Roberts v. Transportation Dept.

• Decision Date: 29 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 19102,19102
• Citation: Roberts v. Transportation Dept., 121 Idaho 727, 827 P.2d 1178 (Idaho App. 1991)
• Parties: Nancy Carol ROBERTS, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of James Arnold Roberts, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kelly J. Reed, Steven D. Clark; Lloyd E. Hedberg and Blanche M. Hedberg, husband and wife, Defendants, and TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, By and Through the Idaho Transportation Board, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1178

827 P.2d 1178

121 Idaho 727

Nancy Carol ROBERTS, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of James Arnold Roberts, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kelly J. Reed, Steven D. Clark; Lloyd E. Hedberg and Blanche M. Hedberg, husband and wife, Defendants and TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, By and Through the Idaho Transportation Board, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 19102.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Oct. 29, 1991.

Joseph M. Imhoff, Jr. and Patrick D. Furey, Imhoff & Lynch, Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Donald J. Farley, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, Boise, for defendant-respondent.

WALTERS, Chief Judge.

This case arises from a fatal accident that occurred when a motorist failed to stop at a marked intersection and collided with the decedent's vehicle traveling along the intersecting state through highway. On appeal, we are asked to determine whether the district court erred when, on summary judgment, it dismissed the wrongful death and personal injury claims asserted against the Idaho State Department of Transportation (the Department). For the reasons stated below, we reverse.

I FACTS

The collision occurred at the intersection of State Highway 69 and Deer Flat Road, located in Ada County, Idaho. Highway 69 is a through highway ¹ and has the right-of-way. Deer Flat Road is within the Ada County Highway District (ACHD). At the time of the accident, there was a stop sign placed along the right-hand side of Deer Flat Road, several feet before its intersection with the state highway. On September 19, 1987, at approximately three o'clock in the afternoon, James Roberts and his wife, Nancy, were traveling north on Highway 69. Stephen Clark and his passenger Carl Cox were proceeding east on Deer Flat Road. Clark failed to stop at the stop sign and entered the intersection, colliding with the Roberts' vehicle. As a result, James Roberts was killed and Nancy Roberts and Carl Cox both were injured.

Nancy Roberts brought an action against Clark, the Department, the ACHD, and the Hedbergs--the owners of the property located adjacent to the Deer Flat Road stop sign--seeking to recover damages for her own injuries and for the wrongful death of her husband. ² With respect to her claims against the Department, Mrs. Roberts alleged that the Department was negligent in failing to erect and maintain proper traffic control signs. Specifically, Mrs. Roberts contended that the state was negligent in: (1) failing to erect a larger stop sign on Deer Flat Road, where greater emphasis and visibility were required; (2) failing to remove foliage encroaching upon Deer Flat Road, which obstructed the existing stop sign; (3) failing to place a "stop ahead" sign on Deer Flat Road; and (4) failing to place a "cross road ahead" sign on Highway 69, in advance of the intersection, to warn motorists of the potentially dangerous condition.

The Department moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the claims against the Department, ruling that the Department was not liable to Mrs. Roberts, either because the Department did not owe the duties Mrs. Roberts alleged had been breached, or because the Department was immune under the "discretionary function" exception to governmental liability, contained in I.C. § 6-904(1). Mrs. Roberts appeals.

II STANDARD OF REVIEW

We begin by noting the standards of review applicable where an appellate court reviews the propriety of an order granting a summary judgment motion. "[I]f the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," then the district court's order of summary judgment will be affirmed. I.C.R.P. 56(c). The pleadings and the evidentiary record will be construed liberally in favor of the party resisting the motion. Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 179-80, 731 P.2d 171, 174-75 (1986). We first determine whether Mrs. Roberts' claims allege a legal duty owed by the Department. We then decide whether the Department was immune from tort liability under I.C. § 6-904(1). See Bingham v. Franklin County, 118 Idaho 318, 796 P.2d 527 (1990).

III DOES PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM ALLEGE A DUTY OWED BY THE DEPARTMENT?

A. The Department's Statutory Duty to Erect and Maintain Signs.

Idaho Code § 40-201 charges the Department and each highway district within the state with the general duty to improve and maintain the highways within their respective jurisdictions. Highway 69 is within the Department's jurisdiction, which includes a thirty-three foot right-of-way on either side of the centerline of that highway. Deer Flat Road is within the jurisdiction of the ACHD. The Department concedes that its jurisdiction overlaps with that of the ACHD at the intersection of Deer Flat Road and Highway 69, and that placement of the stop sign at the intersection within thirty-three feet of the state highway was within the Department's jurisdiction. However, the Department claims it had no authority, and therefore no duty, to place any sign or to remove any obstructive foliage outside of its jurisdiction. It further avers that any duty to erect such a sign along Deer Flat Road, or to remove foliage encroaching upon Deer Flat Road that obscures the Department's stop sign, rested exclusively with the ACHD.

As Mrs. Roberts points out, however, the Department, alone, has an express statutory duty with respect to erecting and maintaining signs at its highways' intersections. Specifically, I.C. § 40-310(12) imposes upon the Department the responsibility to "[f]urnish, erect and maintain standard signs on side highways directing drivers of vehicles approaching a designated through highway to come to a full stop before entering or crossing the through highway." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, I.C. § 40-313(1) states that the Department "shall erect and maintain, whenever necessary for public safety and convenience, suitable signs, markers, signals and other devices to control, guide and warn pedestrians and vehicular traffic entering or traveling upon the state highway system." (Emphasis added.) The legislature in no way qualified this duty by the condition that the sign-placing or maintenance activities occur exclusively within boundaries of the state highway system. Thus, contrary to the Department's position that it is without "jurisdiction" to place and maintain signs outside of its right-of-way, the Department has both the authority and an express statutory duty to do so.

B. Delegation of the Statutorily Imposed Duty.

In further support of its position, the Department cites section 1A-3.1 of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (the Manual), which it adopted pursuant to I.C. §§ 40-313, 49-201(3) and 67-5203A. That section provides that "[t]raffic control devices shall be [placed] only by the authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction...." The Department argues that this provision expressly restricts its authority to place any signs beyond its right-of-way. We disagree for two reasons. First, the purpose of the rule is not to segregate the responsibility of sign-placement among the various highway authorities, as argued by the Department. Rather, when read in context, it is apparent that the rule is intended to prohibit advertisers and other private persons or organizations from placing signs along the highway right-of-way which do not comport with the Manual's regulatory purpose. ³

Second, where, as here, the legislature enacts a statute requiring that an administrative agency carry out specific functions, i.e., furnish, erect and maintain signs on side highways, that agency cannot validly subvert the legislation by promulgating contradictory rules. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). An administrative agency is limited to the power and authority granted it by the legislature. Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash.2d 368, 610 P.2d 857 (1980). See also Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 595 P.2d 309 (1979); Abbot v. State Tax Comm'n, 88 Idaho 200, 398 P.2d 221 (1965). Such delegated authority is primary and exclusive in the absence of a clearly manifested expression to the contrary. Fischer v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 107 Idaho 197, 200, 687 P.2d 587, 590 (Ct.App.1984). An agency must exercise any authority granted by statute within the framework of that statutory grant. Adams v. Industrial Comm'n, 26 Ariz.App. 289, 547 P.2d 1089 (1986). It may not exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge or diminish the provisions of the legislative act which is being administered. Cray v. Kennedy, 230 Kan. 663, 640 P.2d 1219 (1982); Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd., 228 Cal.App.2d 1, 39 Cal.Rptr. 192 (1964). Thus, although the legislature delegated some rule-making authority to the Department to adopt specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices, the Department was not thereby permitted to institute rules or policies limiting its ability to achieve its express statutory duties to place signs on side roads. Such rules would be in excess of the Department's rule-making authority, and therefore invalid and unenforceable.

The Department further contends that the ACHD accepted exclusive responsibility for placing necessary signs and performing necessary maintenance within the ACHD's jurisdiction, and for that reason the ACHD, and not the Department, is solely liable for any failure of that duty. As evidence of this contention, the Department refers to a letter it wrote in May of 1977, in which it opined that it lacked authority outside of its right of way, and relinquished to the various county highway districts, including the ACHD, its former role of placing traffic control devices on rural side roads approaching its highways....