Robertson v. California
Decision Date | 02 October 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 88-7619,88-7619 |
Citation | 110 S.Ct. 216,107 L.Ed.2d 169,493 U.S. 879 |
Parties | Andrew Edward ROBERTSON, petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
See 493 U.S. 985, 110 S.Ct. 525.
See 498 U.S. 926, 111 S.Ct. 309.
Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of California.
Denied.
Leave to File Second Petition for Rehearing Denied Oct. 15, 1990.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2973, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death penalty in this case. Even if I did not take this view, I would grant the petition because it raises the recurring issue whether evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct may be introduced at the sentencing stage of a capital trial. As I have noted before, see, e.g., Miranda v. California, 486 U.S. 1038, 108 S.Ct. 2026, 100 L.Ed.2d 613 (1988) ( ); Williams v. Lynaugh, 484 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct. 311, 98 L.Ed.2d 270 (1987) ( ), the States' highest courts have reached varying conclusions on this issue.
In addition, the petition poses a second question of profound constitutional significance: whether a defendant's waiver of his right to a jury in a capital sentencing proceeding is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent when no evidence indicates that he was aware of a state statute requiring the court to impose a life sentence if the sentencing jury failed to reach a unanimous decision. The California statute at issue here provides that "[i]f the trier of fact [at the sentencing stage] is a jury and has been unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall dismiss the jury and impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for life without possibility of parole." 1977 Cal.Stats., ch. 316, § 12. State high courts faced with the issue whether a defendant must be aware of similar capital sentencing provisions have reached differing conclusions. Compare Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 339-340, 455 A.2d 979, 984 (1983) ( ), with People v. Morgan, 112 Ill.2d 111, 141-142, 97 Ill.Dec. 430, 442-443, 492 N.E.2d 1303, 1315-1316 (1986) (, )cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1329, 94 L.Ed.2d 180 (1987).
In 1978, a jury convicted Andrew Robertson of murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the California Supreme Court vacated that sentence and remanded the case to the trial court. 33 Cal.3d 21, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279 (1982). In a second sentencing proceeding, Robertson indicated his intention to waive his right to a jury. The court then asked him several questions in an attempt to ascertain if Robertson was aware of the effects of a waiver. At no time during the colloquy did the judge read or paraphrase the jury deadlock provision; instead, the court simply stated: Pet. for Cert. 8. Robertson answered that he understood and then waived his right to a sentencing jury. He was again sentenced to death; this time, the California Supreme Court affirmed.
Robertson now claims that his sentence should be overturned because his agreement to waive a jury in the second sentencing proceeding was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Petitioner concedes that the court's instruction was literally correct; if the jurors were not unanimous in recommending life imprisonment, they could not return a verdict to that effect. It is also true, however, that if they were not unanimously in favor of death, even if only one juror refused to agree to the death penalty, then the court was required to order a term of life imprisonment.
In rejecting this claim the California Supreme Court clearly could not rely on the argument that the trial court's instruction fairly apprised Robertson of the relevant law. Rather, the court presumed as a matter of law that Robertson's counsel must have informed him of that part of the law as to which the trial court's statement was misleading. The court adopted this presumption in the absence of any evidence that Robertson's counsel had informed him, or indeed even knew, of...
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...relies on People v. Robertson, 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279 (1982), cert. denied, Robertson v. California, 493 U.S. 879, 110 S.Ct. 216, 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989), lacks As noted above, alleged errors of state law do not provide a basis for federal habeas relief. When a s......
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