Roberson v. District of Columbia Board of Higher Education, 9671.

Decision Date17 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. 9671.,9671.
Citation359 A.2d 28
PartiesSherman L. ROBERSON, Jr., Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION et al., Appellees.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

John Waller, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Leo N. Gorman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom C. Francis Murphy, Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., at the time the brief was filed, Louis P. Robbins, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees.

Before REILLY, Chief Judge, and KERN and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Sherman Roberson was employed at Federal City College [FCC] from July 1970 to June 30, 1973. On June 9, 1972, appellant entered into a one-year employment contract with appellee Board of Higher Education signed by Dr. Harlan Randolph, then president of FCC, to serve as the assistant to the president for community affairs. The contract was to begin on July 1, 1972, and to terminate on June 30, 1973. On July 28, 1972, Dr. Randolph was relieved of his duties as president of FCC; Dr. Elgy Johnson was later named acting president.

The employment contract incorporated a memorandum of understanding which permitted the president of FCC to terminate or modify the contract for acts detrimental to FCC, but only "in accordance with established policies and procedures, of the Board of Higher Education." This phrase evidently referred to Board of Higher Education Resolution No. 70-1, which provides in part:

1. That at least 30 calendar days in advance of a proposed removal, demotion, reduction in rank or compensation, suspension without pay for more than 30 days, or furlough without pay, of any employee of the Board of Higher Education, the President of Federal City College . . . shall transmit to the employee . . a letter containing:

a. A statement of the action proposed;

b. The reasons for the proposed action, stated specifically and in detail

. . . .

5. That an appeal from the action of the President to the Board of Higher Education shall be taken by submitting to the Chairman of the Board, in writing, a statement of the basis for the appeal, and whether a hearing is desired.

Appellant agreed in the contract to "undertake and perform those duties assigned [to] him by" the president or the Board of Higher Education.

Appellant brought suit against appellees on November 8, 1972, seeking damages and equitable relief for alleged breach of his employment contract.1 The complaint was amended on February 12, 1975, and as amended it asserted that appellees, in violation of the contract, had (1) witheld four semi-monthly paychecks due appellant, two of which were later paid, (2) relieved appellant of his duties under the contract as assistant to the president and reassigned him to a "demeaning clerical position" as Acting Associate, Office of the Vice President for Planning and Development, (3) denied him a step increase in salary, and (4) failed to renew his employment contract; appellant further alleged that appellees had (5) willfully and maliciously denied him a step increase, and (6) willfully and maliciously failed to renew his contract, in violation of appellant's due process rights. As a result of these alleged violations, appellant requested $3,000 in actual damages, $45,000 in compensatory damages, $50,000 in punitive damages, and a court order directing appellees to reinstate appellant to the position of assistant to the president.

The case was tried on February 27, 1975, after which the court awarded appellant $655.65, the amount of one withheld paycheck,2 but held that as to his five other allegations, appellant had failed to establish his entitlement to any damages.3 In the alternative, the trial court noted that appellant had not exhausted his administrative remedies, that appellees' conduct did not give rise to the initiation of an adverse action procedure under Board of Higher Education Resolution No. 70-1, and that appellees' conduct under all the circumstances, except for withholding of tho paycheck, was in accord with the contract.

We agree that appellant failed to prove a breach of his employment contract or any other ground for relief, and consequently that he is not entitled to any damages for the five claims before us on this appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.4

Appellant alleges that appellees breached his employment contract when they took certain "adverse actions" against him without having followed the procedures of Resolution No. 70-1. According to that resolution, however, adverse actions subject to these procedural requisites are actions such as "removal, demotion, reduction in rank or compensation, [or] suspension without pay . . ." Appellant retained the same pay and grade level after his transfer; only his title and duties changed, and the trial court evidently concluded that the changes were not significant. Hence, appellant was not demoted or reduced in rank or compensation. Nor did the denial of a step increase or the failure to renew the contract constitute a removal, demotion, or reduction in rank or pay. Rather, these omissions maintained the status quo and did not adversely affect appellant. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court's findings that no adverse actions occurred and that no adverse action proceeding was necessary are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous, and consequently we must accept these findings on appeal.5 See Stone Heating & Ventilating Co., Inc. v. Anacostia Leasing Corp., D.C.App., 256 A.2d 923, 924 (1969); Freas v. Gitomer, D.C.App., 256 A.2d 573, 574 (1969); D.C.Code 1973, § 17-305(a).

Furthermore, we note that each event appell...

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    ...(D.D.C.1997) ("[g]overnmental agencies of the District of Columbia are not suable entities") (citing Roberson v. District of Columbia Bd. of Higher Educ., 359 A.2d 28, 31 n. 4 (D.C.1976); Miller v. Spencer, 330 A.2d 250, 251 n. 1 (D.C. 1974)); Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 1996 WL 440551......
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    ...and Department of Administrative Services are non sui juris ), aff'd, 314 F.3d 641 (D.C.Cir.2003); Roberson v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Higher Educ., 359 A.2d 28, 31 n. 4 (D.C.1976) (holding the Board of Education is not a suable entity); Miller v. Spencer, 330 A.2d 250, 251 n. 1 (D.C.1974)......
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