Roberts v. Harder

• Decision Date: 10 November 1970
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 13964.
• Citation: 320 F. Supp. 1313
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Annie Mae ROBERTS et al., v. John HARDER, Connecticut Welfare Commissioner.

320 F. Supp. 1313

Annie Mae ROBERTS et al., v. John HARDER, Connecticut Welfare Commissioner.

Civ. No. 13964.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

November 10, 1970.

William H. Clendenen, Jr., David M. Lesser, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiffs.

James M. Higgins, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Connecticut, East Hartford, Conn., for defendant.

RULING ON MOTION TO CONVENE A THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT

BLUMENFELD, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Annie Mae Roberts, seeks a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2201 that the provisions of Connecticut's Public Act 299, Conn.Gen.Stats. § 17-2f, violate her rights to due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, and requests a permanent injunction which would enjoin the State Commissioner of Welfare from enforcing and applying its provisions. The plaintiff relies upon the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to afford relief for the alleged deprivation of her constitutional rights. Jurisdiction is sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Because of the nature of the relief sought, the plaintiff has filed a motion that a three-judge district court be convened pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2284.

Jurisdiction

Before considering whether a three-judge district court is required to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim, it must first be decided whether her claim is one over which a federal district court of any composition may exercise jurisdiction.¹ Thompson v. New York Cent. R. R., 361 F.2d 137, 144-145 (2d Cir.1966); Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir.1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748, 63 S.Ct. 1158, 87 L.Ed. 1703 (1943); see Lion Mfg. Corp. v. Kennedy, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 330 F.2d 833, 840-841 (1964). Federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) requires that the claim asserted be one to "redress the deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States * * *." Authoritative interpretation of the quoted language in the context of federal jurisdiction limits its application to cases alleging deprivations only of a right "of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the infringement of property rights * * *." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 531, 59 S.Ct. 954, 971, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (opinion of Mr. Justice Stone). See Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 566 (2d Cir.1969). See also, McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.1969); Bradford Audio Corp. v. Pious, 392 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir.1968); Johnson v. Harder, 318 F.Supp. 1274 (D.Conn.1970). Thus, the allegation that the plaintiff was not afforded due process or was denied equal protection, without more, is not a sufficient basis for § 1343(3) jurisdiction. The significant element is the nature of the right allegedly infringed by the denial of those constitutional safeguards. Bourque v. Shapiro, 319 F.Supp. 729 (D.Conn.1970).

Nature of the Right

In essence the plaintiff's contention is that denial of constitutional safeguards has deprived her of her right to receive welfare assistance in the form of direct money payments rather than vendor payments. The factual background out of which that contention is extracted is as follows.

Plaintiff Roberts receives assistance from the Connecticut State Welfare Department under the program entitled Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). She did not receive her AFDC check dated January 1, 1970, and signed an affidavit so stating on January 5, 1970, in order to receive a duplicate check. This check did not arrive until January 23, 1970.

She promptly notified her landlord that she would be unable to pay her rent until the duplicate check arrived. She also informed her caseworker, who attempted to contact and discuss the matter with the landlord. On January 14, 1970, the landlord took advantage of Public Act 299,² Conn.Gen.Stats. § 17-2f, by making a written complaint to the State Welfare Department requesting vendor payment of plaintiff's rent. As stipulated by that law, the state granted the landlord's request and will continue to pay him directly for plaintiff's rent until her tenancy ceases.

In June of 1970, plaintiff was accorded a fair hearing to challenge these payments of rent directly to the landlord. The following facts were determined: (1) The nonpayment of rent in January occurred through no fault of the plaintiff. Despite this fact, the State Welfare Department is mandated by law to make and continue vendor payments to the landlord. (2) Vendor payments were initiated before plaintiff had an opportunity for a hearing.

The plaintiff contends that a right to direct payment arises out of the philosophical premise that a welfare system should promote the recipient's personal dignity and independence. Persuasive arguments can be made that as a matter of social policy an eligible recipient of welfare assistance generally should receive it in the form of a direct money payment. In an HEW report to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance, January 1969, the general proposition is stated:

"There is ample evidence in welfare history that the money payment made directly to the needy individual preserves his sense of dignity and pride and allows responsibility in management of his own affairs as a necessary step to economic independence."

On the other hand, the report also recognizes that there should be protective or vendor payments for certain services, and also that where a needy individual is incapable of managing direct money payments, for him to receive a money payment would be contrary to his welfare. Thus seen, even as remote a source for constitutional rights as the policy statement of HEW to the Congress does not suggest that the recipient has an unqualified right to receive payments in a manner which enhances his dignity and self-respect.

As applied to this specific case of rental payments, the plaintiff contends that her right to dignity has been impaired because she has been deprived of the economic power to force the landlord to improve the leased premises, a power which she could exercise by withholding the rent or participating in a tenants' action against her landlord. Her claim that exercise of that power would be effective, however, is more ephemeral than those ignorant of the law would be likely to expect.³ See generally, Walsh, Slum Housing, 40 Conn. Bar Journal 539 (1966); Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 Colum.L.Rev. 275 (1966). It is not poor tenants only who yearn for more effective weapons than the threat of withholding rent payments with which to confront reluctant landlords.⁴

Although administratively significant, payment of the rent by a welfare recipient herself is not relevant to the basic purpose of welfare assistance. Certainly the alleged right to receive shelter only in the form of direct money payments to the welfare recipient does not "involve the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (emphasis added), or "the very means by which to live" or render the plaintiff's situation "immediately desperate." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). See also, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1327, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (denial of aid "upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist"); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2142, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968) ("destitute children * * * flatly denied * * * assistance"); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at 261, 90 S.Ct. at 1017 ("brutal need").

Since any loss of "dignity" occasioned by the vendor payments of rent bears no relation to the amount or quality of shelter which this welfare recipient is afforded, payments by that method cannot be held to have deprived the plaintiff of any of the means to subsist. It follows that federal jurisdiction in this case cannot be founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) because plaintiff has failed to allege an infringement of a right of personal liberty.

While federal jurisdiction is not proper in this case, the necessity for any court to consider the question raised should have been avoided.⁵ The state authorities charged with the responsibility of interpreting Public Act 299 ought to have heeded the admonition of Judge Learned Hand in Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir.1944), aff'd,...