Robert Oliver, the Bank of the United States, and the Union Bank of Maryland, Assignees of Smith and Buchanan, Hollins and Blair, and John Styles, Executor of George Styles, Appellants v. James Alexander Andothers, Seamen of the Ship Warren, Appellees
| Decision Date | 01 January 1832 |
| Docket Number | SEVENTY-SEVEN |
| Citation | 31 U.S. 143,8 L.Ed. 349,6 Pet. 143 |
| Parties | ROBERT OLIVER, THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE UNION BANK OF MARYLAND, ASSIGNEES OF SMITH AND BUCHANAN, HOLLINS AND M'BLAIR, AND JOHN S. STYLES, EXECUTOR OF GEORGE STYLES, APPELLANTS v. JAMES ALEXANDER ANDOTHERS, SEAMEN OF THE SHIP WARREN, APPELLEES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
[144]
APPEAL from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland.
Mr Hoffman, for the appellees, moved to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction; the sum in controversy between the appellants and the individual appellees not being sufficient to sustain the appeal.
The motion was argued by Mr Wirt and Mr Taney for the appellants; and by Mr Hoffman for the appellees.
This is an appeal from certain decrees of the circuit court of the district of Maryland, rendered in pursuance of the mandate of this court when the same cause was formerly before us; the report of which will be found in 5 Peters's Rep. 675, et seq.
After the cause was remanded, the circuit court referred it to a commissioner to ascertain and report to the court the sums respectively due to each of the officers and seamen, who were libellants for their wages, and interest thereon. In conformity with this order of reference, the commissioner made reports of the amount so due to each of the libellants then before the court; and thereupon the court, after confirming the second and final report of the commissioner, proceeded to enter a separate decree for each libellant for the amount so found due to him; and to apportion, pro rata, the payment of the same out of the funds in the hands of Robert Oliver and others, the assignees in whose hands the funds were attached: and to decree the deficit to be paid by the owners of the ship Warren. The sums so decreed to the libellants, respectively, in no case exceeded nine hundred dollars, and most of them fell short of five hundred dollars. From the separate decrees so rendered, the assignees prayed an appeal to this court, and give a several appeal bond, upon the appeal from each decree; as well as a joint appeal bond for the whole. Under these circumstances a motion has been made to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground that the sum in controversy in each decree is less than two thousand dollars; and as such, is insufficient to give this court appellate jurisdiction. The motion is resisted upon the other side, upon the ground that the aggregate in controversy, under the whole of the decrees taken together, greatly exceeds that value.
The question is one of great practical importance; but, in our judgment, not of any intrinsic difficulty. The present is a case of seamen's wages, in which there is necessarily a several and distinct contract with each seaman, for the voyage, at his own rate of wages; and though all may sign the same shipping paper, no one is understood to contract jointly with, or to incur responsibility for any of the others. The shipping articles constitute a several contract with each seaman to all intents and purposes; and are so contemplated by the act of congress for the government and regulation of seamen in the merchants' service; act of 1790, chap. 29; and have been so practically interpreted by courts of justice, as well as by merchants and mariners, in all commercial nations in modern times. It is well known that every seaman has a right to sue severally for his own wages in the courts of common law; and that a joint action cannot be maintained in suc courts by any number of the seamen, for wages accruing under the same shipping articles for the same voyage. The reason is, that the common law will not tolerate a joint action, except by persons who have a joint interest, and upon a joint contract. If the cause of action is several, the suit must be several also. But a different course of practice has prevailed for ages in the court of admiralty, in regard to suits for seamen's wages. It is a special favour, and a peculiar privilege allowed to them, and to them only; and is confined strictly to demands for wages. The reason upon which this privilege is founded, is equally wise and humane: it is to save the parties from oppressive costs and expenses, and to enable speedy justice to be administered to all who stand in a similar predicament; in the expressive language of the maritime law, velis levatis. And the benefit is equally as great to the ship owner as to the seamen; though the burthen would otherwise fall upon the latter, from their general improvidence and proverty, with a far heavier weight. A joint libel may therefore always be filed in the admiralty by all the seamen who claim wages for services rendered in the same voyage, under the same shipping articles. But although the libel is thus in form joint, the contract is always treated in the admiralty according to the truth of the case, as a several and distinct contract with each seaman. Each is to stand or fall by the merits of his own claim, and is unaffected by those of his co-libellants. The defence which is good against one seaman, may be wholly inapplicable to another. One may have been paid; another may not have performed the service; and another may have forfeited in whole or in part his claim to wages. But no decree whatsoever, which is made in regard to such claim, can possibly avail to the prejudice of the merits of others, which do not fall within the same predicament. And wherever, from the nature of the defence, it is inapplicable to the whole crew, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Snyder v. Harris Gas Service Company v. Coburn
...and distinct claims. This judicial interpretation has been uniform since at least the 1832 decision of this Court in Oliver v. Alexander, 6 Pet. 143, 8 L.Ed. 349. There are no doubt hazards and pitfalls involved in assuming that re-enactment of certain language by Congress always freezes th......
-
Zahn v. International Paper Company 8212 888
...989 (1882); Seaver v. Bigelows, 5 Wall. 208, 18 L.Ed. 595 (1867); Stratton v. Jarvis, 8 Pet. 4, 8 L.Ed. 846 (1834); Oliver v. Alexander, 6 Pet. 143, 8 L.Ed. 349 (1832). Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969), noted that the judicial interpretation of 'matter in......
-
Travelers Prop. Cas. & Travelers Indem. Co. v. Good
...of the Supreme Court rather than the original subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts. See Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143, 8 L.Ed. 349 (1832). Much later, in 1893, “the original Alexander construction of [the Court's] appellate jurisdiction was applied to the jurisdict......
-
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Benson Hardware Co.
... 132 So. 622 222 Ala. 429 UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY CO. v. BENSON ... 378; Wynn ... v. Tallapoosa County Bank, 168 Ala. 469, 53 So. 228. As ... a general ... demonstrate: Oliver v. Alexander, 6 Pet. 143, 8 ... L.Ed. 349; ... By so ... doing, appellants concede the sufficiency or their gross ... contractor, Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., ... 244 U.S. 376, 37 S.Ct. 614, 61 ... In our ... case of Union Indemnity Co. v. Handley, 220 Ala ... 292, 124 ... exceptions for which those appellees whose judgments are ... reversed should not bear ... ...
-
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND THE COMMON-LAW SCOPE OF THE CIVIL ACTION.
...supra note 3. That article similarly addresses the role of counterclaims in satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement. (18.) 31 U.S. 143 (1832). Justice Story indicated that the Court's treatment of the amount-in-controversy requirement in Oliver represented "the long and settled pra......