Robert Vandewater, Appellant v. Edward Mills, Claimant of the Steamship Yankee Blade, Her Tackle

• Citation: 60 U.S. 82,19 How. 82,15 L.Ed. 554
• Parties: ROBERT J. VANDEWATER, APPELLANT, v. EDWARD MILLS, CLAIMANT OF THE STEAMSHIP YANKEE BLADE, HER TACKLE, &C
• Decision Date: 01 December 1856
• Court: United States Supreme Court

60 U.S. 82

19 How. 82

15 L.Ed. 554

ROBERT J. VANDEWATER, APPELLANT, v. EDWARD MILLS, CLAIMANT OF THE STEAMSHIP YANKEE

BLADE, HER TACKLE, &C.

December Term, 1856

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of California.

It was a libel, filed originally in the District Court, by Vandewater, against the steamer Yankee Blade, for a violation of the following agreement:

'This agreement, made this twenty-fourth day of September, 1853, at the city of New York, between Edward Mills, as agent for owners of steamship Uncle Sam, and William H Brown, as agent for the owners of steamship America, witnesseth, that said Mills and Brown hereby agree with each other, as agents for the owners of said ships before named, to run the two ships in connection for one voyage, on terms as follows, viz:

'Of all moneys received from passengers, and for freight contracted through, between New York and San Francisco, both ways, the Uncle Sam shall receive seventy-five per cent., and the America shall receive twenty-five per cent. The money to be received here, by said E. Mills, and the share of the America to be paid over to William H. Brown, or to his order, (before the sailing of the ship,) and the the share due the America, of moneys received on the Pacific side, to be paid over to said Brown, or to his order, immediately on the arrival of the passengers in New York, by E. Mills, who guaranties, as agent aforesaid, the true and honest return of all funds received by his agents on the Pacific. It is understood that this trip is to be made by the Uncle Sam, leaving San Francisco on or about the 15th of October, and the America leaving New York on or about the 20th of October next.

'Each ship is to pay all expenses of her running and outfits, and to be responsible for her own acts in every respect. Each ship is to retain all the money received for local freight or passengers; that is, for such freight and passengers as only pay to the ports the individual ship runs to, without any division with the other ship.

'No commissions are to be charged anywhere on any receipts for the America, by said Mills, in division, but the expense of advertising and the amount paid out for runners, at all points, are to be borne by each ship in the same proportion as receipts are divided between them.

'In consideration of all the above well and truly performed in good faith, Edward Mills, as agent for the steamship Yankee Blade, hereby agrees, that when the America arrives at Panama, on her voyage hence for the Pacific ocean, said ship Yankee Blade shall leave New York at such time as to connect with the America, conveying passengers and freight on the same terms as is herein before agreed, (say 25 per cent. to the Yankee Blade, and 75 per cent. to the America.) Provided, only, that said connection shall be made at a time that will not prevent the Yankee Blade from making her connection with the Uncle Sam, at her regular time.'

After the usual preliminary proceedings in cases of libel, the proctors for the claimant filed the following exceptions:

The exceptions of Edward Mills, claimant and sole owner of the steamship Yankee Blade, to the libel of Robert J. Vandewater libellant, allege that the said libel is insufficient, as follows:

First Exception.—That, on the face of said libel, it appears that the alleged cause or causes of action therein set forth, are not within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this honorable court.

Second Exception.—There is no cause of action set forth in said libel, whereby the said steamship Yankee Blade can be proceeded against in rem in this honorable court.

Third Exception.—On the face of said libel, it appears the libellant is not entitled to the relief therein prayed for, nor to any decree against the said steamship.

And, therefore, the said claimant prays that the said libel may be dismissed with costs.

In June, 1855, the district judge sustained the exceptions, and dismissed the libel, whereupon the libellant appealed to the Circuit Court.

In September, the Circuit Court affirmed the decree, and the libellant brought the case up to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Cutting for the appellant, and Mr. Blair for the appellee.

Mr. Cutting made the following points:

I. Agreements for carrying passengers and freight on the high seas are maritime contracts, pertaining exclusively to the business of commerce and navigation, and may be enforced specifically against the vessel by courts of admiralty proceeding in rem.

No express pledge is necessary in order to create the lien.

The jurisdiction in rem for breach of contracts of affreightments, by vills of lading or otherwise, is recognised by numerous cases. The ground of such jurisdiction rests upon the maritime nature and subject-matter of the contract. 6 How. U. S. R., 392.

Contracts to carry passengers are analogous in principle. They are of a maritime nature in their essence and subject-matter; and when entered into with a particular ship, they bind her to the due performance of the service. The Pacific, 1 Blatch. R., 576, and the cases and arguments there presented.

II. This court has recognised and adopted this principle.

1. Maritime torts to passengers may be redressed in the admiralty in rem, by reason of the vessel being bound by the contract. S. B. New World v. King, 16 How. U. S. R., 469.

2. The case of the New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. The Merchants' Bank, 6 How. U. S. R., 392, establishes that contracts to be executed on the seas are maritime in their nature, and within the admiralty jurisdiction, as well in personam as in rem. The principle of that case embraces the present.

III. The contract, by Mills, as agent of the owners of the Yankee Blade, to proceed from New York with passengers and freight, to carry them to Panama, and to deliver them to the America, to be carried by her to San Francisco, is for a maritime service, to be performed upon the sea, and within the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States.

1. The mode or rate of compensation to be paid therefor does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The action is for a non-performance of the contract—not for an accounting. The circumstance that the amount of damages might, in part, depend upon the number of passengers that would have been carried, is of no consequence.

2. The agreement did not constitute a partnership between the steamers. Neither party had any joint interest in the vessel of the other, or in the voyage; there was no sharing of losses; each ship was to pay her own expenses of running and of outfits, and was responsible for her own acts in every respect.

The agreement to divide gross receipts was merely a mode of ascertaining the compensation to each vessel, for her separate services.

3. Even if the agreement were to be treated as a mutual arrangement between two vessels, for a joint service, to be rendered by them, on the sea—the compensation therefor to be an apportionment between them, of the whole freight and passage money to be earned by both—it would be a maritime contract, over which the admiralty has jurisdiction. 3 How., 568.

4. The contract is not one merely preliminary to a charter-party, but is a complete arrangement, to be treated as a charter-party, containing in itself the substantial provisions of such an instrument—a definite voyage to be performed on one side, and a definite compensation to be paid therefor by the other side. 3 Sum. R., 144, 148, 149.

Each vessel hired the use and employment of the other, for the proposed adventure; each was to receive, as compensation for such hiring, a certain sum, proportioned to the receipts of both vessels, for that trip. The distinctive characteristics of a charter-party are found.

The question of jurisdiction does not depend upon the particular name or character of the instrument, but whether it imports a maritime contract or not. The Tribune, 3 Sum. R., 144, 148.

5. The objection of the Circuit Court, that the contract was made by the owners, at the home port, does not appear to be authorized by any fact established in the case. The allegation of residence in the claim, (p. 8,) was merely formal, and not issuable. It does not appear where the owner or owners of the Yankee Blade resided at the time of the contract, nor what was her home port.

6. But assuming that the Yankee Blade belonged to New York, and that her owners resided there at the time of the contract, the Circuit Court erred in supposing that there could be no lien for that reason. The existence of a lien depends on the nature of the contract; and if that be maritime, and creates a lien, the circumstance that it is executed by the owner in person does not affect it. 1 Valin Ord. de la Mar., 630, Liv. III, Tit. I, Art. II; 2 Boul. Pat. Droit Com., 298; 3 Pardessus Lois Mar., 159; Ib., 281, 427; 2 Boucher Consul., 379, sec. 675; p. 457, sec. 870; 4 Pardessus, p. 40.

Contracts of affreightment and to carry passengers are frequently (and in New York most generally) made by the owners, or their immediate agents, in the home port. When bills of lading are signed in the home port by the owner, the lien of the shippers exists equally, as if the master had signed them.

The following are cases of liens created by contracts made with the owners in the home port: The Pacific, 1 Blatch. R., 576; The Aberfoyle, Ib., 207; Bearse v. Pigs Copper, 1 Sto., 314; The Mary, 1 Paine R., 671; The Draco, 2 Sum., 179.

7. The conclusion of the learned circuit judge, that this was a personal agreement between the owners of the two ships, and that a personal credit existed, which excluded the idea of a lien on the vessels, is not authorized by the facts.

The contract describes each of the parties to it, 'as agent' of the owners. The 'agents' acted as representatives of the vessels; the owners are not named or referred to. The inference is, that a mere personal credit was not relied on,...