Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Services

• Decision Date: 14 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 19905,19905
• Citation: 114 N.M. 248,1992 NMSC 42,837 P.2d 442
• Parties: Patricia ROBERTS, Petitioner, v. SOUTHWEST COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES, Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 442

837 P.2d 442

114 N.M. 248

Patricia ROBERTS, Petitioner, v. SOUTHWEST COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES, Respondent.

No. 19905.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 14, 1992.

[114 N.M. 248] Gutierrez Law Offices, Avelino V. Gutierrez, Law Office of Damon B. Ely, Daymon B. Ely, Michael B. Browde, Albuquerque, for petitioner.

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, W. Robert Lasater, Susan S. Throckmorton, Charles K. Purcell, Albuquerque, for respondent.

[114 N.M. 249] Atwood, Malone, Mann & Turner, P.A., Rod M. Schumacher, Roswell, amicus curiae New Mexico, Defense Lawyers Ass'n.

OPINION

BACA, Justice.

This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim brought by petitioner Patricia Roberts against respondent Southwest Community Health Services ("SCHS"). The trial court granted a summary judgment motion in favor of SCHS after determining that petitioner's claim was barred by the relevant statute of limitations. Petitioner appealed the summary judgment to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion. We granted certiorari and address two related issues: (1) Whether a distinction between qualified and nonqualified health care providers should be made for the purpose of applying the Medical Malpractice Act's statute of limitations; and (2) if so, whether the statute of limitations for a personal injury caused by the medical malpractice of a nonqualified health care provider accrues at the time of the negligent act or when the plaintiff discovers her injury and its cause. Because we find that a distinction does exist, we reverse and remand to the trial court.

I

For purposes of this appeal, the relevant facts are as follows. On November 9, 1984, petitioner underwent surgery at Presbyterian Hospital, a hospital owned by SCHS. Over the next four years, petitioner suffered from discomfort and medical problems in her abdomen. In January of 1989, petitioner learned that a sponge had been left in her abdomen during the 1984 surgery and had the sponge removed.

On April 9, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for medical negligence that alleged that Drs. Fisk and Smith, the surgeons who had performed the surgery, and the nurses employed by SCHS had negligently failed to remove the sponge from petitioner during the 1984 operation. The complaint alleged that Dr. Fahy, a radiologist, was negligent in failing to discover the sponge. The complaint also alleged that the health care providers had fraudulently concealed the fact of the negligence. The complaint joined SCHS under the theory of respondeat superior.

Drs. Fisk and Smith, who were both qualified health care providers under the Medical Malpractice Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 41-5-1 through -28 (Repl.Pamp.1989 & Cum.Supp.1992) (the "Act"), made a motion for summary judgment, asserting that petitioner's claim was barred by the statute of limitations, Section 41-5-13. Although it was not a qualified health care provider, SCHS also moved for summary judgment based on the three year statute of limitations in Section 41-5-13. The trial court granted the summary judgment motions of Dr. Smith and SCHS and dismissed Smith, SCHS, and all of the employees of SCHS with prejudice. The trial court, however, found that questions of fact regarding the allegation of fraudulent concealment against Fisk remained and that summary judgment as to Fisk was therefore not appropriate.

Petitioner, Fisk, Smith, and Fahy made a subsequent joint motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice as to those parties. Petitioner filed a timely appeal of the summary judgment in favor of SCHS and, in an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations is not a "benefit" of the Act and that the claim accrued at the time of the wrongful act causing injury. Because of an apparent conflict in the case law, we accepted petitioner's application for certiorari. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II

In 1976, in response to a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis, the legislature passed the Medical Malpractice Act.¹ The Act establishes medical malpractice liability coverage, Section 41-5-25, and, in addition, provides other benefits to those providers who choose to become qualified in accordance with Section 41-5-5(A). Section 41-5-5(C) of the Act specifically limits its benefits to those health care providers who accept the burdens of qualification.²

Prior to passage of the Act, we held that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action begins to run at the time of the negligent act that causes injury. Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963). However, in a case that arose before the passage of the Act but that was decided after passage of the Act, the Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case begins to run not at the time of the negligent act but rather at the time that the plaintiff suffers injury. Peralta v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 391, 564 P.2d 194 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977). According to the Peralta court, "the limitation period begins to run from the time the injury manifests itself in a physically objective manner and is ascertainable." Id. at 394, 564 P.2d at 197. Thus, for cases that arose prior to the passage of the Act or that are not governed by the limitations provisions of the Act, the judicial interpretations of the statute of limitations are conflicting.³

For those actions that are governed by the limitations provisions of the Act, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date that the malpractice occurred and expires three years from that date. Section 41-5-13. In a case interpreting this statute of limitations, Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (Ct.App.1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016, 103 S.Ct. 377, 74 L.Ed.2d 510 (1982), the Court of Appeals held that, because the Act codified the common law rule of Roybal, the statute of limitations of the Act was not a "benefit" of the Act and, as such, was equally applicable to qualified and nonqualified health care providers. We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the statute of limitations under the Medical Malpractice Act applies to nonqualified health care providers and, if not, to clarify when a personal injury cause of action for medical malpractice against a nonqualified health care provider accrues.

III

Contrary to the Court of Appeals' opinion in Armijo, petitioner contends that the Act differentiates between "qualified health care providers" and "nonqualified health care providers" because only health care providers meeting the Act's qualifications, Section 41-5-5(A), may claim the benefits of the Act, Section 41-5-5(C). Petitioner argues that the statute of limitations, Section 41-5-13, is a "benefit" of the Act because it bars any medical malpractice claims against qualified health care providers arising three years after the act of malpractice, whether or not such claims are discoverable. Petitioner contends that the statute of limitations for personal injury, NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-8 (Repl.Pamp.1990), is applicable to malpractice claims against a nonqualified health care provider, such as SCHS. Petitioner claims that there is a conflict in the case law interpreting when a personal injury cause of action arising from medical malpractice against nonqualified health care providers accrues. As discussed above, Roybal held that a personal injury claim accrues at the time of the negligent act. 72 N.M. at 287, 383 P.2d at 252. However, the Court of Appeals, in a pre-Act case, held that the cause of action accrues at the time of the injury. Peralta, 90 N.M. at 393, 564 P.2d at 196 (criticizing Roybal ). Petitioner asks us to reconsider Roybal, overrule Armijo, and adopt the rule fromPeralta, i.e., that the cause of action accrues at the time of the injury.

Not surprisingly, SCHS claims that the Act's three year statute of limitations applies to all health care providers, whether they are "qualified" or "nonqualified." Amicus Curiae, aligned with SCHS, cites language from the Act's statute of limitations to support this contention: "No claim for malpractice * * * may be brought against a health care provider unless filed within three years after the date that the act of malpractice occurred * * *." Section 41-5-13. Amicus argues that the legislature's omission of the word "qualified" from this provision indicates that the legislature intended all health care providers to receive the benefit of its protection. Citing Armijo, 98 N.M. at 184, 646 P.2d at 1248, Amicus also contends that the Act merely codified the existing common law rule of Roybal that the cause of action accrues at the time of the wrongful act. SCHS and Amicus argue that the Act's statute of limitations cannot be considered as a "benefit" to qualified health care providers and, consequently, the statute of limitations contained in the Act applies equally to qualified and nonqualified health care providers.

A

In Armijo, the Court of Appeals considered due process and equal protection challenges to the validity of the statute of limitations under the Act. 98 N.M. at 183-84, 646 P.2d at 1247-48. The plaintiff in Armijo, as personal representative of decedent's estate, alleged that the physician-defendant's malpractice had caused decedent's death, which occurred several months after the alleged negligent act. The plaintiff filed his complaint more than three years after the date of the alleged wrongful act but prior to three years after decedent's death. Thus, if the Act's statute of limitations for medical malpractice applied, the claim would be barred; if, however, the wrongful death statute of limitations applied, plaintiff's claim would not have been barred. Id. at 183, 686 P.2d at 1247. The plaintiff argued that the statutory schemes violated equal protection...