Roberts v. NVR, Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15-489 |
| Parties | JEFFREY D. ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. NVR, INC., trading as RYAN HOMES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff, Jeffrey Roberts, brings this action against Defendant, NVR, Inc., trading as Ryan Homes, alleging state law claims of breach of contract, breach of warranty and violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. §§ 201.1 to 201.9.3 (UTPCPL), arising out of the allegedly defective construction of a home.
Presently pending before the Court is a partial motion to dismiss, in which Defendant contends that Counts II (breach of warranty) and Count III (UTPCPL) should be dismissed. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.
On or about July 31, 2013, Plaintiff and NVR entered into a Purchase Agreement for a New Home to be constructed at 223 Taylor Ridge Lane, Mars, Pennsylvania 16046 ("the Home"). On or about February 14, 2014, the parties closed on the Home. At or prior to the closing, Plaintiff was provided with Ryan Homes' "Homeowners Documents" and "Homeowners Guide" which contain representations and warranties. ( 1 Immediately after closing on the Home, Plaintiff moved into the Home and continues to reside there. Since occupying the Home, Plaintiff has noticed numerous defects and deficiencies in its construction. He indicates that he informed NVR about these problems and that itpromised to repair some items and affirmatively indicated that it would not fix certain defects in the walls of the Home. It has not repaired all of the items that it agreed to repair and the Home has cosmetic and possibly structural damage. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-8.)
Plaintiff states that, at all relevant times, NVR was responsible for and controlled the means and methods of the construction and the repairs to the Home, that its efforts to repair the construction defects have exacerbated the defective conditions or created additional defective conditions, and that the defective construction and observable construction defects will result in significant cost to repair and has resulted in diminished value of the Home. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-11.)
On March 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Count I alleged a claim of negligence. Count II alleged a claim of breach of warranty. Count III alleged a claim under the UTPCPL. Count IV alleged a claim of breach of contract.
On April 13, 2015, Defendant removed the action to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction in that: Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania, NVR is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Reston, Virginia and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 4-7.)2 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
On May 15, 2015, Defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss, seeking dismissal of Counts II and III of the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11). On June 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition (ECF No. 14). Defendant filed a reply brief on June 9, 2015 (ECF No. 15).
The Supreme Court has issued two decisions that pertain to the standard of review for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court held that a complaint must include factual allegations that "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "[W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only 'fair notice' but also the 'grounds' on which the claim rests." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). In determining whether a plaintiff has met this standard, a court must reject legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements;" "labels and conclusions;" and "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). Mere "possibilities" of misconduct are insufficient. Id. at 679. The Court of Appeals has summarized the inquiry as follows:
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must take three steps. First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1950. Third, "whe[n] there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id. This means that our inquiry is normally broken into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleadedcomponents of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged.
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
"Generally, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a district court relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record." Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The Complaint attaches the Homeowners Guide and the warranties, both of which may be considered in reviewing the pending motion to dismiss.
Defendant argues that: 1) Count II should be dismissed because implied warranties have been disclaimed and he fails to identify any specific express warranty terms that have been breached; and 2) Count III should be dismissed on the grounds that it is barred by the economic loss doctrine and because Plaintiff has failed to plead justifiable reliance.
Plaintiff responds that: 1) he is not alleging a claim of breach of implied warranties and he has adequately pleaded a breach of express warranty claim; and 2) the UTPCPL claim is not barred by the economic loss doctrine, pursuant to a recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decision on the matter, and he has pleaded sufficient facts to infer that he reasonably relied on the written warranties in purchasing the Home to the extent that is necessary.
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that NVR breached express warranties regarding workmanship; he does not allege a claim of breach of implied warranties. Defendant argues that he has failed to identify any items from the limited warranty that were allegedly breached. Plaintiff responds that he has pleaded all of the elements necessary to state a claim.
To prove a claim of breach of express warranty under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must establish that: the defendant breached or failed to meet its warranty promise, that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm and the amount of ensuing damages. Samuel-Bassettv. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 35 (Pa. 2011). Plaintiff argues that he has alleged that Defendant issued warranties on its workmanship, that the workmanship was substandard and it breached the warranties, that Defendant was notified and had an opportunity to cure, that it failed to correct the defects, and that the breach caused damages. ( Specifically, he alleges that the warranties included workmanship and that the following areas would be constructed in a good and workmanlike manner: the sitework and surface and sub-surface drainage, the concrete for the basement and garage floors, wood and plastics including rough carpentry and trim carpentry, thermal and moisture protection, finishes including drywall (walls and ceilings) and painting, kitchen cabinets, vanities and countertops, plumbing and HVAC. He contends that he is not required at this stage of the proceedings to cite verbatim the text of the warranty language from Defendant's 60 pages of warranties, and this Court agrees.
Defendant cites cases in which the plaintiffs provided no evidence of an express warranty. Barker v. Hostetter, 2014 WL 1464319, at *26 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2014); Arlandson v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 691, 707 (D.N.J. 2011). In this case, Plaintiff has referred to the warranty, which is attached to the Complaint, and cited specific examples of Defendant's failure to construct the Home in a good and workmanlike manner. Plaintiff has pleaded all of the elements of a breach of express warranty claim. Therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss Count II will be denied.
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges a claim under the UTPCPL. Defendant contends that this claim is barred by economic loss doctrine and that Plaintiff has failed to plead justifiable reliance. Plaintiff argues that the doctrine does not apply to bar this statutory claim and that hehas pleaded all that is necessary at this stage of the proceedings.
The Court of Appeals has stated that:
In adjudicating a case under state law, we are not free to impose our own view of what state law should be; rather, we are to apply state law as interpreted by the state's highest court in an effort to predict how that court would decide the precise legal issues before us. Kowalsky v. Long Beach Twp., 72 F.3d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1995);...
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