Robbins v. The City Of Miami Beach, 09-20804 -CIV-HOEVELER

• Decision Date: 20 January 2011
• Docket Number: 09-20804 -CIV-HOEVELER
• Parties: BARRET ROBBINS, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, COLIN PFROGNER, MICHAEL MULEY and WILLIAM SCHOENFELD, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

BARRET ROBBINS, Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, COLIN PFROGNER,
MICHAEL MULEY and WILLIAM SCHOENFELD, Defendants.

09-20804-CIV-HOEVELER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Date: January 20, 2011

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

BEFORE the Court are two motions to dismiss the plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint. The first is filed by three individual Miami Beach police officers [ECF No. 43], and the second is filed by the City of Miami Beach ("CMB") [ECF No. 42]. The motions have been fully briefed and are ready for a decision.

I. Background

The facts of this lawsuit, as alleged in the pleadings, have been summarized in previous orders. On January 15, 2005, Barret Robbins entered a private upstairs bathroom in a Miami Beach public house (where he was admittedly not allowed), causing the bartender to summon the police. Plainclothes Miami Beach police officers Michael Muley and Mark Schoenfeld entered the upstairs bathroom and burst into the stall with guns drawn, while a third officer, Colin Pfrogner, waited in the upstairs hallway. Mr. Robbins was startled

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by the interruption and ran into the hallway, at which point Officer Muley gave chase and shot Robbins several times, as Officers Pfrogner and Schoenfeld stood by.

In the Third Amended Complaint, the plaintiff asserts excessive-force violations against the three police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I-III), and a separate § 1983 claim against CMB for failing to train police officers in the use of force (Count VI). In addition, the plaintiff asserts claims in the alternative under Florida Statute § 768.28 against either: (1) CMB, as the state agency responsible for the negligence of the police officers (Counts V-VII); or (2) against the police officers themselves (Counts VIII-X) for their intentional and malicious conduct, i.e., using "force that was excessive and unreasonable [which] constituted an unwarranted assault and battery.... as well as the subsequent coverup, [all of which] were undertaken in bad faith and with malicious purpose towards Robbins." See PL's Third Am. Compl. ¶¶-62.¹ Both motions to dismiss address the state-law claims, only.²

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II. Standard

A pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a pleading "that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iabal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomblv, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id.

III. Analysis

A. Motion to dismiss by the police officers

The police officers argue that the assault and...