Roberts v. Berry
| Decision Date | 22 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:20-cv-00216-KGB |
| Parties | DENICIA V. ROBERTS PLAINTIFF v. MARK BERRY, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
Before the Court is the motion for leave to amend the complaint of plaintiff Denicia V. Roberts (Dkt. No. 18). Defendants Mark Berry and Mark McKinnon, in their official capacities, and the Arkansas Department of the Military f/k/a the Arkansas Military Department (“AMD”) (collectively “Defendants”) have responded and oppose Ms Roberts' motion for leave to amend (Dkt. No. 26). Also before the Court is Ms. Roberts' motion to compel Defendants to produce certain documents; Defendants' response in opposition to Ms. Roberts' motion to compel Defendants' motion to compel; Ms. Roberts' response to Defendants' motion to compel; and Defendants' reply to Ms. Roberts' response to motion to compel (Dkt Nos. 20; 22; 27; 28; 29). Also before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 30). In an Order dated August 23, 2021, the Court continued the time in which Ms. Roberts had to respond to the motion for summary judgment until 14 days after the Court rules on Ms. Roberts' pending motion to amend her complaint (Dkt. No. 34).
For the following reasons, the Court grants Ms. Roberts' motion for leave to amend complaint (Dkt. No. 18). The Court grants, in part, and denies, in part, Ms. Roberts' motion to compel Defendants to produce certain documents (Dkt. No. 20). The Court grants, in part, and denies, in part, Defendants' motion to compel (Dkt. No. 22). Because the Court grants Ms. Roberts' motion for leave to amend complaint, the Court denies as moot Defendants' currently pending motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 30).
In her complaint, Ms. Roberts alleges that she held the position of painter supervisor at AMD in April 2019, when AMD hired Johnny Rodgers as a painter and placed Mr. Rodgers under her direct supervision (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 9-10). Ms. Roberts complains that “[f]rom the beginning Mr. Rodgers rendered the relationship unworkable” and that Mr. Rodgers “threatened” her by telling her that “he had ‘friends' and would get her [Roberts] fired.” (Id., ¶ 10). Ms. Roberts claims that she was subject to discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment and unjustly terminated from her employment based on her age, race, and sex (Id.). She further claims that she was subject to discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment and unjustly terminated from her employment “in retaliation for her exercise of rights guaranteed her under the Constitution of the United States of America, specifically her right to speak out on matters of public concern” and in retaliation for her exercise of rights guaranteed her under Title VII, “all in violation” of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 et seq. (“Title VII”); 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (“ADEA”); and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 16-123-101 et seq. (“ACRA”) (Id., at 2). Ms. Roberts seeks in her complaint declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against Defendants (Dkt. No. 2, at 1-2). The Court turns to examine each pending motion.
In her motion for leave to amend the complaint, Ms. Roberts requests leave to amend her complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to add two defendants, Scott Stanger and Michelle Young-Hobbs. Ms. Roberts asserts that Mr. Stanger and Ms. Young-Hobbs were involved in the decision to terminate her but that she did not discover that information until depositions held on June 30, 2021 (Dkt. No. 18, ¶¶ 4, 5, 7-8). In her proposed amended complaint, Ms. Roberts also seeks to assert a hostile work environment claim for the first time. She states that she “reported that she was fearful because of the ‘hostile' work environment she was required to work in as a result of Rodgers' threats and actions” and that “she reported the threats to McKinnon, Stanger, and Young-Hobbs, base attorneys, and base police” but was “told that it was her word against Rodgers' word and that essentially nothing could be done.” (Dkt. No. 18-1, ¶ 11). Ms. Roberts asserts that Mr. McKinnon, Mr. Stanger, and Ms. Young-Hobbs dismissed her claims and advised her to “train” Mr. Rodgers (Id., ¶ 12).
In her complaint and proposed amended complaint, Ms. Roberts provides what she asserts is an illustrative example of defendant Mr. McKinnon's “blatant sexism” in handling of one of her concerns related to Mr. Rodgers (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 10). In her proposed amended complaint, Ms. Roberts asserts that Mr. Stanger and Ms. Young-Hobbs were aware of the “blatant sexism and racism pervading AMD's handling of this whole matter.” (Id., at 18-1, ¶¶ 11-14). Ms. Roberts further asserts in her proposed amended complaint that AMD, “by and through the acts and conduct of Defendant McKinnon, Stanger and Young-Hobbs, and with the tacit approval of Defendant Berry, did purposefully retaliate against Plaintiff Roberts for her attempts to assert her right to be free of discrimination on the bases of race, sex and age in violation of Title VII, the ADEA, Arkansas's Civil Rights Act and the Constitution of the United States.” (Id., ¶ 19(b)). Ms. Roberts asserts that Defendants will not be prejudiced by the granting of the motion for leave to file amended complaint because Defendants filed a motion to continue the dispositive motions deadline and the scheduled jury trial, which the Court granted (Dkt. No. 18, ¶ 15). Defendants oppose the motion (Dkt. No. 26).
Ms. Roberts moves for leave to amend her complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which provides that courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). While there is no absolute or automatic right to amend, under the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a), “denial of leave to amend pleadings is appropriate only in those limited circumstances in which undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of the amendment, or unfair prejudice to the non-moving party can be demonstrated.” Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep't, 241 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987)).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.” Rule 16(b)'s “good cause” standard “governs when a party seeks leave to amend a pleading outside of the time period established by a scheduling order, not the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a).” Hartis v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 935, 948 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2008)). Eighth Circuit precedent establishes that, “[i]f a party files for leave to amend outside of the court's scheduling order, the party must show cause to modify the schedule.” Sherman, 532 F.3d at 709 (emphasis in original) (quoting Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008)). The “primary measure of Rule 16's ‘good cause' standard is the moving party's diligence in attempting to meet the [scheduling] order's requirements.” Bradford v. DANA Corp., 249 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992)).
“The moving party fails to show good cause when there has been ‘no change in the law, no newly discovered facts, or any other changed circumstance . . . after the scheduling deadline for amending pleadings.'” Powell v. Camping World RV Sales LLC, No. 4:13-cv-00195 KGB, 2014 WL 5311525, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 16, 2014) (quoting Hartis, 694 F.3d at 948). “[T]he failure to recognize the need for amended claims at an earlier date [does] not constitute good cause to excuse the untimeliness of [a] motion to amend.” Schenk v. Chavis, 259 Fed.Appx. 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Davis v. City of St. John, 182 Fed.Appx. 626, 627 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of motion for leave to amend where “[a]lmost all of the information that the [plaintiffs] sought to add to their complaint had been in their possession well before the suit began”). However, good cause may be shown when plaintiff first discovered facts supporting the proposed amended complaint after the amendment deadline expired. See Powell, 2014 WL 5311525, at *5; cf. Trim Fit, LLC v. Dickey, 607 F.3d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 2010) ().
As mentioned above and relevant here, the Court should consider whether the grant of a motion for leave to file an amended complaint would prejudice the nonmoving party. See Doe v Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 2005) . For example, “[m]otions that would prejudice the nonmoving party by ‘requiring a re-opening of discovery with additional costs, a significant postponement of the trial, and a likely major alteration in trial tactics and strategy' are particularly disfavored.” Kozlov v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 818 F.3d 380, 395 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Steir v. Girl Scouts of the U.S.A., 383 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2004)); see also Popp Telcom v. Am. Sharecom, Inc., 210 F.3d 928, 943 (8th Cir. 2000) (...
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