Roberts v. Mecosta County Hosp.

• Decision Date: 21 July 2004
• Docket Number: Docket No. 122335,Docket No. 122312,Docket No. 122338. Calendar No. 5.
• Citation: 470 Mich. 679,684 N.W.2d 711
• Parties: Lisa ROBERTS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Atkins, M.D., Defendant-Appellant, and MECOSTA COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL, Gail A. DesNoyers, M.D., Barb Davis, and Obstetrics and Gynecology of Big Rapids, P.C., formerly known as Gunther, DesNoyers & Mekaru, Defendants. Lisa Roberts, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gail A. DesNoyers, M.D., Barb Davis, Obstetrics and Gynecology of Big Rapids, P.C., formerly known as Gunther, DesNoyers & Mekaru, Defendants-Appellants, and Michael Atkins, M.D., and Mecosta County Hospital, Defendants. Lisa Roberts, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mecosta County General Hospital, Defendant-Appellant, and Gail A. DesNoyers, M.D., Michael Atkins, M.D., Barb Davis, and Obstetrics and Gynecology of Big Rapids, P.C., formerly known as Gunther, DesNoyers & Mekaru, Defendants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

684 N.W.2d 711

470 Mich. 679

Lisa ROBERTS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Atkins, M.D., Defendant-Appellant, and MECOSTA COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL, Gail A. DesNoyers, M.D., Barb Davis, and Obstetrics and Gynecology of Big Rapids, P.C., formerly known as Gunther, DesNoyers & Mekaru, Defendants.

Lisa Roberts, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gail A. DesNoyers, M.D., Barb Davis, Obstetrics and Gynecology of Big Rapids, P.C., formerly known as Gunther, DesNoyers & Mekaru, Defendants-Appellants, and Michael Atkins, M.D., and Mecosta County Hospital, Defendants.

Lisa Roberts, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mecosta County General Hospital, Defendant-Appellant, and Gail A. DesNoyers, M.D., Michael Atkins, M.D., Barb Davis, and Obstetrics and Gynecology of Big Rapids, P.C., formerly known as Gunther, DesNoyers & Mekaru, Defendants.

Docket Nos. 122312, 122335, 122338. Calendar No. 5.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued December 11, 2003.

Decided July 21, 2004.

Angela J. Nicita, Allen Park, MI, and Mark Granzotto, P.C. (by Mark Granzotto), Royal Oak, MI, for the plaintiff.

Burnheimer & Company, P.C. (by Mark A. Burnheimer), Traverse City, MI, for defendant Michael L. Atkins, M.D.

Smith Haughey Rice & Roegge (by Jon D. Vander Ploeg), Grand Rapids, MI, for defendant Mecosta County General Hospital.

Bensinger, Cotant, Menkes, P.C. (by Kerr L. Moyer), Grand Rapids, MI, for defendants Gail A. DesNoyers, M.D., Barb Davis, and Obstetrics & Gynecology of Big Rapids, P.C.

Kerr, Russell and Weber, PLC (by Richard D. Weber and Joanne Geha Swanson), Detroit, MI, for Michigan State Medical Society.

INTRODUCTION

YOUNG, J.

This medical malpractice case is before us for the second time. In Roberts v. Mecosta, 466 Mich. 57, 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002) (Roberts I), we held that the statute of limitations could not be tolled under MCL 600.5856(d) unless notice was given in compliance with all the provisions of MCL 600.2912b, and that § 2912b imposed no requirement on defendants to object to the sufficiency of plaintiff's notices of intent before the filing of the complaint. Because the Court of Appeals had not addressed the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff's notices of intent did not comply with § 2912b, we remanded the matter to that Court for further proceedings. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's notices of intent strictly complied with the provisions of § 2912b.

We conclude that plaintiff's notices of intent are deficient in several respects and that, therefore, the statute of limitations was not tolled under § 5856(d). The unambiguous language of MCL 600.2912b(4) requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to include in her notice of intent a statement of (1) the factual basis for the claim, (2) the applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant, (3) the manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached, (4) the alleged action that should have been taken to comply with the alleged standard, (5) the manner in which it is claimed that the breach was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice, and (6) the names of all professionals and facilities the claimant is notifying. Although the notices of intent in this case are not wholly deficient with regard to the above requirements, they are nonetheless not in full compliance with § 2912b because they fail to properly set forth allegations regarding the standard of practice or care applicable to each named defendant, allegations regarding the manner in which it was claimed that defendants breached the applicable standards of practice or care, the alleged actions that defendants should have taken in order to satisfy the alleged standards, or allegations of the manner in which defendants' breaches of the standards constituted the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.

Because plaintiff did not fully comply with the unambiguous requirements of § 2912b(4), we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and we reinstate the judgments of the trial court granting defendants' motions for summary disposition.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We set forth the following recitation of facts in our prior opinion:

Plaintiff was pregnant and sought treatment because she was experiencing severe pain in her abdomen. She was diagnosed as having suffered a spontaneous abortion and a D & C [dilation and curettage] was performed. Plaintiff alleges that it was later discovered that she had actually been suffering from an ectopic pregnancy, not a spontaneous abortion, and that her left fallopian tube had burst. Emergency surgery was performed to remove plaintiff's left fallopian tube. Plaintiff claims that as a result of the second operation, she can no longer bear children because her right fallopian tube had previously been removed.

Plaintiff decided to pursue a medical malpractice claim, alleging that defendants misdiagnosed her condition and subsequently performed an unnecessary operation.

Plaintiff served a notice of intent on defendant Mecosta County General Hospital on September 19, 1996, and on the remaining defendants on September 23, 1996. Serving these notices constituted plaintiff's attempt to (1) meet the notice requirements for medical malpractice actions prescribed by MCL 600.2912b and (2) toll the statute of limitations pursuant to MCL 600.5856(d).

After the waiting period required under MCL 600.2912b had passed, plaintiff filed her complaint. Thereafter, defendants filed motions for summary disposition. Defendants argued, inter alia, that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations because the notices of intent failed to comply with the requirements outlined in MCL 600.2912b(4). Specifically, defendants asserted that plaintiff's notices failed to sufficiently state the standard of care, the manner in which the standard was breached, the action the defendants should have taken, and the proximate cause of the injury. Defendants advanced the position that, since the notices were insufficient, the period of limitation was not tolled under MCL 600.5856(d) and had therefore expired. The trial court granted the motions for summary disposition.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that defendants had waived their ability to challenge plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice requirements because they did not raise their objections before the time the complaint was filed.... [Roberts I, supra at 59-61, 642 N.W.2d 663.]

This Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that (1) the statute of limitations was not tolled unless notice was given in compliance with all the provisions of § 2912b, (2) that § 2912b imposed no duty on defendants to challenge any deficiencies in the notices of intent before the complaint was filed, and (3) that defendants were not required to assert the statute of limitations defense or to challenge the sufficiency of the notices of intent until after plaintiff filed suit. Roberts I, supra. We "express [ed] no opinion concerning plaintiff's compliance or noncompliance with MCL 600.2912b, an issue that the Court of Appeals declined to answer." Id. at 71 n. 8, 642 N.W.2d 663. We remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals to address this issue. Id. at 71, 642 N.W.2d 663.

On remand, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's notices of intent strictly complied with the requirements of § 2912b.¹ 252 Mich.App. 664, 666, 653 N.W.2d 441 (2002). The panel opined that plaintiff's notices of intent set forth a proper factual basis for her claim and a sufficient, even if not accurate, allegation as to the applicable standard of practice or care. Id. at 667-670, 653 N.W.2d 441. The panel further concluded that, by reference to the recitations of the factual basis for the claim, the notices of intent set forth the manner in which it was claimed that the applicable standards of care were breached, the alleged actions that should have been taken, and the manner in which it was alleged that the breaches of the standards of care were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The panel likewise concluded that the notices properly set forth the names of all health professionals and facilities that plaintiff notified in relation to the claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case involves questions of statutory interpretation, which are reviewed de novo. Roberts I, supra at 62, 642 N.W.2d 663. We review the trial court's grant of summary disposition de novo. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. RELEVANT STATUTES

MCL 600.2912b(1)² precludes a medical malpractice claimant from commencing suit against a health professional or health facility unless written notice is provided to that professional or facility before the action is commenced. After providing the written notice, the claimant is required to wait for the applicable notice period to pass before filing suit.³

The two-year period of limitation for medical malpractice actions is tolled during the notice period "after the date notice is given in compliance with section 2912b." MCL 600.5856(d) (emphasis supplied). Thus, in order to toll the limitation period under § 5856(d), the claimant is required to comply with all the requirements of § 2912b. Roberts I, supra at 64, 642 N.W.2d 663.

MCL 600.2912b(4) enumerates the specific topics that the claimant is required to address in the written notice of intent:

The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following:

(a) The factual basis for the claim.

(b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.

(c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility.

(d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care.

(e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of

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