Roberts v. Alexandria Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 126249 |
| Citation | 2021 IL 126249,183 N.E.3d 701,451 Ill.Dec. 244 |
| Parties | Thomas ROBERTS et al. v. ALEXANDRIA TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al., Appellants (Safety International, LLC, Appellee). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lori A. Vanderlaan and Wade T. Shimer, of Best, Vanderlaan & Harrington, of Chicago, for appellants.
David P. Bub and Brandon B. Copeland, of Brown & James, P.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee.
¶ 1 Section 3 of the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Contribution Act) ( 740 ILCS 100/3 (West 2018) ) provides that "[t]he pro rata share[1 ] of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his relative culpability" and that "no person shall be required to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share." However, section 3 contains an exception where Id.
¶ 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified a question of law to this court (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 20 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992)). Roberts v. Alexandria Transportation, Inc. , 968 F.3d 794, 801 (7th Cir. 2020). The court of appeals asks "whether the obligation of a settling party is uncollectable pursuant to the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act, 740 ILCS 100/3 [(West 2018)]." We answer the certified question in the negative, holding that the obligation of a tortfeasor who settles is not "uncollectable" within the meaning of section 3 of the Contribution Act.
¶ 4 In September 2013, Thomas Roberts was driving a truck westbound through a construction zone on Interstate 70 in Madison County, Illinois, when he saw a flagger holding a sign that said "SLOW." Roberts slowed down. The flagger suddenly turned the traffic sign from "SLOW" to "STOP." Roberts abruptly slammed on his brakes.
¶ 5 Alexandre Solomakha had been driving a tractor-trailer behind Roberts for about two miles before the stop. The distance between the two vehicles was about 1½ tractor-trailers. When Solomakha saw Roberts slow down, Solomakha slowed down too. But when Roberts slammed on his brakes, Solomakha was not able to stop his tractor-trailer in time. Solomakha's tractor-trailer rear-ended Roberts's truck. Roberts's injuries resulted in medical bills totaling more than $500,000.
¶ 6 In October 2014, plaintiffs, Thomas and his wife, Diane Roberts, filed a complaint for negligence under Illinois law in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, which sat in diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs named as defendants Solomakha, Alexandria Transportation, Inc., and Alex Express, LLC (hereinafter Alex Parties).
¶ 7 In October 2015, the Alex Parties filed a third-party complaint for contribution against several third-party defendants for their role in failing to maintain the safety of the construction site. The Alex Parties filed their contribution claim against Edwards-Kamalduski, LLC (E-K), the general contractor for the road construction project, and Safety International, LLC (Safety), the subcontractor E-K retained through an oral contract to manage (some disputed aspect of) the construction site's worker safety program. The Alex Parties alleged that, if they are liable to plaintiffs in negligence for the crash, then the third-party defendants are also liable as joint tortfeasors because they failed in their duty to keep the construction site safe for travel by the general public.
¶ 8 In February 2017, plaintiffs settled with E-K for $50,000. Plaintiffs and E-K filed a joint motion for a finding of good faith pursuant to the Contribution Act. See 740 ILCS 100/2(c), (d) (West 2016). The Alex Parties objected, arguing that E-K's settlement did not reflect its relative fault. The Alex Parties pointed out that plaintiffs claimed damages including approximately $500,000 in medical bills, $500,000 in future medical treatment, and lifetime lost wages, the total of which exceeded $1 million, without including past pain and suffering. The Alex Parties observed that plaintiffs’ last demand was $2 million and that the E-K settlement amount of $50,000 constituted less than 3% of plaintiffs’ demand. In May 2017, the district court granted the joint motion of plaintiffs and E-K for a finding of good faith and dismissed E-K from the Alex Parties’ third-party contribution action with prejudice.
¶ 9 In late 2017, the Alex Parties settled with plaintiffs for $1.85 million. That settlement released claims against Safety, as well. By its settlement, the Alex Parties paid to plaintiffs the collective tort liability of themselves and of Safety. Therefore, the only remaining claim in the district's court's litigation was the Alex Parties’ third-party contribution claim against Safety.
¶ 10 Prior to a jury trial on the Alex Parties’ contribution claim, Safety asked the district court to put all of the settling parties, including plaintiffs, on the verdict form. In May 2018, the district court, as a matter of Illinois law, denied Safety's request as to plaintiffs. However, the district court determined that the Alex Parties, Safety, and E-K must appear on the verdict form so that the jury could adequately apportion fault among every tortfeasor, even though the court had dismissed E-K from the contribution action.
¶ 11 Giving rise to the certified question before us, in January 2019, the district court determined, based on its interpretation of the Contribution Act, that any share of liability that the jury would assign to E-K should not be reallocated between the Alex Parties and Safety on a pro rata basis. Therefore, the district court ordered that Safety would pay to the Alex Parties only what the jury determined was Safety's portion of fault and that the Alex Parties would remain liable for E-K's entire share along with its own.
¶ 12 In March 2019, after the conclusion of the trial, the jury determined the respective percentage of fault for each tortfeasor as follows:
Consequently, Safety was obligated to contribute 10% of the accident liability, leaving the Alex Parties liable for their share of liability for the accident plus E-K's, which totaled 90% of the accident liability.
¶ 13 In terms of dollars, the $50,000 settlement payment by E-K and the $1.85 million settlement payment by the Alex Parties established the total common liability of $1.9 million owed to plaintiffs. See Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co. , 161 Ill. 2d 267, 286-87, 204 Ill.Dec. 178, 641 N.E.2d 402 (1994) (). Judgment was entered in favor of the Alex Parties and against Safety for $190,000, which represented Safety's 10% pro rata share of the common liability.
¶ 14 The district court denied the Alex Parties’ posttrial motion to alter or amend the judgment, which asked the court to revisit its determination of the reallocation issue. The Alex Parties appealed, contesting the district court's resolution of the reallocation issue. Roberts , 968 F.3d 794.2
¶ 15 The court of appeals began its analysis by citing section 2(b) of the Contribution Act, which provides that "[n]o tortfeasor is liable to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the common liability" ( 740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 2018)). Roberts , 968 F.3d at 800. The court then observed that section 3 of the Contribution Act provides that "[t]he pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his relative culpability" ( 740 ILCS 100/3 (West 2018) ). Roberts , 968 F.3d at 800. The court then cited section 3's exception where ( 740 ILCS 100/3 (West 2018) ). Roberts , 968 F.3d at 800.
¶ 16 In this case, the district court ruled that E-K's obligation was not "uncollectable" and, therefore, did not reallocate E-K's share of liability between the Alex Parties and Safety. Thus, the court of appeals viewed the meaning of an "uncollectable" obligation as the "key question" from the Alex Parties’ appeal. Id.
¶ 17 The Alex Parties argued that section 2(d) of the Contribution Act, which provides that a tortfeasor who settles with a plaintiff in good faith "is discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor" ( 740 ILCS 100/2(d) (West 2018)), renders a settling defendant's obligation, such as E-K's, "uncollectable" in any future contribution action. The court of appeals could not accept this argument, reasoning as follows: Roberts , 968 F.3d at 800.
¶ 18 The court of appeals concluded as follows:
Id. at 801.
¶ 19 The court of appeals certified this question of law pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 20 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). We agreed to answer the certified question.
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