Robert B v. State Of Md.
| Decision Date | 08 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | 2009.,No. 266,266 |
| Citation | 998 A.2d 909,193 Md.App. 620 |
| Parties | ROBERT B.v.STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Mary-Denise Davis & Brian M. Saccenti (Elizabeth L. Julian, Acting Public Defender, on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellant.
Sarah P. Pritzlaff (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellee.
Panel: EYLER, DEBORAH S., MEREDITH, PAUL A. HACKNER (Specially Assigned), JJ.
On March 20, 2009, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied Appellant Robert B.'s 1 petition for expungement of a criminal charge on the ground that he was not qualified for an expungement under Md.Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol., 2009 Cum.Supp.), § 10-105(e)(4) of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”). Appellant challenges that order, and presents a single question for review. As we have restated it, the question before this Court is whether the circuit court committed error in denying Robert B.'s expungement because he was a “defendant in a pending criminal proceeding,” as contemplated by CP § 10-105(e)(4).
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the circuit court committed legal error and we will reverse and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Appellant was charged with possession with intent to distribute and simple possession of a controlled dangerous substance in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City on June 7, 2008. On August 7, 2008, the State entered a nolle prosequi on the possession with intent to distribute charge, leaving only the simple possession count for trial. On September 9, 2008, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City after appellant requested a jury trial. A nolle prosequi was entered on the remaining possession charge on October 6, 2008.
Appellant filed a petition for expungement of both charges in accordance with CP § 10-105(a) on February 6, 2009. The petition was accompanied by a general waiver of any liability claim against the Baltimore City Police Department. At the time he filed the petition, appellant was on probation for a prior armed robbery conviction that resulted from a guilty plea on July 25, 2007, in the Circuit Court for Howard County. Due to appellant's probationary status, the State objected to the petition for expungement, contending that appellant “has been charged with a crime.”
The circuit court denied the petition for expungement, concluding that appellant was “a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding” because of his probationary status, and that he was therefore ineligible to obtain an expungement under CP § 10-105(e)(4)(ii)(2). Appellant subsequently noted this appeal.
Subtitle 1 of Criminal Procedure Article Title 10 deals with expungements in Maryland. First enacted in 1975, this subtitle sets forth the petition process and eligibility requirements to obtain an expungement. A criminal charge concluded by the entry of a nolle prosequi is generally subject to expungement under the statute:
However, that section limits the right to expungement as follows:
(Emphasis added).
Thus, the statute precludes expungement under two circumstances. First, a person is ineligible under subsection (e)(4)(ii)(1) if he “has been convicted of a crime other than a minor traffic violation” since the entry of a nolle prosequi.2 Second, a person is ineligible under subsection (e)(4)(ii)(2) if he is “a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding.”
The issue before this Court is whether the fact that appellant was on probation makes him “a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding” as contemplated by CP § 10-105(e)(4)(ii)(2).
The issue presented is purely a question of law. Therefore, this Court must determine whether the result reached by the trial court was legally correct without giving deference to the legal conclusion of the trial court. White, et al. v. The Pines Community Improvement Assoc., Inc., et al., 403 Md. 13, 31, 939 A.2d 165 (2008); YIVO Institute for Jewish Research v. Zaleski, 386 Md. 654, 662-63, 874 A.2d 411 (2005); Nesbit v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 72, 854 A.2d 879 (2004).
“ ‘The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.’ ” Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 661, 911 A.2d 1245 (2006) (quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 571, 911 A.2d 427 (2006)). The Court of Appeals has stated that, “[t]o determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning.” State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 348 Md. 2, 13, 702 A.2d 690 (1997); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 636 A.2d 448 (1994). “ ‘Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.’ ” Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388 (2006) (quoting Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 801 A.2d 160 (2002)). See also Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886 (2004). “When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the Legislature's intent.” Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 697 A.2d 455 (1997). “If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Stoddard, 395 Md. at 661, 911 A.2d 1245. See also Walzer, 395 Md. at 571, 911 A.2d 427 (quoting Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204 (1994)). Additionally, “[w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engaged in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute's meaning.” Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 776 A.2d 645 (2001). See also Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d 388. “ ‘If there is no ambiguity in th[e] language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends....' ” Stoddard, 395 Md. at 662, 911 A.2d 1245 (quoting Chow, 393 Md. at 443-44, 903 A.2d 388).
“If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then ‘courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration].’ ” Stoddard, 395 Md. at 662, 911 A.2d 1245 (quoting Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174, 680 A.2d 1052, (1996) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730 (1986))). The Court of Appeals has explained that there is ambiguity in a statute “when there exist ‘two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute.’ ” Stoddard, 395 Md. at 662, 911 A.2d 1245 (quoting Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d 388).
In construing a statute, “[w]e avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.” Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020 (2006) (citing Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822 (2005)); see also Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106 (1994). Additionally, “the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears.” State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133, 669 A.2d 1339 (1996). Because the language is a part of the context in which it is found, “related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered.” Gordon Family Partnership v. Gar On Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138, 702 A.2d 753 (1997) (citing Popham v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 333 Md. 136, 148, 634 A.2d 28 (1993)). “Thus, not only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part.” Id.
The expungement provisions of Subtitle 1 of Title 10 of the Criminal Procedure Article do not define the term “pending” as it is used in § 10-105(e)(4)(ii)(2). Nevertheless, there is no reason to think, nor do the parties suggest, that the term “pending” is ambiguous on its face. When interpreting an unambiguous statutory term, that term is defined by its common understanding. Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d 388; Stoddard, 395 Md. at 661, 911 A.2d 1245. The Court of Appeals has said that, “[w]hen the term in a statute is a legal term, absent any legislative intent to the contrary, the term is presumed to be used in its legal sense.” Montgomery County v. Wildwood Medical Center, L.L.C., 176 Md.App. 731, 741, 934 A.2d 484 (2007) (citing Dean v. Pinder, 312 Md. 154, 161, 538 A.2d 1184 (1988)).
We believe the term “pending,” as it is commonly...
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