Robertson v. First Union Nat. Bank, No. 3491.
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
| Writing for the Court | HEARN, C.J. |
| Citation | 565 S.E.2d 309,350 S.C. 339 |
| Parties | Willie ROBERTSON, Raymond Brown and Richard Pinckney, individually, and d/b/a Hollywood Financial Enterprises, Inc., Appellants, v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK, formerly known as First Union National Bank of South Carolina, and Atlantic Appraisals, Respondents, v. United States of America by and through its agency, The Department of Treasury Internal Revenue Service, South Carolina Department of Revenue and Taxation and Charleston County Business License User Fees Department, Respondents. |
| Decision Date | 13 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 3491. |
350 S.C. 339
565 S.E.2d 309
v.
FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK, formerly known as First Union National Bank of South Carolina, and Atlantic Appraisals, Respondents,
v.
United States of America by and through its agency, The Department of Treasury Internal Revenue Service, South Carolina Department of Revenue and Taxation and Charleston County Business License User Fees Department, Respondents
No. 3491.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Submitted April 8, 2002.
Decided May 13, 2002.
Rehearing Denied June 19, 2002.
W. Andrew Gowder, Jr., of Pratt-Thomas, Pearce, Epting & Walker, of Charleston, for respondent First Union National Bank.
Stephen P. Groves, Sr., H. Michael Bowers and Stephen L. Brown, all of Young, Clement, Rivers & Tisdale, of Charleston, for respondent Atlantic Appraisals.
LaVerne H. Manning, of U.S. Attorney's Office, of Columbia, for respondent United States of America.
Joe S. Dusenbury, Jr., of SC Department of Revenue, of Columbia, for respondent SC Department of Revenue and Taxation.
Samuel W. Howell, IV, of Howell & Linkous, of Mt. Pleasant, for respondent Charleston County Business License User Fees Department.
Willie Robertson, Raymond Brown, and Richard Pinckney (Appellants) brought an action against First Union National Bank (Bank) and Atlantic Appraisals (Atlantic) claiming they were harmed by entering into a mortgage agreement secured by property with an over-estimated appraisal value and alleging various causes of action. Bank and Atlantic filed motions for summary judgment on all causes of action. The trial judge granted the motions. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1993, Appellants entered into an agreement with Robert P. Chaplin, III, to purchase a piece of commercial property located in Hollywood, South Carolina. The parties agreed upon a purchase price of $200,000, and Appellants made no attempt to negotiate for a lower price.
After agreeing to purchase the property, Appellants approached Bank to obtain financing. Bank executed a commitment letter of intent to loan Appellants the purchase money "not to exceed $160,000.00 or 80% of the appraised value, whichever is less," to be secured by the real estate. Bank then requested that Atlantic prepare a written appraisal of the property. The appraisal showed the market value of the property in November 1993 was $200,000. Both Robertson and Brown testified they did not see the 1993 appraisal until 1998.
Appellants executed a note and mortgage in favor of Bank for the principal loan amount of $160,000.00. The mortgage provided that Appellants would be responsible for paying off the balance of the debt in five years. At the end of the mortgage period, a balloon payment was due and Bank again hired Atlantic to appraise the property.
G. Hammond Bamberg, III, performed the 1998 appraisal and testified that in 1993, "the building was in good condition and in the photographs it was all painted up and nice looking and really did look good and apparently it was a hundred percent occupied at the time." Bamberg testified that the Hollywood rental market had declined since 1993. Moreover, Bamberg noted that "paint was peeling off' the building, "shrubs were growing through the compressor," and the building
When the final $133,000 payment was due, Appellants defaulted, and Bank commenced foreclosure proceedings. However, before the property could be sold, Appellants filed a complaint against Bank alleging six causes of action for: (1) fraud, (2) civil conspiracy, (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) breach of contract, and (6) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. Bank answered and counterclaimed for foreclosure. Appellants later amended their complaint to add Atlantic as a party defendant to the causes of action for civil conspiracy, negligent misrepresentation, and unfair trade practices.
Both Bank and Atlantic filed motions for summary judgment. At the summary judgment hearing, Appellants argued the discovery process was not yet complete. They also produced an unsigned "Appraisal Review" document dated July 26, 1999, prepared by Fred J. Attaway, Jr., as the opinion of an expert witness questioning the 1993 appraisal performed by Atlantic. Appellants requested the court to "keep the record open" so that they could provide the court with a copy of Attaway's statement. Respondents objected to the introduction of the document as being untimely presented. The trial judge excluded Attaway's Appraisal Review and granted summary judgment on all of Appellants' causes of action.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is appropriate when it is clear there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Toomer v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co., 344 S.C. 486, 489, 544 S.E.2d 634, 635 (Ct.App. 2001); see also Rule 56(c) SCRCP. Summary judgment is not appropriate, however, where further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of the law. Carolina Alliance for Fair Employment v. South Carolina
DISCUSSION
I. Ongoing Discovery
Appellants first argue that summary judgment was premature because they did not have a chance to finish discovery. We disagree.
Appellants' original complaint against Bank was filed on January 25, 1999, and their amended complaint adding Atlantic as a defendant was filed more than a year later on May 23, 2000. Bank answered the original complaint in March 1999 and Atlantic answered the amended complaint in May 2000. However, before Atlantic was added as a party, Charles Middleton, owner of Atlantic, was deposed on December 21, 1999 and April 25, 2000. Atlantic did not file its motion for summary judgment until August 1, 2000.
Under these facts, Bank and Atlantic were clearly authorized under our rules of procedure to file their summary judgment motion. "A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 30 days from the commencement of the action ... move ... for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof." Rule 56(a), SCRCP (emphasis added).
In this case, although Respondents' motions for summary judgment were filed less than three months after Atlantic was made a party, the motions were filed more than a year after Appellants initiated the action and more than eight months after Middleton's initial deposition. We agree with the trial court that any further depositions would not have assisted Appellants. Generally, it is not premature for the trial court to grant summary judgment after all relevant parties have been deposed because the litigants have had a full
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In re Devey, Case No. 17-05751-JW
...(S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (Breach of contract must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.).23 See Robertson v. First Union Nat'l Bank , 350 S.C. 339, 565 S.E.2d 309, 314 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (Fraud must be proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.).24 In the Petersons' Statement o......
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Feeley v. Total Realty Management, Case No. 1:08cv1212 (GBL).
...by insufficient collateral did not constitute an unfair act or practice that affected the public interest. Robertson, 350 S.C. at 350-51, 565 S.E.2d 309. This Court adopts the analysis of the Robertson court. Insufficient allegations have been made to begin to state a claim that the practic......
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Angus v. Burroughs & Chapin Co., No. 3744.
...(2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, (3) which causes the plaintiff special damage." Robertson v. First Union Nat. Bank, 350 S.C. 339, 348, 565 S.E.2d 309, 314 (Ct.App.2002) (citing Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norris, 292 S.C. 595, 600, 358 S.E.2d 150, 152 (Ct.App.1987)). "A civil co......
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Faile v. SC Dept. of Juvenile Justice, No. 25434.
...to the court order. While Semler does not equate the § 319 duty with the "custodial entity's duty to obey court orders," we find § 319 to 350 S.C. 339 be, as decided by the Fourth Circuit, "close to the point." Id. This Court is reluctant to impose the duty to control unless there is an est......
-
In re Devey, Case No. 17-05751-JW
...(S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (Breach of contract must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.).23 See Robertson v. First Union Nat'l Bank , 350 S.C. 339, 565 S.E.2d 309, 314 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (Fraud must be proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.).24 In the Petersons' Statement o......
-
Feeley v. Total Realty Management, Case No. 1:08cv1212 (GBL).
...by insufficient collateral did not constitute an unfair act or practice that affected the public interest. Robertson, 350 S.C. at 350-51, 565 S.E.2d 309. This Court adopts the analysis of the Robertson court. Insufficient allegations have been made to begin to state a claim that the practic......
-
Angus v. Burroughs & Chapin Co., No. 3744.
...(2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, (3) which causes the plaintiff special damage." Robertson v. First Union Nat. Bank, 350 S.C. 339, 348, 565 S.E.2d 309, 314 (Ct.App.2002) (citing Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norris, 292 S.C. 595, 600, 358 S.E.2d 150, 152 (Ct.App.1987)). "A civil co......
-
Faile v. SC Dept. of Juvenile Justice, No. 25434.
...to the court order. While Semler does not equate the § 319 duty with the "custodial entity's duty to obey court orders," we find § 319 to 350 S.C. 339 be, as decided by the Fourth Circuit, "close to the point." Id. This Court is reluctant to impose the duty to control unless there is an est......