Robert G., In re

• Decision Date: 01 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. 10,10
• Citation: 296 Md. 175,461 A.2d 1
• Parties: In re ROBERT G. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 175

296 Md. 175

461 A.2d 1

In re ROBERT G.

No. 10, Sept. Term, 1983.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 7, 1983.

George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on brief), for appellant.

Jillyn K. Schulze, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.

SMITH, Judge.

We shall here hold that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he determined that "good cause" had been shown for divulging juvenile court records.

This case arises under Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol., 1982 Cum.Supp.) § 3-828(b), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides, "A juvenile court record pertaining to a child is confidential and its contents may not be divulged, by subpoena or otherwise, except by order of the court upon good cause shown." The term "court" is defined in § 3-801(i) as to Montgomery County, from whence comes this case, as meaning "the District Court sitting as the juvenile court."

Robert G. was charged in Montgomery County with first degree murder, first degree sex offense and related offenses arising out of a single incident. The State sought a court order authorizing it to review Robert G's juvenile court record prior to making its decision as to whether to ask the death penalty for the offense. Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 412(b) requires the State, if it intends to seek the death sentence for first degree murder, to notify "the person in writing at least 30 days prior to trial" of such fact and to advise that person "of each aggravating circumstance upon which it intend[s] to rely ...." Aggravating circumstances are as set forth in Art. 27, § 413(d).

In Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 495, 348 A.2d 837 (1975), Judge Singley referred for the Court to the State's attorney's "most awesome discretionary power: to determine whether or not to prosecute." Obviously, whether or not to seek the death penalty is an even more awesome power. It was for the purpose of determining whether the death penalty should be sought that the State's Attorney for Montgomery County asked that the juvenile court record in question be disclosed to him. The trial judge said in determining to make the material available to the State:

"There is a great deal of material in [Robert G's] file. This member of the court is personally familiar with [Robert G.] and probably most of his prior record.... [T]he court is generally aware that there is a rather extensive juvenile court record as well, in the legal sense, as well as a great deal of evaluative materials, probation reports, (unclear word) investigations and so forth, that make up [Robert G.'s] file. That I'm sure are and have been of assistance to Defense counsel and would be of some assistance to the State. The court is going to order the release of the records to the State's Attorney. I feel that this should be done for two reasons. First of all the--the being a major offense I don't want this to be considered a precedent for any serious charge, I'll have to determine what constitutes a sufficiently serious charge in future cases but clearly the charges here are of major proportions. And I feel that the--it is in the interest of the community, in the interest of the public to give the State the same advantage in determining matters that are in the file and the weight to be accorded them and the use to be made of them, the same advantage as has already been given to Defense counsel in this case. Limiting it to the facts of this case of course. The State has some decisions to make. And there of course is the proceeding before the State's Attorney wherein the determination be made whether to seek the death penalty, and I feel the State should in that circumstance alone be, be able to have the same material available to it in making its determination and responding to Defense counsel as would the Defense counsel in presenting matters in mitigation. I don't mean to sound naive, the State has alluded to it, that there is some of this material in here that may well be beneficial to [Robert G.] and make the difference between what the State decides to do and what it decides not to do. Clearly in my view some of this material may be beneficial to him in the sentencing aspect if he is convicted of any or all of these offenses. But of course that would be as I read it automatically accessible to parole and probation in any event. That is not really part of my determination.

But I do find that good cause has been shown and the need for this material to be available to the State."

Robert G. immediately appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted his petition for a writ of certiorari prior to argument in that court. The cause was argued before us on April 4, 1983. At that time we issued a per curiam order affirming the judgment of the District Court of Maryland, Montgomery County, for reasons to be stated in an opinion to be filed later and directed that the mandate should issue forthwith. We now state our reasons.

Robert G. points out that one of the purposes of the juvenile subtitle is, as set forth in § 3-802(a)(2), "[t]o remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior...." He also says that § 3-802(b) states that the "subtitle shall be liberally construed to effectuate these purposes." All parties concede that the only exception to the required confidentiality of juvenile records which could be applicable to this proceeding would be if there has been "good cause shown."

Black's Law Dictionary 623 (5th ed. 1979), defines good cause as:

"Substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse. Legally sufficient ground or reason. Phrase 'good cause' depends upon circumstances of individual case, and finding of its existence lies largely in discretion of officer or court to which decision is committed.... 'Good cause' is a relative and highly abstract term, and its meaning must be determined not only by verbal context of statute in which term is employed but also by context of action and procedures involved in type of case presented." (Citations omitted.)

There are no prior Maryland cases arising under this statute. However, this Court has considered the term "good cause" in a variety of contexts. Our view of "good cause" has been as stated by Black. Without exception we have applied an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing action by a trial judge.

One of our most recent cases is Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 456 A.2d 29, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2114, 77 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1983). At issue there was the exclusion of a defendant's only alibi witness whose identity had not been disclosed prior to trial as required by Maryland Rule 741. Rule 741 g provides that "[u]pon motion and for good cause shown, the court may order that specified disclosures be restricted." The rule also allows the trial court to "strike the testimony to which the undisclosed matter relates ... [or] prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the matter not disclosed ...." We held that "good cause" depends upon facts and circumstances.

In Mathias v. State, 284 Md. 22, 394 A.2d 292 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906, 99 S.Ct. 1996, 60 L.Ed.2d 375 (1979), we addressed the issue of an attempt on the part of an accused on the morning of trial to change his election of a court trial to that of a jury trial. What was then Rule 741 provided that a trial court might, "in its discretion and for good cause shown, at any time prior to the trial permit the accused to change his election." We said there:

"Precisely what is meant by an abuse of discretion seems not to have been articulated by this Court. However, some bench marks are to be found. For example, in Washington, B. & A.R.R. v. Kimmey, 141 Md. 243, 250, 118 A. 648 (1922), relative to the discretion to be exercised in considering a motion for a new trial, Judge Urner said for our predecessors, 'A discretion could not be characterized as sound which wholly disregarded evidence by which its exercise should have been aided.' In Horton v. Horton, 157 Md. 127, 133, 145 A. 355 (1929), concerning the discretion of orphans' courts in the case of intestacy to grant letters to a child or to the husband or widow, as the case might be, the Court said, '[I]t means that the court shall actually exercise a discretion, and that it shall make its choice after considering the relative merits and fitness of the applicants, and their respective claims to consideration, and not that it may act without regard to such consideration, solely at its pleasure or caprice.' In Lee v. State, 161 Md. 430, 157 A. 723 (1931), Chief Judge Bond said for the Court:

'The meaning of discretionary power in a trial court, and the rules governing review of discretionary orders on appeal, have often been stated in vague, loose terms which furnish no exact guidance; but for the purposes of this case it seems to us sufficient to observe only that the judgment and discretion must be exercised in solving the exact problem of the law, upon all the considerations which properly enter into the problem, and form it. For instance, the discretion being for the solution of the problem arising from the circumstances of each case as it is presented, it has been held that the court could not dispose of all cases alike by a previous general rule. Union Bank v. Ridgely, 1 H. & G. 324, 407 [ (1827) ].' Id. at 441."

284 Md. at 26-27, 394 A.2d 292.

In Stanford v. District Title Insur., 260 Md. 550, 273 A.2d 190 (1971), appellee requested and was granted a dismissal for lack of prosecution pursuant to Rule 530. Plaintiff appealed. Rule 530 c at that time provided that the trial court "for good cause shown" might suspend the operation of the rule upon such terms as the court may prescribe. In the...