Roberts v. City of Rock Springs, 2022

Decision Date15 June 1937
Docket Number2022
Citation52 Wyo. 89,68 P.2d 891
PartiesROBERTS v. CITY OF ROCK SPRINGS, ET AL
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

RESERVED CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS from the District Court of Sweetwater County; V. J. TIDBALL, Judge.

Action by Isaac Roberts, Jr., against the City of Rock Springs, a municipal corporation, and others. Case submitted to Supreme Court on reserved constitutional questions.

Case remanded--Questions unanswered.

For the plaintiff there was a brief and oral argument by W. W. Tipton of Laramie.

The first question is whether Chapter 49, Section 2, Laws 1933 violates Article 13, Section 1 of the Constitution restricting powers of municipal corporations. The section of the Constitution provides for the classification of municipal corporations. Section 22-1401, R. S. provides for the general incorporation of towns. Sec. 22-301, R. S. provides that cities having more than four thousand inhabitants shall be known as cities of the first class. The two foregoing questions are the only ones created thus far. McFarland v. Cheyenne, 48 Wyo. 86. There were, of course, several towns existing under a special charter upon the adoption of the constitution. May a civil service commission for firemen be set up in cities of more than four thousand inhabitants excluded from other towns of the same class? The question seems to have been settled in McFarland v. Cheyenne, supra. The principle arose in the case of State v. Sheldon, 29 Wyo. 233, involving an act providing for commission government. See also Murname v. St. Louis, 27 S.W 711 and Owen v. Baer, 154 Mo. 434, 55 S.W. 644. The statute (Chapter 49, Laws 1933) does not apply to incorporated towns, but only to first class cities and those under special charter, and is therefore constitutional. The words "town" and "city" used as they are interchangeably, may have caused some confusion. The second question is whether a town of less than four thousand inhabitants, maintaining a paid fire department, may be deprived of the advantage of a fire department civil service commission, since the Constitution, Article 1, Section 34 ordains that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation, and Article 3, Section 27, prohibits the passage of local or special laws on certain subjects. The point was raised and decided in State v. Sheldon, supra. See also McGarvey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120 and State v Board of Trustees (Wis.) 98 N.W. 954. The next question is whether Section 3, Chapter 49, Laws 1933, providing that fire department civil service commissions shall serve without compensation, violates Article 14, Section 1 of the Constitution. The point seems to have been decided in State v. Sheldon, supra. The fourth question is whether Section 11 of Chapter 49, Laws 1933, violates Article 3, Section 24 of the Constitution, prohibiting the title of an act to contain more than one subject. The outstanding decision on the subject is in Re 4th Judicial District, 4 Wyo. 133, decided in 1893. The point was raised in the case of Commissioners v. Stone, 7 Wyo. 280, also in Madden v. Wilde, 48 Wyo. 372. The rule announced in this court seems to be that so long as the title is germane to the general subject of the legislation, in a way that will apprise one of the nature of the general subject, it is sufficient. We think the title as set forth in Chapter 49 of the Laws of 1933 meets this requirement. The fifth question is whether Section 11 of Chapter 49, Laws 1933, extending the provisions of the Firemen's Civil Service Act to firemen in the employment of the cities at the time of the passage of the Act, violates Article 3, Section 32 of the Constitution, which prohibits the extension of terms, and increase or decrease in salaries of an officer, after his election or appointment. The point is not a new one, it having been raised in almost every state where a civil service law has been enacted. See Minton v. Gibson (Ky.) 7 S.W.2d 825. In Wyoming, firemen have no definite term of office or employment. We think a mere reading of Article 3, Sec. 32 shows that it was not intended to apply to persons having no term of office. King v. Johnson (Mo.) 27 S.W. 339; State v. Jennings (Ohio) 49 N.E. 404; People v. Loeffler (Ill.) 51 N.E. 785. The sixth question is whether Section 11, Chapter 49, Laws 1933 violates Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution. After reading the constitutional provisions, it is difficult to understand why this question was submitted at all. We are unable to conceive wherein it is pertinent to the issues in this case. The seventh question is whether Section 11, Chapter 49, Laws 1933 violates Article 14, Section 1 of the Constitution. Public employment is not property and it is error to assume that every citizen has a right to hold office. It is only the citizen having the proper qualifications for an office or position who has the right to hold such office, and the Act applies to all citizens alike. People v. Kipley (Ill.) 49 N.E. 229; State v. Ross (Wyo.) 228 P. 636. The eighth question is whether Section 11, Chapter 49, Laws 1933 is severable so that if held invalid, it may not vitiate the remaining sections of the Chapter. We submit that the section is severable from other portions of the Act. State v. Sheldon, supra. The ninth question is whether Chapter 49, Laws 1933 is a special or local law, in violation of Section 27 of Article 3 of the Constitution. This court has held that if a general law has uniform operation and applies to all persons in a class or under like circumstances and condition, then it is not local or special legislation. State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169; State v. Ross, 228 P. 636. All reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the validity of the statute. State v. Sheldon, supra. McGarvey v. Swan (Wyo.) 96 P. 697.

For the defendants, there was a brief and oral argument by W. W. Magagna and Lewis H. Brown of Rock Springs.

The nature of civil service laws is reviewed in 5 R. C. L. 608 also 46 C. J. 954. Competitive examinations are the prime elements of such laws. Chapter 49, Laws 1933 makes two classifications of cities and towns coming within its provisions: (a) Cities and towns in the State maintaining a paid fire department. (b) Cities and towns having a population of over 4,000 inhabitants. The evident intent of the legislature was to make the law applicable to full time paid fire departments, and not to part time departments. There are three types of paid fire departments in Wyoming: (a) A full time paid department. (b) A department for one or more full time paid truck drivers and a number of what might be called "volunteer firemen," who are really engaged in other occupations for a living. (c) A department wherein all the members are volunteer firemen and receive some compensation if they go to a fire. If the law was intended to cover only full time and paid fire department members, the City of Rock Springs would not come under the provisions of the law at all, although it has more than 4,000 inhabitants. The title of the Act only refers to cities having a population of over 4,000. As to the constitutionality of the Act in general, we cite 5 R. C. L. pp. 609-613. Civil Service Acts attempting to favor honorably discharged soldiers and sailors, without regard to qualifications are generally held unconstitutional. 19 R. C. L. 755; 43 C. J. 609; 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed. Sec. 408; 16 A. L. R. 409. If the statute merely gives a preference among persons equally qualified, it is constitutional. Cook v. Mason (Calif.) 283 P. 891. It seems to be contended by plaintiff that Section 11 of the Act is mandatory and attempts to discriminate in favor of persons occupying positions at the time the law was enacted, regardless of the length of their service, experience, ability, efficiency or character. Phillips v. De Las Casas (Mass.) 102 N.E. 717. This however served to emphasize the invalidity of the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, and seems to establish the competency of such employees by legislative fiat. In order to comply with Article 1, Section 2, and Article 3, Section 27, classifications must meet two requirements: (1) The legislation must apply alike to all persons within the designated classes; and (2) reasonable ground must exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not. While some authorities sustain civil service statutes, granting privileges to honorably discharged soldiers and sailors (King v. Emmons, 191 N.E. 881) the doctrine is not supported by the weight of authority. However that point has no application to a statute which attempts to require cities to retain all employees in the service at the time the act was passed. The controlling purpose of the act was to secure competent and capable employees and to accomplish that result examinations and gradings are required. Section 9 of the Act recognizes the period of service in a position for less than six months to be no evidence of the fitness or qualifications for the position. The section also provides that even though a person did pass the examination and obtained the required grade or standing, nevertheless he is required to serve a probation period of six months before he might be permanently employed. The Milwaukee Act construed in County v. Buech, 177 N.W. 781 provides that long-continued service is evidence of qualification and fitness, without, however, citing authority to sustain the court's decision. The title of Chapter 49, Laws 1933 is misleading. The title to a bill is of great importance to a member of the legislature, in giving him an idea as to what the bill contains. The general law on this subject is set forth at 59 C. J. pp. 811, et seq. It is unlikely that a civil service law based on merit and fitness ascertained by...

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5 cases
  • Rodabaugh v. Ross
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • March 11, 1991
    ...County, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188 (1954); Keefe, State ex rel. v. Jones, 62 Wyo. 61, 161 P.2d 135 (1945). See Roberts v. City of Rock Springs, 52 Wyo. 89, 68 P.2d 891 (1937). We acknowledge the temptation to simply dispose of this case on the merits in light of the decision in Mills v. Reyno......
  • State ex rel. Keefe v. Jones
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • July 31, 1945
    ...questions unanswered, the trial judge's certificate or order reserving them not being regarded as controlling the matter. Roberts v. City of Rock Springs, supra. remanded--questions unanswered. ...
  • State v. Rosachi
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • April 27, 1976
    ...of fact have been disposed of by the trial court. The case was remanded with the questions unanswered. See also Roberts v. City of Rock Springs, 1937, 52 Wyo. 89, 68 P.2d 891, where questions of law and fact had not been decided by the district court. All preliminary matters, including fact......
  • White v. Board of County Com'rs of Albany County
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • June 25, 1957
    ...Daily Journal, 44 Wyo. 226, 11 P.2d 265; State ex rel. Lee v. Continental Oil Co., 48 Wyo. 152, 43 P.2d 686; Roberts v. City of Rock Springs, 52 Wyo. 89, 68 P.2d 891; State ex rel. Keefe v. Jones, 62 Wyo. 61, 161 P.2d 135; and see State ex rel. Fawcett v. Board of County Com'rs of Albany Co......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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