Roberts v. Hayes

• Decision Date: 06 March 1936
• Docket Number: Ag. No. 13.
• Citation: 1 N.E.2d 711,284 Ill.App. 275
• Parties: ROBERTS v. HAYES.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

284 Ill.App. 275

1 N.E.2d 711

ROBERTS

v.HAYES.

Ag. No. 13.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

March 6, 1936.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Fayette County; Thomas F. Jett, Judge.

Suit by Floyd Roberts, administrator of the estate of William M. Roberts, deceased, against Clara B. Hayes, administratrix of the estate of Thomas J. Hayes, deceased. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed. Arthur Roe and Chas. R. Myers, both of Vandalia, and Jesse R. Brown, of Edwardsville, for appellant.

J. G. Burnside, of Vandalia, for appellee.

EDWARDS, Presiding Justice.

The complaint set forth that on May 26, 1934, Thomas J. Hayes, intestate of appellant, brought about and encompassed the death of William M. Roberts, intestate of appellee, by a wrongful and willful act, by firing a revolver bullet willfully and intentionally into the body of said Roberts. Appellee answered, denying that said Hayes occasioned the death of Roberts by any wrongful or willful act, denied that he intentionally fired the shot as alleged, and averred that Hayes, at the time of the shooting, was insane and incapable of forming an intent or acting willfully.

The suit was brought under the Injuries Act, Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 70, § 1 et seq., Ill.Rev.St.1935, c. 70, par. 1 et seq., by appellee, as administrator of the estate of Roberts, in behalf of his next of kin, against the administratrix of Hayes' estate; the latter having killed himself after shooting Roberts. Upon a trial there was a jury verdict for $5,000, upon which the court entered judgment, and from which appellant appeals.

The principal reasons urged as grounds for reversal are the refusal of the trial court to permit appellant to make proof that Hayes was insane at the time of the shooting, the striking of certain testimony, and the refusal to give certain instructions bearing upon the question of insanity as a defense to the action.

The law is well settled that where a lunatic wrongfully kills another, he or his estate, if he thereafter, and before the suit, shall die, is liable in a civil action for damages in behalf of the next of kin of the person killed. McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E. 239,2 Am.St.Rep. 140; Seals v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 254 P. 348, 51 A.L.R. 829;Young v. Young, 141 Ky. 76, 132 S.W. 155;Jewell v. Colby, 66 N.H. 399, 24 A. 902. And it is further held by such authorities that evidence of the insanity of the defendant at the time of the wrongful killing is not admissible when offered in defense of the action.

Appellant, however, contends that the complaint having charged that the shooting was willfully and intentionally done, appellee was under the obligation of proving such intention, and that the way was thereby opened for the defense to plead and prove insanity; that such, if proven, was a complete defense to the action, whereby it became and was competent to offer evidence as to the mental condition of Hayes at the time of the killing; and that the ruling of the court rejecting such offers was to deny to appellant her defense.

An insane person has no will, and his acts necessarily lack the element of willfulness or intention, hence obviously it is not essential to allege or prove his torts as having been done willfully or with any evil intention. McIntyre v. Sholty, supra; Feld v. Borodofski, 87 Miss. 727, 40 So. 816; Buswell on Insanity, § 355; 32 Corpus Juris, 749.

The charge in the complaint that Hayes wrongfully brought about and encompassed the death of Roberts by shooting him was an adequate and complete statement of an unjustifiable killing. The further allegation that same was willfully and intentionally done was wholly unnecessary and added nothing to the sufficiency of the charge. Such matters of pleading, being beyond...