Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills

• Decision Date: 25 June 1941
• Docket Number: No. 8657.,8657.
• Citation: 121 F.2d 285
• Parties: ROBERTSON v. ARGUS HOSIERY MILLS, Inc.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

121 F.2d 285 (1941)

ROBERTSON v. ARGUS HOSIERY MILLS, Inc.

No. 8657.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

June 25, 1941.

W. O. Lowe, of Knoxville, Tenn., and Herbert G. B. King, of Chattanooga, Tenn., for appellant.

Russell R. Kramer, of Knoxville, Tenn. (R. R. Kramer, J. W. Baker, and Poore, Kramer & Cox, all of Knoxville, Tenn., on the brief), for appellee.

Chas. H. Livengood, Jr., of Nashville, Tenn. (Gerard D. Reilly, Irving J. Levy, Robert S. Erdahl, and Geo. W. Crockett, Jr., all of Washington, D. C., and Chas. H. Livengood, Jr., of Nashville, Tenn., on the brief), for Philip B. Fleming, amicus curiae.

Before HICKS, ALLEN, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

ALLEN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for back wages, filed under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 29 U.S. C.A. §§ 201-219. Appellant was employed by appellee in its mill situated in Sevierville, Tennessee, and the petition alleged that the appellee, in violation of the Act, worked the appellant for longer hours and for less pay than is authorized by the statute. The appellee moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction because the amount in controversy is less than $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the District Court sustained the motion.

Appellant urges that since the statute authorizes recovery by the employee of double the amount of minimum or overtime wages due in cases where the employer has violated the statute, the suit is one for enforcement of a penalty, and that jurisdiction is conferred upon the District Court under Title 28, § 41(9), U.S.C., 28 U.S. C.A. § 41(9), which gives such courts jurisdiction of all suits and proceedings for the enforcement of penalties and forfeitures incurred under any law of the United States.

We are not in accord with this contention. The Fair Labor Standards Act, the pertinent provisions of which are printed in the margin,¹ describes the additional equal amount for which the employer shall be liable as "liquidated damages." Under familiar principles of law the conception of penalty is thus excluded from the provision. We see no reason for delving beneath this unequivocal term in order to spell out a meaning at variance with the intent expressed.

However, we think the court erred in dismissing the petition, for clearly it had jurisdiction of the controversy under Title 28, § 41(8), U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(8), which gives the District Courts jurisdiction of all suits arising under any law regulating commerce. If this suit arose under such a law, the citizenship of the parties and the sum or value in controversy is immaterial. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 46, 59 S.Ct. 648, 83 L.Ed. 1092; Turner, Dennis & Lowry Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 271 U.S. 259, 261, 46 S.Ct. 530, 70 L.Ed. 934; Louisville & Nashville Rd. Co. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201, 203, 38 S.Ct. 429, 62 L.Ed. 1071.

Obviously the appellant would not have been entitled to file this action if it were not for the enactment of the statute which creates the cause of action. Section 16(b), Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Title 29, § 216(b), U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b). The express purpose of the statute is to regulate commerce among the several states through the elimination of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of the workers. The statute has been held constitutional on the specific ground that it regulates interstate commerce. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. ___, 132 A.L.R. 1430; Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. ___.

We see no merit in the attempted distinction drawn by appellee that although the Act itself regulates commerce, a cause of action established under it and necessary to the enforcement of the Act does not arise under a law regulating commerce. Assuming, but not deciding that the statute conferring jurisdiction upon federal courts is construed more strictly than the commerce clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, the fact remains that this action falls within the precise terms of § 41(8), Title 28, U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(8). The action complies with the applicable tests of such proceedings as laid down by the courts in a long line of decisions, namely, that it grows out of the legislation of Congress (Tennessee v. Davis, ...