Robbio v. Hart., 8739.
| Citation | 45 A.2d 169 |
| Decision Date | 11 January 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 8739.,8739. |
| Parties | DE ROBBIO v. HART. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; G. Frederick Frost, Judge.
Action of trespass on the case by Domenic J. De Robbio against Charles E. Hart for damages sustained in a collision between automobiles driven by the parties at a street intersection. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied and his motion for new trial after a verdict for plaintiff was granted, and both parties bring exceptions.
Exceptions overruled, and case remitted for a new trial.
Edward I. Friedman and James B. Linehan, both of Providence, for plaintiff.
Sherwood & Clifford, Sidney Clifford, and Raymond E. Jordan, all of Providence, for defendant.
This action of trespass on the case for negligence involves a collision between two automobiles, hereinafter referred to as cars, in the intersection of Princess avenue and Governor street in the city of Cranston, at about 9:45 a. m. on March 11, 1944. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $4200. Defendant's motion for a new trial was heard and granted. The case is before us on plaintiff's exception to the granting of that motion and also on defendant's exception to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict.
The evidence shows that Princess avenue, which is curbed, runs north and south and Governor street, which is uncurbed, runs east and west. The width of the traveled portion of both streets is about 24 feet. On the southwest corner of the intersection there is an open lot approximately 100 feet square, and on the southeast corner there is a house which is located at or near the property line of the streets.
The road and weather conditions were good. The temperature was between thirty-two and thirty-four degrees Fahrenheit. There were no parked or moving vehicles, other than the cars of the parties here, in the immediate vicinity of the intersection at the time of the accident. The plaintiff, who lived some four houses south of the intersection on Princess avenue, was traveling north on that street; the defendant was traveling west on Governor street. Both parties were alone in their respective cars.
The plaintiff in substance testified that he left his home and drove towards the intersection at a speed of not more than fifteen miles an hour, as the motor of the car was cold; that as he came close to the intersection he further reduced his speed; that he first looked to his left, across the open lot at the southwest corner, and saw no traffic coming from that direction; that, when he was six or seven feet from the intersection, he looked to his right into Governor street and, on account of the house on the southeast corner, the farthest point that he could then see on the north side of that street was 75 feet from Princess avenue. He further testified that he then saw no traffic approaching the intersection from that direction; that he looked once more to his left as he entered the intersection and immediately thereafter he again looked to his right, at which time the motor of his car was about even with the center of the intersection; that he then saw defendant's car about 50 feet away from him on Governor street; that it was on its own right-hand side of the street but close to the middle line thereof; and that it was coming towards him at a speed of 40 or 45 miles an hour.
The plaintiff further testified that in this situation he ‘stepped on the gas' but the car ‘started bucking’; that the right rear fender and wheel of his car was struck a ‘terrific blow’ by defendant's car when he, the plaintiff, was ‘Three-quarters across the Governor Street intersection’; that the force of the impact caused the back end of plaintiff's car to slew to the left ‘on the two left wheels' for about 15 feet; that it tipped over but then righted itself and, after moving forward for some distance, it turned around and came to a stop, facing south, on Princess avenue, some 45 or 50 feet north of the intersection.
The defendant's testimony was to the effect that he was traveling in a westerly direction on his own right side of Governor street but close to its center line, because of the soft shoulder on that uncurbed street, at a speed of 15 miles an hour; that, as the house at the southeast corner obstructed his view southerly on Princess avenue, he blew his horn when he was about 23 feet from the intersection; that he further reduced his speed as he approached the intersection; and that he saw the plaintiff's car coming towards him ‘like a shot out of a gun’, or at a speed of 35 miles an hour, just as he had passed the house...
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Lynch v. Saccoccia, 9950
...in attempting to make a left turn in the circumstances, the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care on his own part. De Robbio v. Hart, 71 R.I. 347, 45 A.2d 169. We turn to the defendant's exception to the denial of his motion for a new trial. The trial justice heard the arguments on the ......
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Wein v. Lucey, 9419
...credibility of the witnesses. His decision on such a motion will not be disturbed by this court unless it is clearly wrong. DeRobbio v. Hart, 71 R.I. 347, 45 A.2d 169. In the instant case it is clear that the trial justice realized his duty in respect to the motion before him. In reaching h......