaintiffs failed to comply with the claims statute which therefore was a bar to any cause of action against the FDIC as receiver. The FDIC's motion was joined by Foothill Nissan and granted by the trial court. Plaintiffs' motion for new trial was denied and they filed a timely appeal from the order dismissing their action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Cal.Rules Court, rules 2, 3(a).) ³

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review

The issue in this case, which we address in the published portion of the opinion, is whether the trial court properly dismissed the action based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction under FIRREA. The FDIC contends the trial court properly determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions against failed federally insured depository institutions and plaintiffs failed to timely seek de novo review after their claim was denied by it. ⁴ Because the appeal is from a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ⁵ a question of law, this court reviews the issue de novo. (Finnie v. Dist. No. 1--Pacific Coast Dist. etc. Assn. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 348; Stratton v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1083, 258 Cal.Rptr. 721.)

Because we are applying a federal statute, we follow rules of statutory construction enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno (1990) 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1575, 108 L.Ed.2d 842, quoting from Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania (1980) 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766, the United States Supreme Court held: "The starting point for interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' " The United States Supreme Court has noted that "the statutory language controls its construction" (Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance (1981) 452 U.S. 155, 158, fn. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2239, 2241, fn. 3, 68 L.Ed.2d 744) and that " '[t]here is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the [L]egislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.' [Citations.]" (Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. (1982) 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973.) In interpreting the statute, the United States Supreme Court has noted: " 'In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or a member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' [Citations.] Our objective in a case such as this is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will." (Philbrook v. Glodgett (1975) 421 U.S. 707, 713, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898, 44 L.Ed.2d 525.) On another occasion, the court stated, "We do not, however, construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole." (United States v. Morton (1984) 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 2773, 81 L.Ed.2d 680, fn. omitted.) Further, in interpreting a statute, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of avoiding "absurd results" ( United States v. Turkette (1981) 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246); " 'an odd result' " ( Public Citizen v. Department of Justice (1989) 491 U.S. 440, 454, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2566, 105 L.Ed.2d 377); or "unreasonable results whenever possible." ( American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson (1982) 456 U.S. 63, 71, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1538, 71 L.Ed.2d 748.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted, "Judicial perception that a particular result would be unreasonable may enter into the construction of ambiguous provisions, but cannot justify disregard of what Congress has plainly and intentionally provided." ( Commissioner v. Asphalt Products Co., Inc. (1987) 482 U.S. 117, 121, 107 S.Ct. 2275, 2278, 96 L.Ed.2d 97.) In Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., supra, 458 U.S. at p. 571, 102 S.Ct. at p. 3250, the court stated: "Nevertheless, in rare cases the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling.... [Citations.]" When a statute is unambiguous, its language cannot "be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legislators or committees during the course of the enactment process. [Citation.]" ( West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey (1991) 499 U.S. 83, 98-99, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 113 L.Ed.2d 68.) ⁶

Moreover, in determining whether there has been preemption of any cause of action against a failed depository institution, we are guided by the principles set forth by the California Supreme Court in Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 909-910, 221 Cal.Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375, for resolving the question of jurisdiction in cases involving a federal law. Quoting liberally from Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1981) 453 U.S. 473, 477-484, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2874-78, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 and other sources, Cianci stated: " 'The general principle of state-court jurisdiction over cases arising under federal laws is straightforward: state courts may assume subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal cause of action absent provision by Congress to the contrary or disabling incompatibility between the federal claim and state-court adjudication.' [Citations.] 'This rule is premised on the relation between the States and the National Government within our federal system. [Citation.] The two exercise concurrent sovereignty.... Federal law confers rights binding on state courts,...