Robertson v. American Airlines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 01-2426.,CIV.A. 01-2426. |
| Citation | 277 F.Supp.2d 91 |
| Parties | Kathleen ROBERTSON, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Gary Kohlman, Michael Sampson, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, for the plaintiff.
Ronald DeWald, Lipshultz & Hone, Silver Spring, MD, for the defendant.
GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING AS MOOT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This negligence action comes before the court on the parties' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Kathleen Robertson brings suit against defendant American Airlines ("AA") for compensatory and punitive damages resulting from thermalburn injuries she allegedly sustained during an AA flight. The defendant contends that the plaintiff's complaint is time-barred by the statute of limitations under the Warsaw Convention1 governing international air travel. The plaintiff argues that the Warsaw Convention does not apply to her complaint and that consequently her complaint is not time-barred. Because the AA flight on which the plaintiff sustained her injuries qualifies as "international transportation" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, the court concludes that the plaintiff's complaint is time-barred, grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and denies as moot the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.
At the time of the alleged injury, the plaintiff lived and worked in Virginia. Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Def.'s Statement") ¶ 15; Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Pl.'s Statement") ¶ 1. At the end of August 1998, the plaintiff was scheduled to go to Denver, Colorado on business. Def.'s Statement ¶ 2; Pl.'s Statement ¶ 24.
In August and September of 1998, the plaintiff made various travel arrangements, the booking and travel history of which are critical to this dispute. In early August, the plaintiff booked two round-trip flights through her agent at Gateway Travel, Nancy Thompson. Def.'s Statement ¶ 1; Pl.'s Statement of Disputed Material Facts ("Pl.'s Resp.") ¶ 1; Pl.'s Statement ¶¶ 5, 22, 25. First, on August 7, the plaintiff booked a round-trip British Airways ("BA") flight from Denver to London,2 leaving on September 2 and returning on September 8. Def.'s Statement ¶ 4; Pl.'s Resp. ¶ 4. Three days later, on August 10, the plaintiff booked a roundtrip AA flight from Washington, D.C. to Denver (via Chicago) leaving on August 29 and returning on September 8. Def.'s Statement ¶ 5; Pl.'s Resp. ¶ 5. As a result of these bookings, the plaintiff was scheduled to depart Washington for Denver on August 29; depart Denver for London on September 2; and depart London for Denver and Denver for Washington on September 8, as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date of booking Booking agent Date of flight Flight Airline
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thompson at
August 10 Gateway August 29 DC to Chicago to Denver AA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thompson at
August 7 Gateway September 2 Denver to London BA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thompson at
August 7 Gateway September 8 London to Denver BA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thompson at
August 10 Gateway September 8 Denver to Chicago to DC AA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Def.'s Statement ¶¶ 6-8; Pl.'s Resp. ¶¶ 6-8.
Two weeks later, on August 24, the plaintiff booked an additional flight through Gateway Travel: a one-way trip from London to Washington (via New York) on AA.3 Def.'s Statement ¶ 12, Def.'s Mot. Exs. 11-12; Pl.'s Resp. ¶ 12. Accordingly, five days before the plaintiff was to leave Washington, her itinerary included two options—one on September 8 and one on September 10—for her return to the United States:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date of booking Booking agent Date of flight Flight Airline
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thompson at
August 10 Gateway August 29 DC to Chicago to Denver AA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thompson at
August 7 Gateway September 2 Denver to London BA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thompson at
August 7 Gateway September 8 London to Denver BA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thompson at
August 10 Gateway September 8 Denver to Chicago to DC AA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 24 Unspecified September 10 London to New York to DC AA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Def.'s Statement ¶¶ 6-8, 12; Pl.'s Resp. ¶¶ 6-8, 12.
On September 2, as scheduled, the plaintiff flew from Denver to London. Pl.'s Statement ¶ 31; see generally Def.'s Statement of Disputed Material Facts ("Def.'s Resp."). On the same day that she arrived in London, however, the plaintiff changed her return itinerary.4 Def.'s Statement ¶¶ 9, 11; Pl.'s Resp. ¶¶ 9, 11. Specifically, she changed her September 8 London-Denver BA flight and Denver-Washington AA flight to September 10. Id. She did not, however, cancel her existing September 10 London-Washington AA flight. Def.'s Statement ¶ 13; Pl.'s Statement ¶ 13. As a result, she had two options—both leaving on September 10, but at different times—for her return to the United States:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight (with scheduled
Date of booking Date of flight departure/arrival times) Airline
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 7
(changed Sept. 2) September 10 London (10:20 am) to Denver (1:20 pm) BA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 10 Denver (4:32 pm) to Chicago to DC
(changed Sept. 2) September 10 (11:19 pm) AA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
London (8:00 am) to New York to DC
August 24 September 10 (2:10 pm) AA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Id. On September 10, the plaintiff took the BA flight from London to Denver, spent three hours in the Denver airport, and then took the AA flight from Denver to Washington via Chicago.5 Def.'s Statement ¶¶ 9-10; Pl.'s Resp. ¶¶ 9-10; Pl.'s Statement ¶¶32, 34-35. It was on the Denver-Chicago leg of the AA flight that the plaintiff sustained the thermal burns that form the basis for her complaint.6
On September 7, 2001, three years after the alleged injury, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Notice of Removal. The defendant, joined by then-defendant AMR Corporation ("AMR") (collectively, the "defendants") subsequently removed the action to this court. Id. On August 16, 2002, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On December 16, 2002, the court issued a memorandum opinion striking the defendants' motion for failure to comply with Local Civil Rule 56.1, directing the plaintiff to clarify her position with regard to AMR, and setting a new briefing schedule. Robertson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 5 (D.D.C.2002).
On January 15, 2003, the defendants filed a revised motion for summary judgment. On January 29, 2003, the plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal against AMR, leaving AA as the sole defendant in the case. The court now turns to the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.7
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P.56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are "material," a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nwokeji v. Arik Air
...Convention, art. 1(3), courts focus on objective evidence, rather than any subjective intent. See Robertson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 91, 98-99, 99 n.11 (D.D.C. 2003), aff'd, 401 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Courts have found the simultaneous issuance of tickets at one place suff......
-
Robertson v. American Airlines, Inc., 03-7129.
...D.C.Code § 12-301. The district court agreed with American and granted its motion for summary judgment. Robertson v. American Airlines, Inc., 277 F.Supp.2d 91, 100 (D.D.C.2003). II We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C.Ci......