Roberts v. Biancamano
| Decision Date | 26 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 09 Civ. 6212 (WJM) (MF),09 Civ. 6212 (WJM) (MF) |
| Parties | BARBARA ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS BIANCAMANO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
INTRODUCTION
This Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") action arises out of an August 3, 2007 collision between a United States Postal Service van and Plaintiff Barbara Roberts's automobile. On January 30 and 31, 2013 the Court conducted a non-jury trial concerning liability only, in which it had the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility. Following trial, each party submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
This memorandum opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding liability in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds for the Defendant and against the Plaintiff.
JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND APPLICABLE LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1) and 2679(a), which provides a remedy against the United States for injuries caused by the "negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment."
2. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties to this action, as both reside in this district.
3. Venue in this District is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b).
4. A claimant may recover under the FTCA only "under the circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act of omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2674. That is, a claimant may recover against the United States only to the extent that recovery would be permitted against a private party under the substantive law of the state where the conduct complained of took place. Richards v. U.S., 369 U.S. 1, 6-16 (1962); Rodriguez v. U.S., 823 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1987). In this case, it is undisputed that the conduct complained of took place in New Jersey; accordingly, the Court applies New Jersey negligence law.
5. To recover in a negligence action in New Jersey, a plaintiff must establish: 1) that the defendant owed her a particular duty under the circumstances that gave rise to this action; 2) that the defendant somehow breached that duty; and 3) that the defendant's breach of duty proximately caused her to suffer some damage or harm. See Keith v. Truck Stops Corp. of Am., 909 F.2d 743, 745 (3d Cir. 1990); Griesenbeck v. Walker, 199 N.J. Super. 132, 141 (App. Div. 1985), cert. denied, 101 N.J. 264; Catto v. Schnepp, 121 N.J. Super. 506, 511 (App. Div. 1972), aff'd, 62 N.J. 20.
6. Under New Jersey law, negligence is conduct falling below a standard recognized by law as essential to protecting others from the unreasonable risk of harm - but will not be presumed merely because someone has been harmed. Sanzari v. Rosenfield, 34 N.J. 128, 134 (1961); Murphy v. Terzako, 14 N.J. Super. 254, 259 (App. Div. 1951).
7. Rather, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's negligence caused an injury before recovery will be allowed. See Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981).
8. The preponderance of the evidence standard requires the plaintiff to provide evidence showing that it is more likely than not that the defendant was negligent. Crowley v. Chait, No. 85-2441, 2004 WL 5434953, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2004).
9. Under New Jersey's comparative negligence law, a plaintiff who is found to be fifty percent or less at fault is entitled to a recovery, but any award of damages is diminished by the percentage of fault attributed to her. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1; Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 109 (2004); Ostrowski v. Azzara, 111 N.J. 429, 445-46 (1988).
10. However, a plaintiff's own negligence will wholly bar recovery if it is "greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought." N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1.
11. To determine whether a plaintiff is comparatively negligent, the factfinder should determine whether the plaintiff "was moving about in the world in a way that posed an unreasonable risk of physical injury to herself." Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1312, 1315 (D.N.J. 1993). Thus, individuals in New Jersey have a duty to "not place themselves in positions of unreasonable physical danger." Id.
12. In a non-jury trial, the Court must "find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).
13. In its role as factfinder in a tort case involving motor vehicles, the Court may view and rely on post-collision photographic evidence of the damage to the parties' vehicles without reliance on an expert witness. See, e.g., Caputo v. U.S., 157 F. Supp. 568, 570-71 (D.N.J. 1957).
FINDINGS OF FACT
14. The parties have stipulated that the accident occurred on August 3, 2007 at approximately 4:07 p.m., as Thomas Biancamano, a U.S. Postal Service employee acting within the scope of hisemployment, was attempting to exit the parking lot of the Post Office in Parlin, New Jersey while operating a Postal Service 2001 Dodge Ram van.
15. The parties have further stipulated that "an impact occurred between the right side of [the] van and the left front of a 1999 Dodge Stratus driven by Plaintiff, who was positioned to the right of Mr. Biancamano's vehicle in the parking lot exit," and that Plaintiff's daughter, Latiesha Gooding, was a right front seat passenger in Plaintiff's vehicle at that time.
16. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that at the site of the accident, Washington Road is a paved, asphalt roadway running east-west, with one travel lane in each direction separated by a double yellow centerline, and no shoulder or parking lanes.
17. According to unchallenged measurements taken after the accident by Biancamano's then-supervisor Ellery Ramos, the parking lot exit is approximately 21 feet, 5 inches wide and divided by a faded line into an approximately 12 foot, 9 inch left exit lane and approximately 8 foot, 6 inch right exit lane (there is apparently a separate entrance elsewhere); photographs of the site admitted into evidence demonstrate a faded left and right turn arrow painted on the pavement in the respective lanes, and a stop sign situated where the exit meets Washington Street. See Plaintiff Exhibit 3-L.
18. Biancamano works as an "Area Maintenance Specialist" for the United States Postal Service.
19. At the moment of the accident, Biancamano was traveling to the Old Bridge Post Office.
20. Biancamano testified that at the moment he drove up to the parking lot exit, there were no other vehicles waiting there.
21. Both Biancamano and Postal driving instructor Michael Matelski (whom Plaintiff called as a witness)1 testified that Biancamano's van was too long or otherwise unwieldy to turn right onto Washington Street from strictly within the right exit lane without either the van's front crossing the double-yellow lines into oncoming traffic in the west-bound lane, or else cutting over the curb with its rear wheels.
22. Matelski further testified that the lanes at the exit were too narrow and that the exit should really be marked as a single lane.
23. Accordingly, Biancamano testified that he positioned his van somewhat over the line separating the right and left lanes - the parties dispute how far - in order to make a wider or shallower right turn into the oncoming east-bound lane of Washington Street.
24. Biancamano testified that he drove up to the exit ramp, activated his right turn signal, turned his steering wheel to the right, and then waited a minute or two for an opening in the oncoming traffic on Washington Street before proceeding to make his turn.
25. Biancamano testified that he progressed only several feet into the turn before he heard a "scraping" sound and stopped the van; although he testified that his window was open at the time, he denied hearing a horn honking.
26. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff worked for the Postal Service, and she and Biancamano were co-workers.
27. Plaintiff testified that prior to the accident, she had travelled to the Parlin Post Office with her daughter to pick up mailbox keys for her newly purchased home, which she then intended to show her daughter.
28. Plaintiff testified that she approached the parking lot exit first - in other words, that there were no other vehicles ahead of her; that she activated her right turn signal and stopped in the right lane of the exit for one to two minutes, behind the line where a sidewalk would intersect the ramp, although there was no sidewalk at that location.
29. Plaintiff further testified that Biancamano then drove up suddenly in the left lane with his left turn signal on, moved straight and leftward into the street as though he were attempting to cross Washington Road and proceed in the westbound lane, but then suddenly turned sharply right and collided with Plaintiff's car; Plaintiff further testified that she blew her horn strenuously to warn Biancamano, but to no avail.
30. This sequence of events, Plaintiff stated, took only two or three seconds.
31. Plaintiff testified that the impact threw her car to the right, causing her body to jerk to the right and side-to-side; she further testified that her car was dragged several feet.
32. Plaintiff's testimony was generally hesitant and uncertain, and also contained several factual inconsistencies.
33. Plaintiff first testified that she was stopped at the moment of impact and waiting for Biancamano to "clear" the turn, although she conceded that her car might have been moving forward somewhat when it occurred.
34. Plaintiff conceded on cross-examination that at her deposition she had characterized her car as "behind" the van; she then explained that she meant that the van pulled up ahead of her after she was at the stop first.
35. Pl...
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