Roberts v. Roberts
| Decision Date | 05 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 23079,23079 |
| Parties | Regan S. ROBERTS, Respondent, v. Richard B. ROBERTS, Petitioner. . Heard |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
G. Robin Alley, of Ellison, Quinn, Isaacs & Alley, Columbia, for petitioner.
Robert L. Hallman, Jr., Columbia, for respondent.
This is a domestic action before this Court on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Roberts v. Roberts, 296 S.C. 93, 370 S.E.2d 881 (Ct.App.1988). The sole issue before this Court is whether approximately 43.5 acres of a 48.45 acre tract of real property acquired during the marriage and titled in Mr. Roberts' name is marital property subject to equitable distribution under S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-473 (Supp.1988). The Family Court held the property was a gift to Mr. Roberts from his mother and, therefore, was not marital property subject to distribution. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the property was marital property. We affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals as modified.
Regan S. Roberts (Wife) and Richard B. Roberts (Husband) were married in August of 1974. They have three children. Wife is a school teacher; Husband owns a construction company.
The following facts regarding the acquisition and use of the property are undisputed. Husband's mother inherited an interest in the subject property. In January of 1976, Husband's mother purchased the property at a Master's sale for $24,500.00. Husband's mother conveyed this property to Husband by deed in May 1976. Richard and his wife, Regan, began construction of a house on the property in 1977, which they occupied as their marital residence beginning in 1982 until these proceedings began below.
The remaining facts surrounding the acquisition of the property are disputed. Wife testified that, in fact, she and Husband had purchased the property. According to Wife, Husband's mother had agreed to allow them to use the mother's inherited interest in the property ($11,745.68) to make the purchase. The couple was to repay this amount to Husband's mother. Wife testified she and Husband supplied the remaining portion of the $24,500.00 purchase price. In order to raise this additional amount, Wife testified she borrowed funds from her credit union, and the couple used their savings.
In support of her version of the facts, Wife presented evidence tending to show repayment of the funds borrowed from Husband's mother. Wife introduced into evidence 15 checks made payable to Husband's mother written on the couple's joint checking account totalling $3,000.00 on which notations had been made by Husband indicating they were "payments" attributable to various months. Additionally, Wife introduced checks drawn on the couple's joint checking account totalling $6,500.00 which were made payable to Standard Savings and Loan. Husband admitted on cross-examination these checks were probably deposited into his mother's savings account at Standard Savings. Wife testified she understood the couple was also repaying the debt to the mother, in part, by the use of the couple's income tax refunds. She testified Husband told In support of her allegations that the couple had supplied the remainder of the purchase price, Wife introduced copies of checks totalling $12,621.00, which she testified comprised the remaining amount. Included in these checks were two made payable to Wife from the S.C. Teacher's Credit Union, which Wife testified were the proceeds from two loans she had acquired to assist in raising the purchase price. Wife testified she found the copies of these checks, along with a copy of a deposit slip, on a joint account in Husband's and his mother's name, which listed the checks, in Husband's file.
her she could not use such a refund one year in order to purchase a bedroom suite, because the refund must go to his mother.
The Husband testified the property was a gift to him from his mother. However, aside from the deed, which showed the property was titled solely in his name, he offered no additional evidence in support of his position. He was unable to recall the reason checks had been written to his mother or deposited into her savings account. Husband stated on cross-examination his mother had never loaned the couple any funds. Husband was unable to recall any reason Wife might have borrowed the funds from the credit union.
The Family Court found the entire 48.45 acres was a gift to Husband. However, the Family Court determined that, as the marital home was located upon the property, five acres of the property surrounding the marital home had been transmuted into marital property. The Family Court divided this and all additional marital property equally between the parties.
The Court of Appeals held the preponderance of the evidence established the entire 48.45 acres was marital property and should have been equitably distributed. The Court of Appeals ordered a remand to determine if the property could be distributed in kind. 370 S.E.2d at 884.
Husband alleges the Court of Appeals erred in finding the copy of the deposit slip was admissible, in finding the property was marital property and not a gift, and in failing to remand for a redetermination of the percentage of equitable ownership following the finding the property was marital property.
As an action for divorce is an equitable action heard by a family court judge alone, this Court may, on appeal, find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 283 S.C. 404, 323 S.E.2d 781 (1984).
Wife testified the copy of the deposit slip "showed" Husband had taken the funds referenced thereon and deposited them into his mother's account. Husband objected to the line of testimony, noting the copy did not reflect that the deposit had actually been made, and Wife had no actual knowledge concerning whether the deposit had, in fact, been made. The trial judge questioned Wife regarding her direct knowledge that the deposit had been made. Upon her admission that she had no direct knowledge regarding the deposit, the trial court sustained Husband's objection as to the "deposit slip". The record does not reflect an offer of the copy of the deposit slip into evidence, an objection to such an offer, or a ruling on the evidence's admissibility.
Fundamental principles of evidentiary procedure dictate evidence must be offered before an opposing party may object to its introduction or its admissibility may be ruled upon by a trial court judge. C. McCormick,...
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