Roberson v. State
| Decision Date | 12 February 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 481S112,481S112 |
| Citation | 430 N.E.2d 1173 |
| Parties | William C. ROBERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
John W. Brooks, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., of Indiana, Aimee L. Kolze, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Appellant was charged in a four-count information of Theft, two counts of Attempted Murder and resisting a law enforcement officer. Trial by court resulted in a finding of guilty on all four counts. He received sentences of two years on the theft count, forty years on the attempted murder counts, and two years on the resisting arrest count. The sentences were to be served concurrently. Appellant does not question his conviction on the theft count or the resisting arrest count, but confines his assignments of error in this cause to the murder counts.
The record shows the following facts. At approximately 2:00 A.M. on April 29, 1980, Indianapolis Police Officer Roy Street was on routine patrol at the corner of Woodlawn and Virginia Avenue in the City of Indianapolis. As he passed Mac's Auto Sales, he observed a person later identified as the appellant in this cause crouching next to a vehicle parked in the auto sales lot. As the police officer got out of his car to investigate he noticed an automobile at the scene had both its trunk and hood open and there was an automobile tire and wheel in the trunk of the car, and also one in the backseat of the car. Appellant came from behind the car and stated that his car would not start. As the officer and appellant talked, the officer noticed a tire and jack sitting a few feet in front of appellant's car.
At this point appellant entered his car and attempted to start it. The officer ordered the appellant from the car and attempted to place handcuffs on him. Immediately the appellant began to struggle and shouted, As the officer and appellant struggled, the officer struck the appellant in the forehead with his flashlight. Meanwhile the appellant continued to shout, "Don't beat me."
As the two fought, the officer informed appellant that he should "Quit fighting, or I will let this dog out of the car." While fighting with appellant the officer was able to contact other officers through a microphone attached to his jacket. As the officer and appellant struggled, the officer's dog became excited and was trying to get out of the backseat of the police car to aid the officer.
Appellant claims now that the activity of the dog and the presence of the officer caused him to be fearful he was going to be attacked. As the officer drew his revolver to try to subdue the appellant, the appellant grabbed the barrel of the gun and a fight for possession of the gun ensued. The officer testified he could have shot appellant but he chose not to hoping to subdue him without injuring him.
In the meantime appellant pulled a razor from his pocket and held it to the officer's throat advising him to drop the pistol, which the officer did. With appellant then in possession of the gun, the officer attempted to get behind his car in order to put the automobile between he and appellant. However, appellant fired a shot striking the officer in the calf of the leg. As the officer then got behind the car, four more shots were fired, one of which blew the antenna from the police vehicle. At that time Officer Robert Harlis, responding to Officer Street's call for help arrived at the scene, and as he alighted from his car appellant pointed the gun at him and fired the remaining shot at Officer Harlis. The shot struck Officer Harlis's car. Appellant jumped in his automobile and fled the scene. As he did so, Officer Harlis fired a shot breaking the rear window behind the driver of the fleeing car. Continued pursuit of appellant resulted in the officers being directed to appellant's house where he was apprehended hiding behind a mattress in a storage closet.
It is appellant's contention that the finding of guilty of attempt to commit murder is not sustained by sufficient evidence. Appellant maintains the evidence failed to offer any substantial proof that appellant performed either of the two acts necessary to commit an attempt. He correctly maintains that first the State must prove the defendant was acting with a specific intent to commit the crime and second he must be shown to have engaged in an overt...
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Humbert v. Smith
...evidence and determine which witnesses to believe or disbelieve. Cuppett v. State (1983), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 298, 300; Roberson v. State (1982), Ind., 430 N.E.2d 1173, 1174. The evidence is of sufficient probative value to support the trial court's Humbert contends that the judgment in this c......
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Shields v. State
...by reason of intoxication, he must be so intoxicated as to be incapable of entering the required specific intent. Roberson v. State, (1982) Ind., 430 N.E.2d 1173. The degree of intoxication is a question of fact, and the burden of proving intoxication is on the defendant. Bates v. State, (1......
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Brooks v. State, 40A04–1512–CR–2373.
...However, the jury was under no obligation to believe Mays's explanation for why he and Brooks stole the trucks. See Roberson v. State, 430 N.E.2d 1173, 1175 (Ind.1982) (providing that it "is the prerogative of the trier of fact to believe the witnesses or disbelieve them, and to disregard t......
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Marshall v. State
...Cuppet v. State (1983), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 298. It was for the jury to determine which witnesses to believe or disbelieve. Roberson v. State (1982), Ind., 430 N.E.2d 1173. The evidence is sufficient to support the Appellant claims the deputy prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his trial. ......