Robertson v. Duncan

Decision Date04 December 2020
Docket Number2190473
Citation327 So.3d 1174
Parties Russell B. ROBERTSON and Amanda V. Robertson v. Anthony Lynn DUNCAN and Lonnie O. Duncan
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

* Note from the reporter of decisions: Judge Chappell, circuit judge, Jefferson County, was appointed to preside over this case upon the recusal of the circuit judges in the 14th Judicial Circuit.

Russell B. Robertson, Jasper, for appellants.

Jeffrey M. Sewell and Alana S. Beard of Sewell Sewell Beard, LLC, Jasper, for appellees.

EDWARDS, Judge.

Russell B. Robertson, who is an attorney, and Amanda V. Robertson appeal from a judgment entered by the Walker Circuit Court ("the trial court") (1) in favor of Lonnie O. Duncan and against the Robertsons on Lonnie's breach-of-contract claims and (2) in favor of Lonnie and his brother, Anthony Lynn Duncan ("Lynn"), on the Robertsons’ claims of slander of title and of violation of the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act ("the ALAA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 12-19-270 et seq. Lynn has not filed a brief on appeal.

The Robertsons are married. Their house in Walker County ("the home") was damaged by fire on the morning of May 4, 2017, after which they met with the Duncans regarding the repair of that fire damage. Each of the Duncans had been in the homebuilding business for over 30 years. The parties agree that the initial meeting eventually resulted in an oral agreement regarding fire-damage repairs, which have been performed and paid for to the extent that the parties did not otherwise agree to modify the work to be performed. The Robertsons also apparently had an agreement with HJJ, Inc., d/b/a Servpro of Walker County ("Servpro"), for Servpro to perform work on the home in preparation for the work they discussed with the Duncans.

The Robertsons and the Duncans disagree over whether the agreement regarding the fire-damage-repair work was made with Lynn (the Robertsons’ position at trial), with Lonnie (the Duncans’ position at trial), or with both of the Duncans (the trial court's conclusion following trial). Also, the Robertsons and the Duncans disagree regarding whether the Robertsons owed $15,145 for additional repair work that was not included within the $102,410 cost estimate provided for the fire-damage-repair work. See discussion, infra. It is undisputed that Amanda requested that Lonnie perform the specific items of additional repair work at issue, that Lonnie performed that additional repair work, and that Lonnie paid for all the supplies and materials for the additional repair work. The Robertsons disputed, however, that their agreement for the additional repair work was with Lonnie, who was a licensed homebuilder under Ala. Code 1975, § 34-14A-1 et seq. ("the Homebuilders Licensing Act"), at all times pertinent to the present case, and they disputed that they owed more than the $102,410 estimated cost of the fire-damage-repair work. Essentially, the Robertsons contended that $102,410 represented a cap for all the work that was performed by the Duncans because that amount was purportedly all the fire-insurance proceeds that were available to the Robertsons. The Robertsons also contended that any agreement they had was with Lynn, who had retired from homebuilding in 2013 and was a not a licensed homebuilder at any time pertinent to the present case.

On July 26, 2018, the Duncans filed a complaint in the trial court against the Robertsons. The complaint alleged claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and enforcement of a lien pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 35-11-210,1 the latter being based on a recorded "Mechanic's Lien" ("the lien document"), a copy of which the Duncans attached as an exhibit to their complaint. See Ala. Code 1975, § 35-11-213. The Duncans sought a judgment for $15,145,2 plus interest and costs, the enforcement of their purported lien, and, if the lien remained unsatisfied, the condemnation and sale of the home to satisfy the lien. The Duncans’ complaint referenced Lonnie and Lynn collectively as plaintiffs regarding the alleged claims. The complaint made no reference to any employment relationship, any other principal-agent relationship, or any contractor-subcontractor relationship between Lonnie and Lynn.

Regarding the Duncans’ claims for enforcement of the lien, it is undisputed that the lien document had been executed and filed by Lynn in the Walker Probate Court on February 15, 2018.3 The lien document provided a legal description and street address for the home and specifically stated, among other information, that Lynn was the "lien claimant" and that

"the [l]ien [c]laimant entered into a builder's contract, with the [Robertsons] to repair damage caused by a fire on said [home] for the original total sum of $102,410.00. [sic] And later for additional improvements to the [home] at the request of the [Robertsons] in the amount of $15,145.00, for a total sum of $117,555.00, which became due and payable upon completion of the requested build and/or project services."

The lien document referenced an alleged balance owed of $15,145, but it made no reference to Lonnie or to any relationship between Lonnie and Lynn. Nevertheless, at trial, the Duncans testified that Lynn was acting on behalf of Lonnie and at Lonnie's instruction when Lynn prepared and filed the lien document. See discussion, infra. Also, on July 27, 2018, the Duncans filed a notice of lis pendens referencing their pending action against the Robertsons.

The Robertsons filed an answer to the Duncans’ complaint and a counterclaim against the Duncans. The Robertsons’ answer denied most of the material allegations of the compliant and alleged various affirmative defenses to the Duncans’ claims, including the statute of limitations. As to the alleged work performed by the Duncans, the Robertsons admitted that they had entered into an agreement with Lynn to perform repair work for $102,410, but they denied that they had entered into any agreement with Lonnie or for the additional repair work for $15,145. The Robertsons’ counterclaim included claims of breach of contract against Lynn based on his purported failure to complete the repair work as required under their fire-damage-repair agreement (essentially, his failure to complete punch-list items); of slander of title by each of the Duncans based on the filing of the lien document and the filing of the notice of lis pendens, which allegedly had caused a sale of the home scheduled for late August 2018 to fall through; and of violation of the ALAA by each of the Duncans. The Robertsons also requested a judgment declaring the parties’ rights in the home pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-222. The Duncans filed a reply generally denying the allegations of the Robertsons’ counterclaim and alleging various affirmative defenses.

On May 29, 2019, the Robertsons filed a motion for a summary judgment seeking a judgment in their favor on the Duncans’ claims and a partial summary judgment in their favor with respect to their declaratory-judgment, slander-of-title, and ALAA counterclaims. Regarding Lynn's claims, the Robertsons argued, in part, that his claims were due to be denied because he was not a licensed homebuilder. See Ala. Code 1975, § 34-14A-14(d). On June 25, 2019, the Duncans filed their response to the Robertsons’ motion for a summary judgment. In part, the Duncans conceded that Lynn was unlicensed, but they argued that he had worked part-time for Lonnie since 2013, that the Robertsons’ agreement regarding the fire-damage-repair work and their alleged agreement regarding additional repair work were with Lonnie, and that the Robertsons were aware that Lynn was working for Lonnie when they made those agreements.4

On June 27, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the Robertsons’ motion for a summary judgment, indicated that it would likely grant the Robertsons’ motion for a summary judgment as to Lynn's claims, and thereafter held ore tenus proceedings on Lonnie's claims and the Robertsons’ counterclaims. On September 25, 2019, the trial court entered a judgment adjudicating the Duncans’ and the Robertsons’ respective claims ("the September 2019 judgment"). The September 2019 judgment granted the Robertsons’ motion for a summary judgment as to Lynn's claims but denied their motion for a summary judgment as to Lonnie's claims. Those rulings were based on findings that the "[Duncans] entered into [a] contract to repair the Robertsons’ home, which was damaged by fire, as a homebuilder as defined by" the Homebuilders Licensing Act, that Lonnie was licensed under the Homebuilders Licensing Act, that Lynn was not licensed under the Homebuilders Licensing Act, and that "said contract to repair the home ... was for an amount greater than $10,000." The trial court specifically cited Ala. Code 1975, former § 34-14A-2(10), which defined "residential home builder" when the Duncans performed their work on the home and commenced their action; that statute, in pertinent part, defined "residential home builder" as

"[o]ne who constructs a residence or structure for sale or who, for a fixed price, commission, fee, or wage, undertakes or offers to undertake the construction or superintending of the construction, or who manages, supervises, assists, or provides consultation to a homeowner regarding the construction or superintending of the construction, of any residence or structure which is not over three floors in height ..., or the repair, improvement, or reimprovement thereof, to be used by another as a residence when the cost of the undertaking exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000)."5

The trial court also referenced Ala. Code 1975, § 34-14A-5(a)(1), which states that "[a]ll residential home builders shall be required to be licensed by the Home Builders Licensure Board annually," and the trial court concluded that Lynn was barred from maintaining any action against the Robertsons, citing Ala. Code 1975, § 34-14A-14(d), which states: "A residential home builder, who does not have...

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