Robert R. Keegan v. Mark S. Sneed

• Decision Date: 16 October 2000
• Docket Number: 00-LW-4787,CA2000-02-029
• Citation: Robert R. Keegan v. Mark S. Sneed, 00-LW-4787, CA2000-02-029 (Ohio App. Oct 16, 2000)
• Parties: ROBERT R. KEEGAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees v. MARK S. SNEED, et al., Defendants-Appellants CASE
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

ROBERT R. KEEGAN, et al Plaintiffs-Appellees v. MARK S. SNEED, et al., Defendants-Appellants

No. CA2000-02-029

00-LW-4787 (12th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Twelfth District, Butler County.

October 16, 2000

Pratt Singer & Thomas Co., LPA, Michael R. Thomas, 301 N. Breiel Boulevard, Middletown, Ohio 45042, for plaintiffs-appelleesRobert R. Keegan, et al.

Freund Freeze & Arnold, Stephen C. Findley, Daniel D. Ernst, One Dayton Centre, One S. Main Street, Suite 1800, Dayton, Ohio 45402, for defendants-appellees, Mark S. Sneed and Taylor Home Improvement

Matthew E. Ice, 6047 Frantz Road, Suite 203, Columbus, Ohio 43017-6209, for defendant-appellant, Community Insurance Company

OPINION

YOUNG J.

Defendant-appellant, Community Insurance Company dba Anthem Blue Cross/Blue Shield ("Anthem"), appeals the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas finding that Anthem waived its rights of recovery in a personal injury suit by plaintiffs-appellees, Robert R. Keegan and his children, against Anthem and defendants-appellees, Mark S. Sneed and Taylor Home Improvement ("Taylor Home").

Keegan was injured in an automobile accident caused by Sneed, an employee of Taylor Home.Keegan incurred substantial medical expenses and lost wages.Anthem, as Keegan's health benefits provider, paid part of the medical expenses.

Keegan filed suit against Sneed and Taylor Home seeking compensation for his injuries and loss of consortium for his two sons.yfn Keegan named Anthem as a co-defendant praying for "a judgment against Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield for an itemization of those expenses that defendant has paid which were reasonable and necessary for injuries sustained in this collision[.]"yfn

Sneed and Taylor Home answered.Anthem also answered.Anthem cross-claimed for subrogation against Sneed and Taylor Home for the medical expense benefits it paid on Keegan's behalf.Anthem also counterclaimed for reimbursement against Keegan, in the event that he received a judgment against Sneed and Taylor Home.yfn Sneed and Taylor Home and Keegan timely answered the cross-claim and counterclaim.

The parties were ordered to mediate the dispute, and Keegan settled with Sneed and Taylor Home.Although Anthem was present at the mediation, it refused settlement offers.Keegan's causes of action against Sneed and Taylor Home were dismissed.Anthem voluntarily dismissed its cross-claim and counterclaim.

The parties filed pretrial statements.Anthem then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.Anthem argued that the complaint did not properly set forth an action for declaratory judgment.Keegan filed a memorandum in opposition, as well as his own motion for judgment on the pleadings.Keegan argued that Anthem waived its subrogation rights by dismissing its cross-claim and counterclaim.Keegan requested judgment as to expenses arising out of the collision.

A bench trial was held on Keegan's apparent declaratory judgment claim against Anthem.After Keegan's presentation, Anthem made a motion to dismiss for failure to show a right to relief.The trial court overruled all the outstanding motions.Anthem presented no testimony or evidence.

The trial court filed a decision finding that Keegan's third cause of action, as against Anthem, stated a cause of action for declaratory relief of the rights of Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield and Robert R. Keegan pursuant to the subrogation clause in the policy of health insurance.Ohio clearly is a notice pleading state and all parties in this particular case treated the complaint as a declaratory judgment action.This is strongly evidenced by Defendant Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield's action in subsequently filing its cross claim and counterclaim against the plaintiff and the tortfeasor.

The trial court found that Anthem failed to prove that it had a subrogated interest or that the benefits it paid were "a proximate and direct result of the negligence of the tortfeasor."The trial court concluded that Anthem abandoned and waived any rights it had when it dismissed its cross-claim and counterclaim.The trial court entered judgment that Anthem "had no right of subrogation to any recoveries that the plaintiff may have received."yfn Anthem appeals, raising three assignments of error.

Assignment of Error No. 1:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ANTHEM'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND IN FINDING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WAS A CAUSE OF ACTION SEEKING A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.

Assignment of Error No. 2:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ANTHEM'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND IN DENYING ANTHEM'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO CIV.R. 41(B)(2), AS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT WAS NOT A PROPER DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AND PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF.

In its first two assignments of error, Anthem contends that Keegan failed to set forth a basis for declaratory judgment.It asserts that although Keegan continually claimed to be seeking to determine the parties' rights, those rights were not contested, and only the amount to be paid was at issue.

Civ.R. 12(C) provides:

Motion for judgment on the pleadings.After the pleadings are closed but within such times as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.

A motion pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) raises only questions of law to be determined by consideration of the pleadings.State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570;Kareth v. Toyota Motor Sales(Sept. 28, 1998), Clermont App. No. CA98-01-011, unreported, at 3, appeal dismissed(1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 1502.Dismissal of a cause under Civ.R. 12(C) is appropriate where the court(1) construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.

Midwest Pride IV, 75 Ohio St.3d at 570, citingLin v. Gatehouse Constr. Co.(1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 96, 99.Thus, Civ.R. 12(C) requires a finding that "no material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Midwest Pride IV, 75 Ohio St.3d at 570.Unlike a determination under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), which allows for review of the complaint alone, review under Civ.R. 12(C) allows all pleadings to be considered.Id. at 569.

A declaratory judgment action allows the court to declare the rights, status, and other legal relations and obligations of the parties.Civ.R. 57;yfn R.C. 2721.03;King v. W. Res. Group(1997), 125 Ohio App.3d 1, 5, discretionary appeal not allowed (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1502.Such an action is an appropriate mechanism for establishing the obligation of an insurer in a controversy between it and its insured as to the insurer's liability under the policy.Id.SeeAllstate Ins. Co. v. Coriell(C.P.1971), 30 Ohio Misc. 67.Three elements are necessary for declaratory judgment to be obtained as an alternate to other remedies:

(1) a real controversy within the scope of the Declaratory Judgment Act(R.C. 2721.01-.15) must exist between adverse parties;

(2) which is justiciable in nature; and

(3) speedy relief is necessary to the preservation of rights that may otherwise be impaired or lost.

Freedom Road Foundation v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 202, 204, rehearing/reconsideration denied, 80 Ohio St.3d 1481;Rocky Fork Hunt & Country Club v. Testa(1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 442, 445.A court may refuse a declaratory judgment where "the judgment or decree would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the action or proceeding[.]"R.C. 2721.07;Molnar v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm.(1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 318, 320.A declaratory judgment action "may not be used to determine isolated questions of fact."Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Cochrane(1951), 155 Ohio St. 305, paragraph two of the syllabus.Nor is such an action appropriate where "a resolution of the controversy depends greatly upon a determination of the facts of the case."Therapy Partners of America v. Health Providers, Inc.(1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 572, 578.

In the instant case, Keegan requested "a judgment against Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield for an itemization of those expenses that defendant has paid which were reasonable and necessary for injuries sustained in this collision[.]"Keegan based his third cause of action, that for a declaratory judgment, upon his admission that Anthem had rights of reimbursement and subrogation under the contract.As a result, there was no real controversy between Keegan and Anthem concerning their rights under the insurance contract.

The only dispute, and the judgment which Keegan requested, concerned the factual matter of the amount of expenses which Anthem paid and to which it could later claim right.In effect, Keegan attempted to force Anthem to prove, as a purely factual matter, what amounts it could ultimately recover from either Keegan or Sneed and Taylor Home.This was not a proper subject for a declaratory judgment action.

Keegan did not state any basis upon which declaratory judgment could be considered, as his complaint concerned only a factual matter, rather than a determination of rights under the insurance contract.The trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise and by denying Anthem's motion for judgment on the pleadings.The court further erred by holding a hearing on the non-existent claim for declaratory judgment.Because Anthem was entitled to judgment on the pleadings, we need not address the trial court's decision overruling Anthem's motion for dismissal pursuant to Civ.R 41(B)-(2), mooting the second assignment of error.The first assignment of error is...