Roberts v. Baca
| Decision Date | 21 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:14-cv-00053-RCJ-VPC |
| Parties | HASSAN ROBERTS, Petitioner, v. ISIDRO BACA, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Before the court are the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (#2), respondents' answer (#7), and petitioner's reply (#13). The court finds that petition is not entitled to relief, and the court denies the petition.
On June 18, 2008, petitioner was a passenger on a Greyhound bus, which was heading eastward on Interstate 80. The bus stopped at the Greyhound station in Reno for refueling and cleaning. The passengers, including petitioner, were required to leave the bus while it was being refueled and cleaned.
Reno police officers were at the station to interdict drugs. Officers and a drug sniffing dog entered the bus. Officer Joseph Lever immediately smelled marijuana. Ex. 32, at 76 (#9). The dog went to the back of the bus and alerted officers to a backpack sitting on the floor. Id. at 78 (#9). Lever picked up the backpack. An attached luggage tag had the name "Marvin Davis" on it. Id. at 81 (#9). Lever went into the bus station, asking out loud for the person who owned the backpack. Nobody responded. Then Lever went outside the bus station, where people would smoke, and did the same. Nobody responded. Lever then went to the boarding doors and waited with the backpack. Id. at 82 (#9). A few minutes later petitioner approached Lever and said that the backpack was his.1 Id. at 84 (#9).
Lever asked if he could search the backpack. Petitioner agreed. Ex. 32, at 85 (#9). Lever found inside the backpack a bottle of baby powder and a bottle of foot powder. Lever opened each bottle. Plastic bags containing marijuana and MDMA (ecstasy) pills were inside the bottles. Id. at 87-89 (#9). Lever detained petitioner.
Lever also found inside the backpack a Greyhound bus ticket with the name "Marvin Davis," paperwork with petitioner's actual name, and photographs of petitioner. Ex. 32, at 94-96 (#9). Petitioner noted that he had two suitcases in the luggage compartment of the bus. He pointed them out, and Officer Andy Carter retrieved them. Attached to both suitcases were luggage tags with the name "Marvin Davis." Id. at 54 (#9). Lever did not learn from petitioner that his actual name is Hassan Roberts after Lever had detained petitioner, but while they were still at the bus station. Id. at 97 (#9).
Lever left at the bus station the backpack, the suitcases, and those contents not taken into evidence. He said that he and Carter had an informal practice of police officers was to leave luggage that was not necessary as evidence at the bus station. If the arrested person was released from jail on bail, then he could simply collect the luggage at the bus station and continue with his journey, without going through the lengthy process of having the luggage released from the evidence locker. Ex. 32, at 109 (#9).
At the police station, the powder bottles were photographed. Lever's partner then discarded the bottles. The detectives decided that the case against petitioner was clear, the bottles were unlikely to have any fingerprint evidence because their exteriors were covered in powder, and they were a mess. Ex. 32, at 118-20 (#9).
Petitioner filed a pre-trial motion regarding the loss of the backpack and the powder bottles. Ex. 15 (#8). At first it was a motion to suppress, then it became a motion to dismiss, and in the end it became a motion to instruct the jury that the evidence that the police failed to preserve was presumed to be favorable to the defense. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that petitioner had not shown that the police had acted in bad faith or with gross negligence. Ex. 28 (#8).
Petitioner went to trial. The jury found petitioner guilty of the following counts:
I. Trafficking in a controlled substance;
II. Possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale;
III. Possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale;
IV. Possession of a controlled substance; and
V. Possession of a controlled substance.
Ex. 36 (#9). The trial court convicted and sentenced petitioner accordingly. Ex. 41 (#9).
Petitioner appealed. The state acknowledged that the convictions for counts II and IV merged into the conviction for count I, and that the convictions for count V merged into the conviction for count III. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected all of petitioner's arguments. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with the state on merger of counts, and it remanded for entry of a corrected judgment of conviction. Ex. 58 (#10). Ultimately, petitioner was convicted of the following counts:
I. Trafficking in a controlled substance; and
III. Possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale.
Ex. 60 (#10).
Petitioner then filed a post-conviction habeas corpus petition in the state district court. Ex. 61 (#10). The state district court appointed counsel, who filed a supplement. Ex. 63 (#10). The state district court held an evidentiary hearing. Ex. 64 (#10). The state district court denied the petition. Ex. 65 (#10). Petitioner appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Ex. 72 (#10). The Nevada Supreme Court then denied petitioner's requests for rehearing and en banc reconsideration. Ex. 75 (#10), Ex. 83 (#10).
Petitioner then commenced this action.
Congress has limited the circumstances in which a federal court can grant relief to a petitioner who is in custody pursuant to a judgment of conviction of a state court.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
Federal habeas relief may not be granted for claims subject to § 2254(d) unless it is shown that the earlier state court's decision "was contrary to" federal law then clearly established in the holdings of this Court, § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); or that it "involved an unreasonable application of" such law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts" in light of the record before the state court, § 2254(d)(2).
Richter, 562 U.S. at 100. "For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), 'an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.'" Id. (citation omitted). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. (citation omitted).
[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).
Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.
As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Ground 1 is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate (1) that the defense attorney's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and (2) that the attorney's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694. "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 697.
Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both "highly deferential," . . . and when the two apply in tandem, review is "doubly" so . . . . The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations omitted).
Petitioner argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the backpack.2 On this issue, the Nevada Supreme Court held:
Roberts submits that an illegal search occurred when police officers used a drug-sniffing dog to smell his...
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