Robert v. Autopart Int'l

• Decision Date: 30 June 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-07266-FLW-DEA
• Parties: JAVIER ROBERT, Plaintiff, v. AUTOPART INTERNATIONAL; Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

JAVIER ROBERT, Plaintiff, v. AUTOPART INTERNATIONAL; Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-07266-FLW-DEA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

June 30, 2015

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

OPINION

WOLFSON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

:

Plaintiff Javier Robert ("Plaintiff") asserts a claim for violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act of New Jersey ("CEPA"), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:19-1, et seq, stemming from an alleged instruction given to Plaintiff by his employer, Autopart International, Inc. ("Defendant"), relating to treatment of Plaintiff's injury.¹ Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is granted, and Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff has thirty (30) days to file a Motion to Amend his Complaint.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

The following allegations are taken as true for the purposes of this Motion. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant, working as a driver for the company. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 18. In January of 2012,² Plaintiff was involved in a traffic accident while driving in the course of his employ. Id. ¶ 8. In the accident, Plaintiff allegedly "sustain[ed] serious and permanent injuries[,]" id. ¶ 9, for which he sought medical treatment.

Plaintiff was first seen by a physician "authorized by Defendant," who recommended further medical treatment through a follow-up appointment. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12. However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant subsequently refused to let Plaintiff see Defendant's worker's compensation doctor and told him to file an insurance claim through his own personal insurance. Id. ¶ 13. The Complaint does not name the representative for Defendant who took this action and made this statement. See id. Whoever he or she may have been, Plaintiff alleges that he informed the representative that the proffered course of action would constitute insurance fraud, so he could not file such a claim. Id. ¶ 15.³

Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment on January 16, 2012, a termination which Plaintiff alleges took place as retaliation for his refusal to follow the unnamed representative's instruction. Compl. ¶ 18. This action followed. The Complaint was filed on January 16, 2013, inNew Jersey Superior Court.⁴ Defendant removed the case to federal court pursuant to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction on November 21, 2014. Petition for Removal ¶ 12.

Thereafter, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. Defendants contend that the factual allegations in the Complaint fail to satisfy all the elements of a CEPA claim. Accordingly, Defendant seeks dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

II. Standard of Review

When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations omitted). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court clarified the 12(b)(6) standard. Specifically, the Court "retired" the language contained in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 561 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46). Instead, the factual allegations set forth in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. As the Third Circuit has stated, "[t]he Supreme Court's Twombly formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus: 'stating . . . [a] claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element. This 'does not impose a probabilityrequirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 127 U.S. at 556); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[A] claimant does not have to 'set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.' . . . The pleading standard 'is not akin to a 'probability requirement[;] ". . . to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint merely has to state a 'plausible claim for relief.'" (Citations omitted)).

In affirming that Twombly's standards apply to all motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court explained several principles. First, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Second, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679. Therefore, "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. Ultimately, "a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). However, "a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings . . . [although a] limited exception exists for documents that are integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint." W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 98 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Third Circuit has reiterated that "judging the sufficiency of a pleading is a context-dependent exercise" and "[s]ome claims require more factual explication than others to state a plausible claim for relief." Id. at 98. This means that, "[f]or example, it generally takes fewerfactual allegations to state a claim for simple battery than to state a claim for antitrust conspiracy." Id. That said, the Rule 8 pleading standard is to be applied "with the same level of rigor in all civil actions." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct at 1953).

III. Discussion

New Jersey's CEPA statute provides, in part, that "[a]n employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee . . . objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy, or practice which the employee reasonably believes . . . is in violation of a law." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3c.

To maintain a claim for a CEPA violation, Plaintiff must allege factual support for the following: (1) Plaintiff reasonably believed Defendant's actions were violating the law; (2) Plaintiff performed some whistle-blowing action under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c; (3) Defendant took some adverse employment action against Plaintiff; and (4) a causal nexus exists between the whistle-blowing action and the adverse employment action. Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (N.J. 2003); Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 476 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)).

A. Plaintiff's Belief Notwithstanding, the Alleged Conversation Lacks Adequate Factual Basis in the Complaint

The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that "N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c does not require a plaintiff to show that a law, rule, regulation or clear mandate of public policy actually would be violated if all the facts he or she alleges are true. Instead, a plaintiff must set forth facts that would support an objectively reasonable belief that a violation has occurred." Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 464. The task falls to the Court to first determine whether "there is a substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and a law or public policy identified by the court or the plaintiff." Caver, 420 F.3d at 254 (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 464). Then, whether a belief is genuine andreasonable under the meaning of the statute is a question reserved for the finder of fact. Id. Accordingly, so long as Plaintiff has alleged that he believed the suggested action to be illegal, and so long as the Court finds a law to which the complained-of conduct is tied, the Complaint will pass 12(b)(6) muster on the first element of the CEPA claim.

Plaintiff has alleged that he "advised . . . Defendant that [filing on his personal insurance] was insurance fraud . . . ." Compl. ¶ 15. Inherent in this alleged statement is a belief that the action was illegal. Further, depending on the facts, the conduct could run afoul of New Jersey law relating to insurance fraud, possibly rendering Plaintiff's belief to be reasonable.⁵ See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-4.6 (2014). Accordingly, the first element of the CEPA claim could potentially be met if the allegation contained adequate factual support in the Complaint. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211.

However, Plaintiff provides zero factual allegations to support his claim relating to this communication. See generally Compl. No representative of Defendant is named as having participated in the alleged conversation or giving the alleged instruction. See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15. Nor does Plaintiff allege a date, time, or location at which the alleged conversation took place. See id. Plaintiff also does not identify who owned the vehicle he was driving. See id. Nor does the Complaint contain allegations relating to the medium through which the conversation wasfacilitated. See id. Nothing alleged in the Complaint provides support "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (Third Circuit case noting that the Twombly standard "simply calls for enough...