Robertson v. Bradbury

Decision Date16 December 1889
Citation33 L.Ed. 405,10 S.Ct. 158,132 U.S. 491
PartiesROBERTSON, Collector, v. BRADBURY
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for plaintiff in error.

Edward Hartley and Walter H. Coleman, for defendant in error.

BRADLEY, J.

This is a suit to recover alleged excess of duties exacted on certain cargoes of asphaltum in cakes, imported by Bradbury, the plaintiff below, from Antwerp, in May, 1883. Two questions are presented in the case for our determination: First, whether the seventh section of the act of March 3, 1883, entitled 'An act to reduce internal revenue taxation, and for other purposes,' went into effect at the time of the passage of the act, or not until the 4th of July following; secondly, if it did go into effect at the time of the passage of the act, whether, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff below was entitled to the benefit of that section. Prior to the passage of the act referred and the department holds that it takes sections of the Revised Statutes (which were taken from the ninth section of the act of July 28, 1866, 14 St. 330) the collector, in determining the 'dutiable value' of merchandise, was required to add to the cost, or actual wholesale price or general market value, at the time of exportation, in the principal markets of the country whence the goods were imported, the cost of transportation, shipment, and transshipment, with all the expenses included, from the place of growth, production, or manufacture, to the vessel in which shipment was made to the United States; also the value of the sack, box, or covering, and commissions and brokerage; which additions were to be regarded as part of the actual value, and a penalty was imposed for not including them. These sections were repealed by the seventh section of the act of March 3, 1883. They are repealed by words in the present tense, thus: 'That sections 2907 and 2908 * * * be, and the same are hereby, repealed, and hereafter noen of the charges imposed by said sections, or any other provisions of existing law, shall be estimated in ascertaining the value of goods to be imported.' We do not see how there can be any doubt that this repealing section went into immediate effect. The law itself went into immediate effect, although, it is true, various provisions of it, contained in other sections, were postponed to take effect, some on the 1st of July, and some on the 1st of May. But where such postponement was intended it was expressed, and only referred to the parts that were so postponed. It did not affect the section in question; and such was the understanding of the treasury department itself at the time. In a treasury circular of March 12, 1883, addressed to the collectors of customs, the secretary, referring to the act in question, then just passed, said: 'Various sections recite the date when each shall go into effect, and, so far as concerns these sections, those dates control. Section 7, however, names specifically no date when it is to go into operation, and the departnment holds that it takes effect from and after the date of the passage of the act.' This cotemporaneous construction is entitled to some weight in favor of importers. U. S. v. Johnston, 124 U. S. 236, 253, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446. At all events, it was undoubtedly the correct construction.

The question then arises whether the plaintiff below, by anything that took place in the entry of the goods at the custom-house, or by any omission to do what the law required, precluded himself from being entitled to the benefit of this statute. Under the old law, the cost or value of the goods at the place of production was often merged for convenience with the costs of transportation to the place of shipment and the other charges, and the aggregate was called the price or value 'free on board' of the vessel in which the goods were shipped to the United States. This price or value, 'free on board,' or 'f. o. b.,' in the absence of fraud, represented the 'dutiable value,' subject, of course, to correction by appraisement. When the vessel arrived, and the consignee presented the entry at the custom-house, it was accompanied with the invoice, showing this price or value. In the present case, although the goods were shipped in April, the consignors in Europe, not being aware of the passage of the act of March 3, 1883, repealing sections 2907 and 2908, made out the invoices in the usual way, stating the price of the goods as free on board at Antwerp, including therein the original cost of the goods at the mines, near Neufchatel, Switzerland, their cost of transportation from Neufchatel to Antwerp, and the other charges required by the repealed sections. This invoice was duly certified by the consul at Manheim, Germany. Before the entry of the goods, a corrected supplementary invoice had arrived, in answer to a telegram, and was presented at the time of the entry; but it had no consular certificate, that being supplied afterwards. On the trial of the cause, the plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show these facts. He produced the entry, which described the importation as '12,000 cakes, 300,000 kilometers, asphaltum, marks 15,750, $3,749,' with the usual consignee's oath that the invoice and bill of lading produced with the entry were the true and only ones received, and that the invoice exhibited the actual cost or fair market value at Neufchatel of the goods, and all charges thereon. The invoice, certified by the consul, on which the entry was based, was also produced in evidence, representing the goods as 'a quantity of asphaltum, 300,000 kilograms, at 52.50 marks per 1,000 kilograms, 15,750 marks, free on board, Antwerp.' There was attached to this invoice, on making the entry, and when produced in evidence, the uncertified, supplementary invoice before referred to, which represented the goods as 'a quantity of asphaltum, 300,000 kilograms; value at the mines, 34.50 marks per 1,000 kilos., M 10,350. Freight and charge from the mines to Antwerp, free on board, at 18 marks per 1,000 kilos., 5,400. Free on board Antwerp, marks 15,750.'

Attached to the consular invoice was the oath of the owner of the goods, which stated, among other things, that said invoice contained the actual cost and quantity thereof, and of all charges thereon. The certificate of the consul, attached to said invoice, was dated 20th of April, 1883, and certified, among other things, that the invoice, 'in which are mentioned and described certain asphaltum, amounting, with the charges thereon, to the gross sum of marks 15,750, was produced to him by the owner,' and that the actual market value of the goods, except as corrected by him, was correct and true. The plaintiff further offered evidence to show that, being charged with duties on the tntire amount of 15,750 marks, he protested against the assessment on the ground that the defendant 'assessed duty upon the cost of transportation, shipment, and transshipment, with all expenses included, from the place of production and the entire amount of 15,750 marks, he protested shipment was made to the United States, contrary to section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883;' claiming 'that said charges were not subject of appraisement or duty;' and, on a second ground, that the weigher's return howed a less quantity than that on which duty was charged, and that he paid the excess of duties exacted under compulsion solely for the purpose of obtaining the goods.

An appeal was taken to the secretary of the treasury, who affirmed the decision of the collector, on the ground that the deduction for charges had not been made in the entry, and the action was brought within proper time thereafter. A. W. Patterson, the plaintiff's custom-house broker, testified that he presented the two invoices above named at the custom-house on the entry of the goods; that he made the entry for the paintiff; that he asked to make the entry on both the consular and supplemental invoices, the latter as explanatory of the former;...

To continue reading

Request your trial
32 cases
  • v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • February 19, 1991
    ...a clear direction by Congress to the contrary, a law takes effect on the date of its enactment. See Robertson v. Bradbury, 132 U.S. 491, 493, 10 S.Ct. 158, 158, 33 L.Ed. 405 (1889); Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch 104, 119-120, 3 L.Ed. 671 (1815); see also 2 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statu......
  • Cunningham v. Potts
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
    • December 4, 1925
    ...621, 208 P. 67, 23 A. L. R. 1354; Robertson v. Frank Bros. Co., 132 U. S. 17-23, 10 S. Ct. 5, 33 L. Ed. 236; Robertson v. Bradbury, 132 U. S. 491, 501, 10 S. Ct. 158, 33 L. Ed. 405; Swift & Courtney & Beecher Co. v. United States, 111 U. S. 22-31, 4 S. Ct. 244, 28 L. Ed. 341; O'Shea v. Kava......
  • Jamison v. Collins
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • December 21, 1998
    ...at 470 (citing Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404, 111 S.Ct. 840, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991); Robertson v. Bradbury, 132 U.S. 491, 10 S.Ct. 158, 33 L.Ed. 405 (1889); Arnold v. United States, 13 U.S. 104, 9 Cranch 104, 119-20, 3 L.Ed. 671; Qasguargis v. INS, 91 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. ......
  • Schulte v. Beneficial Finance of Kansas
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Kansas
    • October 24, 1980
    ...statutory provision governs, a statute becomes effective on the day of its passage or enactment into law. Robertson v. Bradbury, 132 U.S. 491, 10 S.Ct. 158, 33 L.Ed. 405 (1889); Lapeyre v. U.S., 17 Wall 191, 84 U.S. 191, 21 L.Ed. 606 (1872). Conversely, if a statute itself schedules a speci......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT