Roberson v. Alltel Information Services

• Decision Date: 30 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-10956.,03-10956.
• Citation: 373 F.3d 647
• Parties: Louis C. ROBERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLTEL INFORMATION SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

373 F.3d 647

Louis C. ROBERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLTEL INFORMATION SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-10956.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 30, 2004.

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David K. Watsky (argued), Cheryl Anne Rubenstein, Gillespie, Rozen, Watsky & Motley, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John L. Collins (argued), Anouchka Maria Oppinger, Seyfarth Shaw, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Appellant, Louis Roberson, filed suit against Appellee, Alltel Information Services ("Alltel"), claiming race, sex, and age discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). The district court granted summary judgment for Alltel on each of Roberson's claims. Roberson timely appealed.

Roberson, an African-American male, was born December 31, 1952. Roberson worked at Alltel for approximately twenty years during which time he rose to the level of Systems Engineer-Applications ("SEA"). In Spring 2000, Roberson was reclassified from SEA to Mainframe Programmer II ("Programmer II"). Later that year, Alltel placed Roberson on an unfunded assignment,¹ working under project leader Skip Steed. While working on the project, Roberson and Steed had numerous conflicts such that Roberson eventually requested that Alltel remove him from the assignment. Roberson then filed his first discrimination complaint claiming that Alltel reclassified him to Programmer II in retaliation for addressing issues regarding minority workers with Alltel management. Roberson's complaint also objected to Alltel's "good-ole boy" network, referring specifically to his problems with Steed. After investigating Roberson's allegations, Alltel concluded there was no discrimination, but granted Roberson's request for removal from the project.

As part of his first discrimination complaint, Roberson indicated a desire to switch from programming to business analysis. Alltel granted Roberson's request and allowed him a ninety-day trial period in a Business Analyst II position. Alltel informed Roberson that if he desired to stay in the business analyst position, his pay and classification could be altered upward or downward depending on his evaluations after the trial period. Roberson disagreed with his placement, believing that he was qualified for a higher classification than Business Analyst II, but nonetheless accepted Alltel's offer. After beginning his trial period, Roberson filed his second complaint of discrimination in which he alleged that two co-workers walked past him with a computer cable shaped like a noose. Alltel conducted an investigation, but found no discrimination.

At the end of the trial period, based on multiple evaluations of Roberson's work, Alltel offered Roberson two options: he could either stay in the Business Analyst II position at that classification's pay scale, which was significantly less than his Programmer II pay, or he could return to his classification as a Programmer II. Roberson disagreed with the evaluations and the proposed placement. Roberson then filed his third complaint of discrimination alleging that Alltel's decisions regarding his pay and placement in the business analysis field were discriminatory. He also reasserted the allegations from his previous discrimination complaints. Alltel conducted an investigation, but again found no discrimination.

Shortly after the conclusion of the third investigation, Alltel began a corporate-wide reduction-in-force. Eleven employees at the Irving, Texas office, Roberson among them, were included on the reduction-in-force list. After his termination, Roberson filed this lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment to Alltel concluding that Roberson failed to prove that Alltel's employment decisions were based on impermissible considerations.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir.2003). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Roberson and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

I

Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to discharge ... or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race ... [or] sex...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The ADEA forbids "an employer ... to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The standard of proof for Title VII discrimination claims also applies to § 1981 claims, Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 403 n. 2 (5th Cir.1999), and ADEA claims. See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). Because the same facts underlie all three causes of action, we conjunctively analyze Roberson's Title VII, § 1981, and ADEA claims. See Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 967 (5th Cir.1999).

"The Title VII inquiry is `whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'" Johnson, 351 F.3d at 621 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983)). Courts traditionally employ two frameworks for analyzing discrimination claims: "mixed-motive" and "single-motive" or "pretext." See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (mixed-motive); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (pretext). Under the mixed-motive framework, the individual must demonstrate, by either direct or circumstantial evidence, that the employer was motivated to take the adverse employment action by both permissible and forbidden reasons. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. 1775. Under the pretext framework, after the employee demonstrates a prima facie case of discrimination and the employer meets its burden of positing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, the burden falls to the employee to establish that the employer's permissible reason is actually a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Roberson argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003), altered this traditional structure for analyzing discrimination claims. Desert Palace held that direct evidence of discrimination was not required to obtain a Title VII mixed-motive instruction. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 92, 101-02, 123 S.Ct. 2148. While Desert Palace only explicitly addressed jury instructions, Roberson asserts that the opinion also implicitly altered the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework such that summary judgment should only be granted if an employee fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether or not a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the employment decision. The few courts to address the implications of Desert Palace have reached varied results. Some conclude that Desert Palace overrules or greatly limits McDonnell Douglas.² Other courts find no tension between the two decisions.³

For purposes of this case we need not decide the fate of McDonnell Douglas because Roberson's claims fail under any interpretation of Desert Palace. Specifically, Roberson has not created a fact issue as to whether Alltel's adverse employment decision was, even in part, motivated by discriminatory animus. Cf. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that "it is not particularly significant whether [the plaintiff] relies on the McDonnell Douglas presumption or ... on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent" because "[u]nder either approach, [the plaintiff] must produce some evidence suggesting that [the employer's] failure to promote him was due in part or whole to discriminatory intent, and so must counter [the employer's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason]"); Allen v. City of Pocahontas, Ark., 340 F.3d 551, 557 n. 5 (8th Cir.2003) ("Without reaching the issue as to whether [Desert Palace] alters the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas, the result in this case remains the same [because] Petitioner has provided no evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a reasonable jury could logically infer that age or gender was a motivating factor in her termination.").

II

In order to withstand summary judgment, Title VII requires that Roberson, using direct or circumstantial evidence, "present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude ... that `race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.'...