Roberson v. Manning

• Decision Date: 27 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. S–13371.,S–13371.
• Citation: 268 P.3d 1090
• Parties: Diane ROBERSON, Appellant, v. Wayne MANNING and Dennis Wilson, Appellees.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

268 P.3d 1090

Diane ROBERSON, Appellant,

v.Wayne MANNING and Dennis Wilson, Appellees.

No. S–13371.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Jan. 27, 2012.

Goriune Dudukgian, Alaska Legal Services Corporation, Anchorage, for Appellant.

Appellees did not participate.

Before: CARPENETI, Chief Justice, FABE, WINFREE, CHRISTEN, and STOWERS, Justices.

OPINION

STOWERS, Justice.I. INTRODUCTION

Wayne Manning told Diane Roberson he would give her his share of their jointly purchased mobile home. Without her knowledge, he then transferred title of the mobile home to his name only and sold it to Dennis Wilson. Wilson attempted to terminate Roberson's tenancy in the mobile home. Roberson filed suit in the superior court to be declared the owner of the home. The court concluded that Manning did not give his share of the home to Roberson and that Wilson was a good-faith purchaser and therefore the owner. Roberson appeals, arguing that she is the owner because Manning's gift to her was valid and the sale to Wilson was invalid. We vacate the superior court's conclusion that Manning did not give Roberson the home. We also vacate the superior court's determination that Wilson was a good-faith purchaser. We remand for additional findings on both of these issues.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Diane Roberson and Wayne Manning were romantically involved between September 1989 and June 2005. In 1997 Roberson and Manning jointly purchased a mobile home in Anchorage. The financing bank retained the title, which remained in the name of the previous owners with the “transferee” line left blank.

The two occupied the mobile home off and on until 1999, after which time they rented it to Roberson's daughter.

On June 25, 2005, Manning petitioned for a domestic violence protective order against Roberson. Roberson moved into the mobile home with her daughter on or around the day the petition for a protective order was filed. At a June 30 hearing on the protective order petition, Manning stated on the record, “I'm going to pay it off and she can have my share of it. I don't have a problem with that.” ¹

Soon thereafter, Manning paid the remaining balance on the mobile home and received the original title from the bank. In August 2006 Manning titled the mobile home in his name by filling in the transferee line on the original title with his name only. In August or early September he agreed to sell the mobile home to Dennis Wilson for $10,000.

Before the sale, Wilson visually inspected the outside of the mobile home and observed that someone was living there, but he did not inspect the inside. Wilson paid Manning $2,000 down in exchange for the title and agreed to pay the remainder within 30 to 45 days. Around the time of the sale, Manning told Wilson that his ex-girlfriend was living in the mobile home, but not that Roberson and Manning had been co-purchasers of the home. Wilson transferred the title to his name on September 2, 2006. Wilson later testified that after “this lawsuit came up,” he told Manning he would not pay the remaining $8,000 until title was “straightened out” or, as Manning testified, until Wilson “got rid of Ms. Roberson from the trailer.”

On September 6, 2006, Wilson had a Notice to Terminate Tenancy delivered to Roberson. It informed her that the mobile home had been sold to Wilson and that Wilson would evict her if she did not vacate the home by October 6.

Roberson remained in the mobile home and filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the superior court against Manning and Wilson. She requested declarations that she was the mobile home's rightful owner and that Wilson was not a bona fide purchaser. She also requested injunctions prohibiting Manning or Wilson from evicting her and ordering them to convey the mobile home's title to her.

The superior court conducted a bench trial in July 2008. At that time, Roberson was still living in the mobile home. Manning testified that he agreed to give Roberson his share of the mobile home at the 2005 domestic violence hearing only because she was trying to move into his house where he lived with his mother. He feared that if Roberson returned to his house, she would abuse his mother. As a result, he argued that the gift was made under duress and was therefore invalid. Wilson, who was pro se, argued that he was the rightful owner because he purchased the mobile home in good faith.

The superior court concluded that Manning did not give his share of the mobile home to Roberson because there was no delivery through title transfer. The court also concluded that Wilson was a good-faith purchaser of the mobile home. It concluded that Roberson and Manning were co-owners of the mobile home and that Roberson should receive 50% of the proceeds of the sale. The court further concluded that Wilson was entitled to immediate possession.

On appeal, Roberson argues that Manning gave her his share of the mobile home. She argues that the superior court erred in concluding that Wilson was the owner of the home because Manning did not have voidable title to her share of the mobile home and Wilson was not a good-faith purchaser. She asks us to reverse the superior court and hold that she is the sole owner of the home.

III. DISCUSSIONA. Standard Of Review

We apply our independent judgment to questions of law, adopting “the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” ² We review de novo the application of law to facts.³

B. It Was Error To Conclude That Manning Did Not Give His Share Of The Mobile Home To Roberson Solely Because Manning Did Not Deliver Title.

The superior court concluded that Manning did not give his share of the mobile home to Roberson at the June 2005 hearing because, although “intention to give it up was expressed,” Manning never transferred title to Roberson. Roberson argues that Manning delivered the property because she was living in the home as of June 2005, and that Manning therefore properly gave her his share of the mobile home.

Under Alaska law, the transfer of ownership of a vehicle, including a mobile home,⁴ is “not effective” ⁵ until the original owner “deliver [s] the certificates of title and registration to the transferee at the time of delivery of the vehicle.” ⁶ Failure of delivery of the title and registration, however, only “creates a presumption ... that there has been no delivery” until title has passed properly.⁷ “[T]his presumption may be rebutted by a showing that there has actually been a delivery and that ownership has actually passed ... in conformity with the true intentions of the parties.” ⁸ Alaska Statute 28.10.261 supports this interpretation, providing that “[i]n a civil ... proceeding, when the title or right to possession of a vehicle is involved, the ... records of the [Department of Motor Vehicles] are prima facie evidence of the ownership or right to possession.” The statute “does not preclude oral testimony as to the ownership, or right to possession, of a motor vehicle” that can outweigh the prima facie evidence.⁹

It was legal error to conclude that Manning did not transfer his share of the mobile home to Roberson solely because he did not transfer title. The superior court should have viewed the failure to transfer title as only prima facie evidence and considered whether the other evidence of transfer of ownership presented at trial outweighed the prima facie evidence.¹⁰ Because additional findings of fact are required to correctly apply the law, we vacate the superior court's conclusion and remand for a determination of whether Roberson overcame the presumption that there was no delivery of the mobile home.¹¹

The superior court must determine the true intentions of the parties to fully assess whether Roberson overcame the presumption that there had been no delivery of the mobile home.¹² The superior court must also determine if Manning had the necessary donative intent to make a gift of his share of the mobile home to Roberson, rather than a mere promise to make a gift in the future. Generally, a promise that is not supported by consideration is not legally enforceable.¹³ Manning's donative intent must be clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal.¹⁴ The superior court should look to the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties, the relationship between the parties, and especially Manning's direct expressions in order to determine his intent.¹⁵

At the bench trial before the superior court, Manning also argued that the gift was made under duress, thus signifying that he did not truly intend to give Roberson the mobile home. Therefore, the superior court should also consider whether Roberson exerted undue influence over Manning. We have held that a gift is void if obtained by undue influence.¹⁶ When determining whether there was undue influence, the superior court should consider the effect of the influence, the person by whom it was exerted, the time and place, and all other circumstances.¹⁷ Manning has the burden of showing that he was “virtually compelled” to give Roberson the mobile home, and that he “would not have [given] it if left to the free exercise of [his] own judgment and wishes.” ¹⁸

C. The Question Whether Wilson Was A Good–Faith Purchaser Must Be Remanded To The Superior Court For Further Findings.

The superior court concluded that Wilson was a good-faith purchaser because there was no evidence of impropriety or conspiracy, and Wilson offered a price for the home that was “consistent with his purposes and needs.” As a result, the court concluded that Wilson was entitled to possession, and Manning and Roberson, as co-owners, should divide the proceeds of the sale equally.

Roberson argues that Wilson was not a good-faith purchaser because he knew Roberson was living in the home but never inquired about her interest in it, and because he knew the purchase price was far below market value. On the issue of Wilson's knowledge, Manning testified at the trial that he had told Wilson that...