Robert Westefer v. Snyder
| Decision Date | 25 February 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 00-708-GPM,CIVIL NO. 00-162-GPM |
| Parties | ROBERT WESTEFER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DONALD SNYDER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
This matter is before the Court on the following documents: the "Affidavit" filed by Maurice Wallace, construed by the Court as a motion to intervene (Doc. 601); Wallace's motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") (Doc. 602); the motion to strike Wallace's motion to intervene brought by Defendants Donald Snyder, Odie Washington, Michael V. Neal, George DeTella, Michael O'Leary, Thomas Page, Dwayne Clark, Roger Cowan, Rodney Ahitow, Roger Walker, Roger Zimmerman, Don Hulick, Deidre Battaglia, and Eddie Jones (Doc. 603); and the motion to strike Wallace's motion for a TRO brought by Defendants (Doc. 607). The claims in this case and the procedural history of the case have been detailed in other orders of the Court. See, e.g., Westefer v. Snyder, 725 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ill. 2010); Westefer v. Snyder, Civil Nos. 00-162-GPM, 00-708-GPM, 2009 WL 2905548 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2009). Thus, the Court will not repeat that recitation here. In brief, this case is principally a class action brought by and on behalf of prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") to challenge the adequacy under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the procedures employedby the IDOC to place prisoners in the closed maximum security prison ("supermax prison") at the Tamms Correctional Center ("Tamms").1 The Court entered judgment in this case on July 20, 2010. Snyder, Washington, Neal, DeTella, O'Leary, Page, Clark, Cowan, Ahitow, Walker, Zimmerman, Hulick, Battaglia, and Jones are past and present officers and employees of the IDOC. Wallace is a prisoner in IDOC custody who currently is serving a sentence of life imprisonment at the supermax prison at Tamms for murder.
In Wallace's motion to intervene he alleges that he is: not permitted to hold a job; subject to a "razor and clipper" restriction, meaning he is not permitted to have a razor or clippers in his cell; confined in his cell twenty-three hours a day; not allowed to receive visits; and not permitted to subscribe to newspapers and magazines. Also, Wallace complains that the library at the supermax prison at Tamms is inadequate. In his motion for a TRO Wallace claims that prison officials at Tamms have discontinued barber services and library services for prisoners incarcerated in the supermax prison. Defendants in turn have requested that Wallace's motion to intervene and motion for a TRO be stricken. Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The rule provides further that "[t]he court may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading." Id. A Rule 12 motion to strike may be directed only to a pleading, as "pleadings" are defined under Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not to a motion or a paper other than a pleading. See Granger v. Gill Abstract Corp., 566 F. Supp. 2d 323, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Nevertheless, the Court has inherent power to strike documents other than pleadings. See Kremers v. Coca-Cola Co., 714 F. Supp. 2d 912, 915 n.1 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (citing Kitson v. Bank of Edwardsville, 240 F.R.D. 610, 611 (S.D. Ill. 2006)).
Regarding intervention, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits intervention in a class action by unnamed members of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(B)(iii); Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 60, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). However, to intervene, a class member must satisfy the requirements of Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 380-81 (D. Del. 1990). Concerning intervention as of right, Rule 24 states, in relevant part,
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who:
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). With respect to permissive intervention, Rule 24 provides, in relevant part, that "[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who: (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1). Under Rule 24(a), a proposed intervenor as of right must satisfy four requirements: (1) a timely application for leave to intervene; (2) a claim of interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of an action; (3) a danger that disposition of the action may as a practical matter diminish the applicant's abilityto protect that interest; and (4) existing parties to a case will not adequately represent the applicant's interest. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941, 945-46 (7th Cir. 2000); Southmark Corp. v. Cagan, 950 F.2d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 1991). Failure to satisfy any one of the four requirements is fatal to a request for intervention as of right. See Reid L. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 289 F.3d 1009, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002). As to permissive intervention, a district court has "'considerable discretion'" in this area, and "reversal of a court's denial of a Rule 24(b) motion for permissive intervention 'is a very rare bird indeed.'" Griffith v. University Hosp., L.L.C., 249 F.3d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting EEOC v. National Children's Ctr, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
Turning first to the matter of intervention as of right, no federal statute gives Wallace an unconditional right to intervene in this case, and therefore the relevant inquiry is whether Wallace has established a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). The Court finds that he has not. In regard to the requirement of timeliness, factors to be considered in determining if a motion to intervene is timely are: (1) the length of time the intervenor knew or should have known of his or her interest in a case; (2) the prejudice to an original party caused by the delay; (3) the resulting prejudice to the intervenor if the motion is denied; and (4) any unusual circumstances. See Shea v. Angulo, 19 F.3d 343, 348-49 (7th Cir. 1994); Schultz v. Connery, 863 F.2d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1988). Also, "any substantial lapse of time weighs heavily against intervention." United States v. State of Wash., 86 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996) (). Cf. Larson v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 530 F.3d 578, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2008) (). This litigation has been pending for over ten years and is well-known to prisoners at Tamms; indeed, even the general public has some familiarity with this case. It obviously is highly prejudicial to the original parties to this case for Wallace to begin trying to litigate new claims that previously never have been at issue in this case at this very late stage of the proceedings. Wallace will not be prejudiced by denial of his request for intervention as untimely because, as will be discussed in a bit more detail presently, the claims he is trying to assert have nothing to do with the subject matter of this case. Finally, Wallace offers no explanation for his delay in seeking to intervene. Under the circumstances, then, the Court finds that his application for intervention is untimely.
Moreover, no interest of Wallace's will be impaired by a denial of intervention. In general, an intervenor's interest will not be impaired or impeded within the meaning of Rule 24(a) if the disposition of an action will not preclude the intervenor from bringing suit in another forum to enforce a claim. "'The existence of 'impairment' depends on whether the decision of a legal question involved in the action would as a practical matter foreclose rights of the proposed intervenors in a subsequent proceeding''" and "[t]he possibility of foreclosure is measured by the standards of stare decisis." American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 147-48 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Meridian Homes Corp. v. Nicholas W. Prassas & Co., 683 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1982)). Here the Court's judgment in this case will have no preclusive effect at all on the claims Wallace is attempting to assert in this case, because Wallace's claims have no bearing on the subject matter of this case. As Wallace appears not to understand, the only question that has ever been at issue in this case is whether IDOC prisoners have a due process right not to be transferred to the supermax prison at Tamms without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
In general, a state prisoner has a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in avoiding conditions of confinement at a supermax prison where conditions at such a prison impose "an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context." Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995)). In this case, the Court has been required to examine conditions of confinement at the supermax prison at Tamms in detail, in order...
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