Robbins v. Fugit

Decision Date26 February 1920
Docket NumberNo. 23418.,23418.
PartiesROBBINS et al. v. FUGIT
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Decatur County; John W. Donaker, Judge.

Action by Elizabeth Fugit against William F. Robbins, executor of the will of Charles S. Williamson, deceased, and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed, with instructions to sustain motion for new trial.

Hugh Wickens, John E. Osborn, and Frank Hamilton, all of Greensburg, for appellants.

John F. Goddard, Edgar E. Hite, and Thomas E. Davidson, all of Greensburg, for appellee.

TOWNSEND, C. J.

Appellee brought suit against appellants to contest the probated will of her brother, Charles S. Williamson. The issue was undue influence and unsoundness of mind. The jury returned a general verdict in appellee's favor.

It is claimed by appellants that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence. This need not be decided, because the judgment must be reversed for other reasons, and on retrial the evidence will probably vary in many particulars from that adduced at this trial.

[1] On the subject of monomania and hallucinations the court gave the following instruction, at the request of appellee:

“No. 5. If you find from the evidence that the testator, Charles S. Williamson, made statements to persons to the effect that Elizabeth Fugit, the plaintiff, and members of his family, or any of them, had assaulted him and otherwise mistreated him, such statements cannot be taken as true, or to prove that such assault and mistreatment was committed by them upon him. However, if it is shown by the evidence that such assaults and mistreatments did not occur and were not committed by said persons, then such statements by said Charles S. Williamson may be considered by you as circumstances tending to show hallucination and unsoundness of mind.”

This instruction is erroneous. To make this instruction accurate, it should have embodied the element that the testator spontaneously believed these things to be true in the face of the facts to the contrary and in the face of reason. Barr v. Sumner, 183 Ind. 402, 418, 107 N. E. 675, 109 N. E. 193, and cases there cited.

[2][3] In instruction No. 7 the court told the jury, at the request of appellee, that if they found from the evidence that the testator had made a will in 1905 in which he had provided for his sister, and they further found that no good reason or cause had been shown by the evidence since the making of that will to induce the testator to disinherit her, they should consider that fact in determinating whether or not the testator was of sound or unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will in suit, “and whether or not it was his will.” The expression in quotation marks authorized the jury to consider the facts embodied in the instruction in determining whether or not the will in suit was duly executed. This was error. It was competent for the jury to take into consideration previous declarations of the testator, either oral or written, to throw light upon his mental capacity at the time of making the will in suit; but such declarations are not competent on the subject of undue influence. Ditton v. Hart, 175 Ind. 181, 189, 93 N. E. 961, and cases there cited.

[4] Appellants also complain of the court's action in repeating propositions of law applicable to the facts in numerous instructions. On the subject of undue influence alone, the court gave 14 or 15 instructions. In 3 different instructions he told the jury that undue influence need not be proved by direct evidence; that it could be shown by circumstances. When an instruction is once given which fully covers a subject, it should not be repeated. Such needless repetition amounts to an argument on the part of the court and may mislead the jury. It is not always reversible error, but it is always bad practice. It has been repeatedly condemned. Union, etc., Co. v. Buchanan, 100 Ind. 63, 80;Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boggs, 101 Ind. 522, 530, 51 Am. Rep. 761;Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409, 426, 3 N. E. 389, 4 N. E. 908;Miller v. Coulter, 156 Ind. 290, 298, 59 N. E. 853;Modern Woodmen, etc., v. Kincheloe, 175 Ind. 563, 566, 94 N. E. 228, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1259.

The instructions are entirely too...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Drolet v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • February 10, 1960
    ...giving of repetitious instructions as 'bad practice' but has not seen fit to reverse on that ground alone. See Robbins, Exr. v. Fugit, 1920, 189 Ind. 165, 168, 126 N.E. 321; Modern Woodmen of America v. Kincheloe, 1911, 175 Ind. 563, 94 N.E. 228, Ann.Cas.1913C, 1259n. In Davis, Exr. v. Babb......
  • Rust v. Watson
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • March 17, 1966
    ...exiomatic that the trial court is not required to instruct the jury on any specific rule of law more than once. Robbins, Exr. v. Fugit (1920), 189 Ind. 165, 126 N.E. 321; Vandalia Coal Co. v. Yemm (1910), 175 Ind. 524, 92 N.E. 49, 94 N.E. 881; Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Seal, Admr. (196......
  • Stumpf v. Leland
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1922
  • Kiger v. Arco Auto Carriers, Inc.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • March 26, 1969
    ...practice of giving repetitious instructions is not favored, it will not always constitute reversible error. Robbins v. Fugit, 189 Ind. 165, 126 N.E. 321 (1920). It is clearly not reversible error in this case. Each instruction contributes something to the totality of the charge to the jury.......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT