Robertson v. Lion Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 April 1896
• Citation: 73 F. 928
• Parties: ROBERTSON et al. v. LION INS. CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

73 F. 928

ROBERTSON et al. v. LION INS. CO. et al.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Virginia.

April 24, 1896

Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, Blackford, Horsely & Blackford, and A. W Nowlin, for complainants.

Peatross & Harris, for defendants.

Before SIMONTON, Circuit Judge, and PAUL, District Judge.

SIMONTON Circuit Judge.

This is a bill to set aside an award made after a loss by fire pursuant to the terms of a policy of insurance. The complainant is a merchant of Lynchburg, Va., engaged in the ready-made clothing business. He sustained the loss, and is dissatisfied with the award.

The law on the subject is not disputed. It is clearly stated in 4 Minor, Inst. 152. Awards can be set aside only for:

'(1) Improper conduct of the arbitrators; (2) improper conduct of the parties, or one of them; (3) illegality or injustice apparent on the face of the award itself.'

It is stated clearly and fully by Mr. Justice Grier in Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 350:

'Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes, it should receive every encouragement from courts of equity. If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation. ' In order,' says Lord Thurlow (Knox v. Symmonds, 1 Ves.Jr. 369), 'to induce the court to interfere, there must be something more than an error of judgment, such a corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake, either apparent on the face of the award or to be made out by evidence; but, in case of mistake, it must be made out to the satisfaction of the arbitrator, and that, if it had not happened, he should have made a different award. Courts should be careful to avoid a wrong use of the word 'mistake,' and, by making it synonymous with mere error of judgment, assume to themselves an arbitrary power over awards. The same result would follow if the court should treat the arbitrators as guilty of corrupt partiality, merely because their award is not such a one as the chancellor would have given. We are all too prone, perhaps, to impute either weakness of intellect or corrupt motives to those who differ with us in opinion.'

The question, then, resolves itself into a question of fact. The insured and the insurer not being able to agree upon the amount of the loss, a resort was had to the arbitration clause in the policy. The insured proposed as his arbitrator R. B. Schenck, of Lynchburg. The insurer proposed a name of its arbitrator. The person named was promptly objected to by the assured. The name was withdrawn, and A. C. Westbrook, of Atlanta, was named and was accepted in his stead. The bill is filled with grave charges against the character and judgment of this arbitrator. But the record fails to disclose any evidence whatever reflecting upon his character, either as an experienced or as an honest man. The two arbitrators, having been sworn according to law, proceeded to select an umpire to decide between them in case they should differ. This umpire was selected, before they had begun possibly, certainly before they had compiled their own appraisement; and very properly. Then, before the possibility of a heated discussion over differences of opinion, they could more easily agree upon an umpire. A gentleman from Richmond was selected. His business...