Roberts v. Office of Administration, Com. of Pa.
| Decision Date | 28 April 1977 |
| Citation | 30 Pa.Cmwlth. 19,372 A.2d 1233 |
| Parties | G. D. ROBERTS et al. v. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, G. D. Roberts et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Argued Dec. 10, 1976.
Christine H. Kellett, John R. White Gettysburg, for appellants.
Jeffrey G. Cokin, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg for appellees.
Ten Pennsylvania State Police Troopers (Appellants) have appealed a decision of the Secretary of Administration (Secretary) refusing them a hearing on the grievance described hereinbelow. We reverse and remand and direct the Secretary to conduct the requested hearing.
In 1969 the State Police Commissioner (Commissioner) instituted the new rank of Crime Investigation Specialist (CIS), together with a special training program, and invited state policemen to apply for it. Appellants applied and were admitted in May 1970. They were immediately advanced to a pay scale equivalent to that of Corporal, and were removed from the normal competitive ranks and restricted to competition for promotion within the CIS series.
On March 23, 1972, the CIS program was terminated as a result of an opinion of the Attorney General wherein he stated that the program as it then existed was illegal because of the absence of rules and regulations governing it, and because the initial entry of individuals into the program was in disregard of merit principles. Appellants were thereupon reclassified to the rank of Trooper, but received no reduction in pay. At that time, a section of the Pennsylvania State Police Field Regulations provided for an informal procedure for the airing of grievances. Though Appellants complained to their superiors about the reclassifications, they took no formal action for three and a half years. On October 29, 1975, the Commissioner promulgated a new, more detailed, four-step grievance procedure. Shortly thereafter, Appellants availed themselves of the new procedure by formally asserting their grievances in writing to their immediate supervisors (Step 1), their Troop Commanders (Step 2), the Commissioner (Step 3), and the Secretary (Step 4). They were denied relief at all levels and the Secretary denied their request for a hearing.
Appellants' argument on the merits is that the administrative action of reclassifying them from the rank of Trooper to the rank of Crime Investigation Specialist was in law a promotion and that their subsequent reclassification some two years later was a demotion, as this Court has defined the term. Appellants contend that this alleged demotion is in direct conflict with Section 205(e) of the Administrative Code of 1929 [1] , which reads:
'No enlisted member of the Pennsylvania State Police shall be . . . reduced in rank except by action of a court martial held upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police and the Governor.'
They claim entitlement to promotion to the rank of Corporal, a right which they say they could establish if given a hearing, and contend that to deny them a hearing is a denial of fundamental due process.
In addition to addressing the merits, the Secretary has moved to quash the appeal on essentially two grounds: first, that his action did not constitute an adjudication and therefore is not appealable; and second, that having slept on their grievance for over three and a half years, Appellants are barred from airing it now. We find no merit in either contention.
' Adjudication' is defined by Section 2 of the Administrative Agency Law [2] as 'any final order, decree, decision, determination, or ruling by an agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities or obligations . . ..' If Appellants' argument that they have been unjustly demoted and are therefore entitled to promotion to Corporal is correct (and we so consider it, in ruling on the motion to quash), the Secretary's action would be one 'affecting personal (and) property rights, privileges, immunities or obligations'. See Begis v. Industrial Board of the Department of Labor and Industry, 9 Pa.Cmwlth. 558, 308 A.2d 643 (1973). His action here involved the exercise of discretion and not the performance of a purely ministerial duty, and was therefore judicial in nature, which, we have held, is another attribute of an adjudication. Fricchione v. Department of Education, 4 Pa.Cmwlth. 288, 287 A.2d 442 (1972).
Our decisions in Department of Health v. Schum, 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 356, 346 A.2d 599 (1975), and O'Peil v. State Civil Service Commission, 13 Pa.Cmwlth. 470, 320 A.2d 461 (1974), are not inconsistent with our holding here. We held in those cases that, where an administrative agency or official refuses to hear the merits of a grievance at all, ruling merely that the grievance procedures are not available to the particular grievant, the action is not an adjudication and therefore not reviewable through appeal; and if the grievant disagrees, believing that the agency or official has a clear duty to hear his grievance, his remedy is in mandamus. Here, the Secretary's letter discusses the merits of the claim in detail and purports to dispose of every aspect of the grievance completely and with finality. [3] It therefore is an adjudication and is properly before us on appeal.
Second, we disagree with the Secretary that the passage of three and a half years bars this action. The grievance procedure in effect from the time of the reclassifications to the time of the promulgation of the new four-step procedure prescribed no limitation of time in which complaints could be brought. And although the Secretary alleges that promoting Appellants to the rank of Corporal will result in the disruption of State Police promotion schedules and the violation of a consent decree requiring the State Police to integrate their ranks at a specified rate, we perceive no causal relationship between the alleged prejudicial effects and Appellants' delay. Moreover, there is a substantial question as to...
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